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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis analyses the stock market synchronicity of 34 emerging markets and compares the 
findings with seven developed markets. The study uses weekly stock return data and the final 
dataset includes approximately 20.8 million weekly observations for 40,014 firms across the 
world.  
 Morck et al. (2000) are among the first to introduce the topic of stock market 
synchronisation and argue that stock markets in economies with high per capita GDP move in 
a relatively unsynchronised manner over time, in contrast to stock prices in low per capita 
GDP economies. They also suggest that stock synchronicity is associated with 
macroeconomic indicators including rule of law, inflation, corruption and geographical size. 
In addition, Skaife et al. (2006) propose a further measure of stock synchronicity based on the 
proportion of zero returns and argue that the zero-return measure is a superior measure of 
stock market co-movement. The study uses both measures proposed by Morck et al. (2000) 
and one measure proposed by Skaife et al. (2006) for synchronicity analysis and extends the 
analysis to cover a ten year period, a larger sample of shares and more recent measures of 
country specific characteristics. 
 It is found that stock markets in emerging economies are more synchronous than in 
developed economies over the sample period using the classical measure. It is also found that 
over the 10-year study period the synchronicity measure is stationary. There is evidence of a 
statistically significant negative correlation between stock synchronicity and both government 
accountability and corruption for the emerging markets using the cross-sectional analysis. 
 The R-square measure of stock synchronicity averages 0.091 for the emerging markets 
and 0.045 for the developed economies, suggesting that higher stock price co-movement is 
evident in emerging economies. Further, there is a statistically significant positive correlation 
between the R-square measure and both corruption and inflation. There is also a negative 
correlation evident between the R-square measure and government accountability. In addition, 
it is found that in civil law countries R-square measures are generally higher than in common 
law countries. 
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 The study also uses the zero-return measure of stock synchronicity suggested by Skaife 
et al. (2006). It is found that the zero-return measure for emerging economies is higher than 
for developed economies. Surprisingly, China and the S&P 500 group of companies exhibit 
the lowest values for the zero-return measure during this period, which is inconsistent with 
the classical measure and the R-square measure. Further, panel data analysis shows that GDP 
per capita and trade openness have a strong effect on the zero-return measure. 
 The Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation coefficient indicate that the 
classical measure and the R-square measure are positively correlated and appear to capture 
similar aspects of the markets in the study, which is also consistent with cross-sectional 
analysis results. In contrast, the zero-return measure shows either insignificant or negative 
correlation with the classical measure and the R-square measure for most sub-period and full 
period analysis. 
 Finally, there is evidence that emerging stock markets are more synchronous over time 
than in developed financial markets. It is found that common-law country stock synchronicity 
is lower than in civil-law countries or post-communist countries using the classical measure 
and the R-square measure. There is evidence that the classical measure and the R-square 
measure are positively correlated, whereas the zero-return measure is statistically insignificant 
or negatively correlated with both the classical measure and R-square measure, suggesting 
that the zero-return measure captures different aspects of stock market behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
1.1    History of the topic 
It is often argued by the academic researchers that stock prices in emerging economies are 
more synchronised over time than those in developed economies. This is not only because 
developed economies have a higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; it appears that 
there are several other factors which directly and indirectly affect the capital markets of these 
economies, such as low rate of corruption, strong investor protection rights, political stability 
and low inflation. Stock synchronicity can be explained in terms of the tendency of share 
market prices to move in the same direction over a particular period of time. Morck et al. 
(2000) argue that stock prices in economies with a high per capita GDP move in a relatively 
unsynchronised manner over time, in contrast to stock prices in low per capita GDP 
economies. They argue that low GDP per capita economies tend to be undiversified which 
makes firm-level earnings more correlated. Further, Morck et al. (2000) find that low-income 
economies often cannot provide proper protection of property rights for investors.  
 Additionally, Morck et al. (2000) propose two models to capture the tendency for stock 
return synchronicity. The first model captures the broad, market-wide movements in share 
prices for individual firms for a particular period, referred to as the Classical Synchronicity 
Measure. The second model is the market model of R-square measure. This captures the level 
of firm-specific price movement that is reflected in overall share market prices. The thesis 
will use both of these models to measure stock price synchronicity for developed and 
emerging markets. The study will also use the zero-return synchronicity measure developed 
by Skaife et al. (2006) as an alternative measure. Skaife et al. (2006) use the zero-return 
measure in their analysis of six equity markets (the sample includes Australia, France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA) and argue that the zero-return measure better captures 
stock price synchronicity for an equity market.  
 The published literature in the area of stock market synchronicity is limited and this 
thesis contributes to the literature through its focus on the emerging equity markets. The 
thesis uses the three measures to capture the stock synchronicity of emerging markets and 
compares the findings with a selection of developed equity markets. Additionally, the thesis 
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compares these three synchronicity measures to access the impact of the choice of measure. It 
is important to determine how closely correlated these measures are.  
 It is found that stock synchronicity is important for a range of players in the market. 
There is evidence that synchronous stock market has greater market wide risk of individual 
assets pricing and market wide firm effects are less important for individual firms. Thus, 
stock synchronicity is important for arbitrage traders, analyst and for noise traders.  
 The study analyses all available stock prices from the DataStream database for 34 
emerging markets and seven developed markets around the world. The emerging markets 
span a range of legal origins (for example, common law, civil law and post-communist 
origin), equity market size and geographical location. La-Porta et al. (1998) examine legal 
systems around the world and the impact of investor rights protection. They find that 
common-law countries generally provide the strongest protection of investor rights in contrast 
to civil law countries. In addition, Morck et al. (2000) argue that weak investor rights 
protection reflect poor structural systems in a country, leading to market-wide share price 
swings.  
 A sample of 12 emerging countries with common law origin, 19 emerging countries 
with civil law origin, three emerging countries with post-communist origin and seven 
developed economies have been selected for the analysis. The developed countries are 
selected on the basis of equity market size. Further, the study includes both the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the S&P 500 groups of companies for the USA. The sampled 
shares include both dead and live stocks from the DataStream database to avoid the 
survivorship bias problem. The study period is from January 1996 to December 2005.  
 
1.2   The importance of the topic 
Stock synchronicity is an important characteristic of emerging market economies as it has 
been shown to be closely related to economic development and stock market stability. It also 
has implications for asset pricing, noise traders and for the investors. Further, stock 
synchronicity is also closely related to corporate governance mechanisms. For example, 
Morck et al. (2000) argue that corporate governance mechanisms are more effective when the 
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stock synchronicity is lower. They also find that stock synchronicity is closely related with 
the protection of property rights and argue that highly synchronous markets are inefficient 
markets. However, there is a literature related to this topic dealing with trading volume and 
cross autocorrelation, though this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 The study is important for the several reasons. First, stock synchronicity is measured for 
emerging markets and compared with the developed economies. Roll (1988) argues that stock 
synchronicity can push the value of a stock from its fundamental value and this over- or 
under-valuation of stocks can adversely affect the overall equity market. Further, Campbell et 
al. (2001) argue that large investors are exposed to greater risk as stock synchronicity 
increases. Indeed, stock synchronicity is an important factor for developed market economies 
as well as for the emerging market economies. 
 Second, the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, corruption, 
inflation, GDP per capita, trade openness and stock synchronicity is analysed. Roll (1988) 
argues that when stock prices begin to fall, various corporate governance mechanisms come 
into effect. Further, Morck et al. (2000) argue that corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. 
investor rights protection and government regulatory controls) are more effective in less 
synchronous economies (developed economies). The study investigates the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the stock synchronicity of emerging markets. 
 Third, three different synchronicity measures are used in analysis of stock market 
synchronisation. The measures are the classical synchronicity measure, the R-square measure 
and the zero-return measure. The thesis compares these three synchronicity measures with a 
view to determining how closely related they are. It is also important to assess whether the 
three measures capture the same features of a stock market.   
 
1.3   Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter two contains a literature review and chapter 
three explains the methodology and the data used in the thesis. Chapters four, five and six use 
the three different synchronicity measures in an analysis of emerging and developed markets. 
A comparison between the three synchronicity measures is provided in chapter seven. 
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 Chapter eight concludes the thesis, summarising the major findings of the research and 
emphasising the major contribution of this study to the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 2  Literature review 
 
 
2.1   Synchronicity definition 
Synchronicity refers to the tendency for the stocks in a share market to move in the same 
direction. The stock co-movement direction can be upwards or downwards depending upon 
the trend in the market. It is argued that stock prices in poor economies are more synchronised 
over time than those in rich economies. However, finding a definition of stock market 
synchronicity is not an easy task. Roll (1988) argues that stock market synchronicity depends 
on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-wide information capitalised into stock 
prices. In addition, Morck et al. (2000) suggest that stock prices in high per capita GDP 
economies move in a relatively unsynchronised manner. In contrast, stock prices in low per 
capita GDP economies tend to move up or down together. 
So we can define synchronicity as the co-movement of stocks of a share market in a 
particular period of time. Measuring stock synchronicity is a difficult task because this 
involves analysis of market-wide share price co-movement. For example, the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the USA has approximately 4,0491 firms listed in its stock 
market. To measure stock synchronicity of the NYSE, the study needs to collect each firm’s 
weekly observations for a relatively long period of time, in our case 10 years. This could 
include about 2 million weekly firm observations. 
 
2.2   Synchronicity measures 
The most widely accepted measures of stock price synchronicity are proposed by Morck et al. 
(2000). They argue that synchronicity can be measured in different ways although they 
propose two approaches: 
1. Classical synchronicity measure 
2.  R-square measure 
                                                 
1
 According to DataStream database on July 28, 2006 
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 The third model of stock synchronicity is developed and proposed by Skaife et al. 
(2006) and is known as the zero-return days measure. 
2.2.1   Classical synchronicity measure 
 
The first model expresses the broad, market-wide movements at a particular time as a ratio 
that focuses on the tendency of stocks to move in the same direction. This model is referred to 
as the classical stock synchronicity measure. Morck et al. (2000) use this model to capture 
stock price synchronicity over a period of time for the market as a whole.  
The classical synchronicity measure is defined by the following formula: 
 
[ ]
down
jt
up
jt
down
jt
up
jt
jt
nn
nnMAXf
+
=
,
        
(1) 
   
Here, jtf
 
is the fraction of the stock of country j in week t . upjtn is the number of the 
stock in country j whose prices rise in week t and downjtn is the number of stocks whose 
prices fall.  
The classical synchronicity measure captures market-wide share price co-movements 
over a relatively short period of time, such as a given week. The other measures (R-square 
measure and zero-return measure) require relatively longer periods to capture share market 
price co-movement. It should be noted that the synchronicity measures captures the tendency 
of stock prices to move together. It is not based on a particular asset pricing model though it 
does have the ability to reflect firm specific information within a market. 
However, the main strength of the classical synchronicity measure is that it is a simple 
model to capture stock price co-movement for a particular period of time. This measure 
requires only individual firm stock market return data to calculate market-wide share price co-
movement. In contrast, one limitation of the classical synchronicity measure is that it requires 
market-wide stock return data by individual firm, which might be difficult to obtain. In 
addition, this measure is unable to provide individual firm-level stock synchronicity values, 
which are important for firm-level stock synchronicity analysis. 
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2.2.2   R-square measure 
The second approach is the market model R-square estimate using all available firms in the 
share market. This approach captures levels of firm-specific information reflected in share 
prices. The R-square measure of stock price synchronicity is probably the most widely used 
method of capturing stock price co-movement in the literature. This measure captures stock 
price synchronicity at individual firm level, which is then averaged to give a country-level 
measure. It should be noted that, the R square measure of stock synchronicity is not expected 
to exhibit mean reversion over time. Higher R-square values indicate greater stock price 
synchronicity and lower R-square values indicate lower levels of stock price synchronicity.  
The R-square is a strong measure to capture firm-level stock price synchronicity. This 
model measures the correlation between a firm’s stock return data and market return data for 
a given period, which is generally considered  to provide an accurate picture of stock market 
synchronous behaviour.  
However, the R-square synchronicity measure is not able to capture stock market 
synchronicity for a short period of time, such as over a given week. In addition, this measure 
requires stock return data and market return data from individual firms to measure R-square 
synchronicity, which is a lengthy process. 
2.2.3   Zero-return measure 
The zero-return measure is a relatively new model developed by Skaife et al. (2006), who 
argue that the R-square statistics do not provide a reliable market-level measure of stock 
market synchronicity. They propose an alternative model to capture stock price synchronicity 
more effectively than the existing classical synchronicity and R-square measures. They argue 
that if the value of information signals is not sufficient to exceed the trading cost, then the 
marginal investor will not trade. Further, if the marginal investor stops trading then there will 
be no change in price and this will result in a zero-return day. 
The zero-return days measure captures the variation in stock price synchronicity 
across firms due to the differences in firm-specific information. However, this model requires 
each firm’s long-term stock return data to capture the market co-movement. 
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2.3   Recent literature 
2.3.1   Synchronicity and its determinants  
 
Morck et al. (2000) argue that share prices in stock markets in emerging economies move 
more closely together than in those of developed markets. They use bi-weekly return data to 
measure stock return synchronicity for 40 countries around the world, including 15,920 firms. 
They use data from 1993 to 1995 for time series analysis and the 1995 data for cross-sectional 
analysis. They argue that highly diversified conglomerate2 companies account for a large 
fraction of stock market values and that widespread inter-corporate ownership might cause 
firms to move together.  
Morck et al. (2000) find that stock price synchronicity is negatively correlated with a 
country’s geographical size and positively correlated with GDP growth and earning co-
movements. They argue that a ‘small country effect’ causes the higher stock price co-
movement found in smaller countries. This finding is further supported by Levine and Zervos 
(1998), who argue that smaller countries often have unstructured financial markets leading to 
lower financial growth when compared to developed financial markets. In addition, Morck et 
al. (2000) find that stock price synchronicity could be affected by the number of stocks in a 
stock market. They argue that countries with fewer listed firms have stock markets that are 
more volatile and exhibit higher stock price synchronicity. Nevertheless, they argue that 
financial markets in emerging economies are more volatile because of the sharp changes in 
monetary policy and the higher inflation rate. For example, a sudden change in monetary 
policy is a quite common phenomenon along with changes in government in a country such as 
Indonesia.  
Jin and Mayers (2006) examine the link between measures of corporate transparency 
and the R-square based measure of stock synchronicity. They find that in a more transparent 
environment, proportionately more firm-specific information is revealed to outside investors. 
As a result, market-wide information explains a smaller proportion of the overall return 
variation, resulting in lower levels of synchronisation and a lower average R-square for the 
market. 
                                                 
2
 A group of diverse companies run as a single organisation 
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Additionally, Morck et al. (2000) use three good governance indices as proposed by 
La-Porta et al. (1998) for cross-sectional analysis − government corruption, risk of 
expropriation by the government and risk of government repudiation of contracts. The indices 
range from zero (0) to ten (10), with zero indicating poor governance and 10 indicating strong 
governance. Morck et al. (2000) find that lower stock price co-movement exists in countries 
with better protection of private property rights and higher stock price co-movement exists in 
countries where private property rights are not strongly respected. They find that countries 
with poor protection of private property rights are mostly emerging countries, whereas higher 
levels of property rights protection are evident in developed economies. They also find that 
higher GDP per capita countries rank higher in good governance index values. For example, 
countries such as Germany, France, the UK and the USA score higher in the good governance 
indices and these countries also have higher GDP income per capita. Further, they find that 
those good governance indices are significantly correlated with capital market size. These 
findings suggest that capital market size is an important explanatory factor for stock 
synchronicity.  
Morck et al. (2000) also argue that stock prices in economies with high per capita 
GDP are less synchronised than stock prices in low per capita GDP economies. They find that 
low GDP economies tend to be undiversified which makes firm earnings highly correlated, 
such that country-wide political instability is more likely to cause market-wide share price 
swings in emerging economies. Therefore, share prices in emerging economies tend to be 
more synchronous than in developed economies.  
Li et al. (2003) argue that individual stocks are becoming more synchronous for the 
average country in the sample. They examine the Canadian stock market and compare this 
with Mexico and the East Asian markets3, finding that Canadian stocks move less 
synchronously than Mexican stocks. They also find that since Canada entered into the free 
trade agreement with the US, its stocks have exhibited a permanent increase in firm-specific 
variation because of increased market openness to the US market. In contrast, when Mexico 
entered into NAFTA with the US its stocks exhibited a strong temporary increase in stock 
price synchronicity. They argue that developed economies like Canada, with well-developed 
                                                 
3
 Li et al. (2003) use R-square synchronicity measures for their cross-sectional analysis. 
    
 
10 
institutions, exhibit permanent increases in firm-specific stock return variation, whereas 
emerging economies exhibit temporary increases in share price co-movement due to these 
types of openings. In addition, they find evidence of similar types of temporary stock price 
co-movement in the East Asian financial markets as a result of economic liberalisation. It is 
argued that East Asian economies exhibited strong economic growth in the early 1990s but 
failed to maintain this growth due to their weak economic infrastructure. Li et al. (2003) 
suggest that in the 1990s individual firm synchronicity fell for the average country’s stock 
market and they argue that the implementation of comprehensive institutional reforms in the 
1990s in certain East Asian economies was followed by very large increases in the firm-
specific variations between individual stocks. They find that institutional reform in such 
countries decreased market-wide economic fluctuations and also reduced market-wide stock 
price variation.  
They argue that institutional reforms reduce the overall synchronicity of individual 
stock prices. For example, following strong political and economic reforms in Poland, 
inflation dropped dramatically. In the Soviet era Polish inflation was running at three-digit 
numbers (585.8 percent in 1990) but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Poland 
reformed its monetary and political policy, inflation dropped to a one-digit number within a 
few years (2.1 percent in 2005). This dramatic change in inflation was made possible by the 
liberalisation of monetary policy and the development of close economic ties with the 
Western world. Li et al. (2003) propose that less synchronous stock prices prevail in better 
functioning economies and highly synchronous stock returns tend to reflect poor economies. 
Skaife et al. (2006) use the R-square synchronicity measure, which is associated with 
firm-specific information in an international setting, to conduct several analyses using data 
from the six largest equity markets in the world4. They find that lower R-square values are 
associated with more informative prices in Australia and higher R-square values are 
associated with more informative prices in Germany, Japan and the USA. In addition, they 
find a statistically significant association between future earnings and returns, conditional on 
R-square values, in France and the UK. They argue that there are significant differences in 
                                                 
4
 Skaife et al. (2006) use the six largest equity markets of the world for their R-square synchronicity analysis. 
Their sample countries are Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA. 
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voluntary information flow, ownership structures, trading activity and market frictions across 
countries and this affects the price formation process in these markets.  
Skaife et al. (2006) conduct five different analyses using the data from the six sample 
countries. Their first analysis is based on the work of Morck et al. (2000), who suggest that 
stock synchronicity measures are associated with the more informative prices from the 
individual firms. However, Skaife et al. (2006) find that lower R-square values are not 
associated with more informative stock market prices in Australia, France, Germany, Japan, 
the UK and the USA. Moreover, they find that higher R-square values are associated with 
more informative prices in Japan, Germany and the USA. They do not find any statistically 
significant association between a firm’s future earnings and the R-square values in France and 
the UK and so they reject the hypothesis that lower R-square values are associated with more 
informative prices and suggest that higher R-square values could also be associated with 
greater informative prices in some countries, such as Japan. Further, they state that R-square 
based measures of stock synchronicity are not good measures of stock price co-movement. 
They suggest that R-square statistics are not able to reflect fully the informativeness of stock 
prices in a country. 
Their second analysis, which examines the correlation between the R-square measure 
of stock synchronicity and analyst forecast error, finds evidence of a positive correlation in 
Australia, France, Germany, the UK and the USA − the only exception being Japan. 
However, they find evidence that firms with higher R-square values have lower analyst 
forecast error, which contradicts the findings of Li et al. (2003).  
In addition, Skaife et al. (2006) test whether firms that cross-list in the USA stock 
market lower their stock price synchronicity measures in Australia, France, Germany, Japan 
and the UK. According to the US law, cross-listing registration requires more information 
disclosure by foreign firms in the USA. They find no evidence that R-square values decline 
after cross-listing on the USA stock market. In contrast, they find that R-square values for 
French and UK firms increase after cross-listing. This surprising result seriously questions the 
reliability of the R-square synchronicity measure for cross-country analysis and stock 
synchronicity analysis.  
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Skaife et al. (2006) also examine the correlation between synchronicity measures and 
proxy firm informativeness variables that are reflected in the stock prices5, finding some 
inconsistent correlations between R-square synchronicity measures and information proxies 
across the sample countries. This inconsistency raises further questions concerning the 
reliability of the R-square statistic measure for stock price synchronicity. 
Skaife et al. (2006) argue that R-square statistics are not a reliable measure of stock 
market synchronicity and propose an alternative model. Based on the work of Bekaert et al. 
(2003), they suggest that the proportion of zero-return days provides a simple, accurate 
measure that captures firm-specific information.  
They repeat their analysis using the proportion of zero-return days metric and find a 
significant and consistent relationship between the zero-return metric and information 
proxies. They recommend the proportion of zero-return days6 as a better measure of stock 
price synchronicity than the traditional models, and this measure appears to capture the 
frequency of information arrival which tends to result in lower zero-return days.  
The concept of stock market synchronicity is not new to the literature of finance and 
economics. For example, French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) argue that high stock prices 
and a well-informed market generate low stock synchronicity. Roll (1988) shows that the 
movement of stock prices depends on several related factors which include firm-level and 
market-level information that is capitalised into stock prices. They find that the US stock 
returns are more volatile during exchange trading hours compared with non-trading hours. 
They argue that private information is the principal factor behind high trading time variance. 
Conversely, both French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) suggest that most variations in 
stock prices reflect proprietary firm-specific information.7 
                                                 
5
 The proxy firm informative variables include quality of firm information flow, firm size, turnover and industry 
regulation.  
6
 Alternatively, zero-return metric.  
7
 Further work on correlation is done by Brennan et al. (1998) while it is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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2.3.2   Co-movement across international markets 
Karolyi and Stulz (1995) investigate the co-movement between the USA and Japanese stock 
markets focusing on the daily stock return data. They find evidence that the US and the 
Japanese cross-country return covariance exhibits a strong ‘day of the week’ effect and 
covariance is higher for Monday returns than for other days. They also find evidence that firm 
covariance in returns is not as high on days of US macroeconomic announcements. They 
suggest therefore that the global component of national macroeconomic announcements has 
only a small effect. In addition, Karolyi and Stulz (1995) state that there is a nonlinear 
relationship between covariance and international stocks. Essentially, the large overnight 
returns of Japanese stocks lead to higher covariance in the next day’s stock returns on the US 
stock market. Indeed, there is evidence that overnight return covariance is greater for similar 
firms. 
Longin and Solnik (1995) analyse the correlation of monthly excess returns for seven 
major countries for the period from 1960 to 1990. They find evidence that correlation 
increases over time and large stocks drive the correlations. In addition, they find that 
correlation is driven by dividend yield and interest rates. They use a GARCH model with 
constant conditional correlation for their analysis and find that international correlation is 
unstable over time, although growing international financial integration around the world 
could lead to a progressive increase in international market correlation. They argue that 
international market correlation is higher when the stock markets are volatile, especially when 
the markets are down. In addition, they argue that growing political, economic and financial 
market integration affects international financial market co-movement, as more integrated 
economies are influenced by global market factors. The progressive increase in the number of 
internationally integrated equity markets will lead to higher correlation between firms 
worldwide. They further argue that the progressive removal of international investment 
barriers8 affects international market co-movements. It is suggested, however, that 
macroeconomic announcements contain information for daily and intra-day share market 
returns which may cause the larger stocks to move in the same direction.   
                                                 
8
 Such as financial, political and legal barriers. 
    
 
14 
Longin and Solnik (1995) find that international equity market correlation is 
increasing, particularly over the past 30 years and further, the increase in correlation is 
accompanied by an increase in volatility. There is also some evidence that economic 
variables, such as dividend yield and interest rates, contain information about future volatility 
and correlation.  
Wurgler (2000) proposes that capital flow is more responsive to value added in 
countries where firm-specific variation is a greater part of the total variation of individual 
stock returns. He suggests that capital moves faster to higher-value uses where stock prices 
move less synchronously. Thus, stock synchronicity is higher in low GDP economies than in 
high GDP economies.  
Nguyen and Aman (2006) observe that corporate governance mechanisms are 
positively correlated with higher stock price valuation and market valuation in the Japanese 
stock market. They construct three critical dimensions for governance indices: board 
structure, ownership composition and disclosure policy, suggesting that ownership structure is 
one of the most important factors in determining a firm’s performance. Further, they argue 
that accounting transparency has a positive effect on a firm’s market valuation.  
 
2.4   Explanatory variables 
As one of the main objectives of this thesis is to compare the measures of stock synchronicity, 
the study can not focus on the firm-specific variables but rather it focuses particularly on the 
country-wide stock market synchronicity variables. It has been argued that stock price 
synchronicity is influenced by several economic factors such as corporate transparency, 
information disclosure and GDP per capita. It is argued that these factors are influential in 
explaining stock market co-movement for an emerging market. For example, Morck et al. 
(2000) use macroeconomic instability, small country effects, economic and managerial 
diversification, synchronous fundamentals and inflation as stock synchronicity descriptive 
variables and suggests that these variables help to explain stock price co-movement in 
emerging markets.  
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In addition, Dasgupta et al.(2006) argue that corporate transparency and stock price 
synchronicity are strongly correlated, suggesting that greater transparency indicates early and 
timely disclosure of firm-specific information. Accordingly, stock synchronicity decreases as 
corporate disclosure and greater transparency increase. They use corporate transparency and 
cross-listing (ADR) disclosure as descriptive variables for their stock synchronicity analysis. 
In contrast, Chan and Hameed (2006) use the trading volume of stocks as a descriptive 
variable to explain stock synchronicity for individual firms. They find that size of the firms 
has a strong impact on market-wide share price swings and that, when the number of stocks 
within a market is small, a few large companies tend to dominate overall market movements. 
Thus, there is evidence of two approaches in the literature. While the first focuses on country-
level analysis, the second looks more closely at individual firm-based effects. In this thesis 
the focus is on country-wide effects, rather than firm-specific effects. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the explanatory variables used in recent cross-sectional analyses 
of share market synchronicity. The table shows that Morck et al. (2000) use only the classical 
synchronicity measure, while Skaife et al. (2006) use both the zero-return and R-square 
measures. The R-square measure has been used in every study to date as a measure of stock 
co-movement analysis, although Skaife et al. (2006) have recently criticised it. 
Most of the published literature concentrates on firm-level cross-sectional analysis 
rather than country-level analysis of stock synchronicity. For example, Durnev et al. (2004a) 
use corporate diversification, industry size, leverage, advertising spending and R&D 
spending; Durnev et al. (2004b) use industry size and industry structure variables; Baker et al. 
(2003) use market capitalisation of the firm, growth rate, market value traded and growth rate 
of sales variables, while Skaife et al. (2006) use research and development expense, analyst 
earnings forecast, proportion of shares, standard deviation of sales, standard deviation of 
ROA, market value of equity and average weekly turnover.  
Given the focus of this thesis on country-level analyses, the study does not rely on 
firm-level explanatory variables in statistical analysis. Further, while a number of explanatory 
variables have been proposed in the literature they are not all statistically significant. For 
example, Morck et al. (2000)  use several country-level and firm-level explanatory variables 
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in their analysis, though few of the firm-level variables are found to be statistically significant 
(e.g. earnings co-movement index and firms variance index). 
 
Table  2.1  Summary of stock synchronicity measures and explanatory variables 
Recent literature analysis 
 
No Author and year Explanatory variables used Measure used 
1 Morck et al. (2000) Property rights, good governance index**, no of 
stock listed in the market**, anti-director right index, 
GDP per capital*, geographical size*, earning co-
movement index, variance on GDP growth. 
R-square measure 
Classical Measure 
2 Skaife et al.(2006) Firm’s research and development expense**, 
analysts forecast earnings**, standard deviation of 
ROA**, market value of equity**, average weekly 
turnover ** 
R-square measure 
Zero-return measure 
3 Li et al. (2003)  Trade openness, capital openness**, good 
governance, Asian crisis dummy, real crisis dummy, 
Peso dummy. 
R-square measure 
4 Durnev et al. (2003) Industry structure**, size*, diversification**, past 
earnings volatility, volatility of beta, institutional 
ownership, research and development expenses, past 
industry returns, future dividends explanatory power. 
R-square measure 
5 Durnev et al. (2004b) Size, liquidity**, leverage**, advertising expenses*, 
R&D expenses**, firm-specific stock return 
variation, absolute systematic stock return variation, 
relative firm-specific stock return variation**, 
absolute firm-specific fundamental variation**, 
corporate diversification, relative firm-specific 
fundamental variation, Herfindahl index**. 
R-square measure 
6 Chan and Hameed (2006) Synchronicity, analyst coverage*, size**, trading 
volume, firm capitalisation. 
R-square measure 
7 Durnev et al. (2004a) Market size, initial GDP*, inflation, trade openness*, 
government size**, bank credit, market 
capitalisation*, rule of law, educational expenses.  
R-square measure 
Note:   
* represents the significant level by 5 percent and ** indicates the significant level by 10 percent. 
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A suite of country-level indicator variables has become available in recent times and the 
explanatory power of these variables is a primary focus of this analysis. They include 
corporate transparency, information disclosure, political connectivity, legal rule and market 
openness, although the study also includes commonly used control variables such as GDP per 
capita and country size for the analysis of stock synchronicity in emerging markets. The 
following section will discusses these explanatory variables and their ability to explain stock 
price co-movement in emerging markets. 
2.4.1   Corporate transparency and information disclosure 
Lack of corporate transparency and poor information disclosure can lead to high levels of 
stock price synchronicity. It is argued that countries with poor information disclosure and a 
lack of corporate transparency exhibit higher stock price synchronicity. For example, Chan 
and Hameed (2006) suggest that emerging markets exhibit poor information disclosure and 
lack of corporate transparency and this increases the cost of collecting firm-specific 
information. As a result, security analysts tend to generate their earnings forecasts based on 
macroeconomic information. Hence, the share prices of firms with poor corporate 
transparency in emerging markets generate less firm-specific information leading to greater 
levels of synchronicity in share price movements across the market.  
Further, Durnev et al. (2004b) and Durnev et al. (2003) find that higher firm-specific 
stock price variation is associated with higher information content about future earnings. 
While Piotroski and Darren (2004) find that stock price synchronicity increases with analyst 
coverage, they argue that analysts specialise by industry and greater industry and market-wide 
information tends to get impounded in stock prices. 
In contrast, Jin and Mayers (2006) examine the link between corporate transparency 
and synchronicity and they find that in a more transparent environment, proportionately more 
firm-specific information is revealed to outside investors. Therefore, market-wide information 
explains a smaller proportion of the overall return variation, resulting in lower levels of 
synchronisation. 
Dasgupta et al. (2006) present a simple model to illustrate that a more transparent 
information environment can have an ambiguous effect on measures of stock synchronicity, 
particularly R-square measures. They suggest that the R-square measure can increase 
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subsequent to an improvement in corporate transparency through two channels. First, greater 
transparency (cross-listings) leads to timely disclosure of firm-specific information about 
future events. So when future events eventually take place there is less surprise news about 
shares, resulting in a higher R-square. Second, greater transparency allows financial market 
participants to gain access to firm-specific information, such as managerial quality, leading to 
a higher R-square. This critique seriously questions the standard synchronicity measure, the 
R-square, developed by Morck et al. (2000). 
However, corporate transparency and information disclosure have an effect on stock 
price synchronicity. Poor information disclosure and the lack of corporate transparency are 
often cited as the main causes of higher stock price synchronicity in emerging economies, 
examples of which include Poland, Malaysia and Indonesia. Yet, well-structured financial 
markets with good information disclosure and corporate transparency are argued to exhibit 
low levels of stock price synchronicity, for example Germany, Australia and the UK.  
2.4.2   Legal environment 
A country’s legal structure (origin) has a strong effect on the protection of investor rights. For 
example, French-based civil law origin countries generally provide weaker protection of 
investor rights compared to countries of English-based common law origin. La-Porta et al. 
(1998) examine the legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, 
the origin of these rules and the enforcement quality for a sample of 49 countries. They argue 
that there are important differences in investor protection attributed to the legal origin of a 
country. Further, countries with weak investor protection limit investor participation in the 
capital markets and encourage private ownership. They divide the world into three basic legal 
origin categories: German- and Scandinavian-based civil law countries, French-based civil 
law countries and English-based common law countries. They find that French-based civil 
law countries have the weakest investor protection and the least developed capital markets 
compared with English-based common law countries.  
La-Porta et al. (1998) also examine voting rights, ease of participation in corporate 
voting and legal protection against expropriation by management. They argue that common 
law countries provide shareholders and creditors with the strongest protection and French-
based civil law countries the weakest. In addition, the quality of law enforcement is the 
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highest in countries based on Scandinavian and German civil law and weakest countries based 
on French civil law. Further, La-Porta et al. (1998) examine the anti-director rights of these 
countries, which also include voting rights.9 They argue that common law countries offer the 
best legal protection to their shareholders. They also find that 94 percent of common law 
countries provide protection to minority shareholders, which is the highest for the three 
categories. For example, common law countries allow shareholders with as little as 9 percent 
of total share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting, which is the lowest 
percentage for the three legal systems. In contrast, La-Porta et al. (1998) argue that French-
based civil law countries offer the least legal protection to their shareholders. They find that 
such countries require around 15 percent of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders 
meeting. In addition, they find that the aggregate anti-director rights score for French-based 
civil law countries is the lowest of the three legal systems. 
Durnev et al. (2004b) and De Long et al. (1990) state that an institutional environment 
which protects private property rights is an important precursor to economic growth. They 
suggest that property rights protect shareholder rights in emerging economies, which leads to 
higher productivity and higher economic growth. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
Shleifer (1994) argue that a very high ownership concentration may reflect poor investor 
protection. It is found that a higher incidence of ownership concentration is evident in civil 
law countries. They also examine ownership concentration in the largest publicly traded 
companies in their sample and find a strong negative correlation between concentration of 
ownership and the quality of investor protection. This argument suggests that countries with a 
high level of ownership concentration often provide weak investor protection.  
2.4.3   Country size 
The debt and equity market size of a country often depends on the geographical size of that 
country. It is argued that most of the countries of the world conduct the major part of their 
trading internally. Large countries often have structured debt and equity markets which 
directly influence the growth of the economy (Australia, Canada, Germany and the USA) and 
they generally have larger capital markets. In contrast, smaller countries tend to have fewer 
                                                 
9
 Anti-director rights measures the quality of law enforcement in favoring minority shareholders against the  
managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision-making and voting processes. 
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large firms in their capital market. These few large firms can manipulate the financial 
markets, which could lead to higher stock price synchronicity. For example, Morck et al. 
(2000) argue that the size of the economy is an important factor in explaining stock market 
synchronicity. They state that economic activities in less developed economies are 
concentrated in a small geographical area, while large economies are more likely to be 
diversified across geographical area and across several industries. They suggest that small 
economies are likely to be more specialised with a few large firms comprising a large portion 
of economic activity. Levine (1998) also argues that smaller countries often have smaller debt 
and equity markets and poor investor protection rights; associated with higher stock price 
synchronicity.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) argue that developed countries have large structured debt 
and equity markets and these structured financial markets contribute to economic growth. 
They state that countries with developed financial markets have superior growth in capital-
intensive sectors. In addition, they argue that size of the country also helps the local firms to 
produce locally and gives the economy superior growth opportunities. Further, they state that 
a firm in a large country (China, India and Brazil) has competitive cost advantages over one 
in a small country. These countries have higher GDP growth rates despite structural problems, 
and large population size also gives these countries a competitive advantage over smaller 
countries. 
Further, financial markets in large countries tend to be more structured than markets in 
smaller countries and capital market manipulation is more difficult due to the large number of 
companies participating in these markets (Bernstein and Weinstein, 2002). In contrast, few 
big firms exist in small economies and so it is possible for them to manipulate the financial 
market (Islam, 1988; Islam and Khaled, 2005; Security-And-Exchange-Commission, 1998). 
Thus capital market size gives the large economies a better functioning and less synchronous 
stock market.  
2.4.4   Political connection 
The political connections of firms play a vital role in the business sectors of emerging 
economies. Firms with close political connections often receive undue favours from the 
government and in countries with higher corruption rates this situation is even more critical. 
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For example, Shleifer (1994) argues that politicians in developing countries are very 
influential in the business and financial sectors. He states that a politician can shut down a 
business or even refuse to start a business using a variety of tactics such as licensing 
requirements, legislation and repudiation of commitments. In addition, Fisman (2001) finds 
that approximately 25 percent of the market values of Indonesian companies are related to 
political connections. Further, Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) find that politically well-
connected firms also attract more investment opportunities for foreign investors. They analyse 
130 Indonesian firms which represent over 80% of the Indonesian market capitalisation in 
December 1996 and find that firms with close political connections do receive undue favours 
from the Government. 
Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) analyse the link between a firm’s political connections 
and international financing, using the data from Indonesian firms. They find evidence that 
foreign security and political connections under the Suharto regime were legitimate and firms 
with close ties to the regime were less likely to use foreign debt or equity markets. They argue 
that political relationships influence global financing for local firms10. Firms connected with 
the Suharto regime did not participate in global financial markets because they attracted 
benefits from the regime as long as Suharto was in power. When the connection to Suharto 
was lost due to the change in leadership, raising capital from abroad became a more fruitful 
solution for those no longer politically well-connected firms.  
Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) argue that political ties influence the performance of 
Indonesian firms in two ways. First, firms with strong political connections underperformed 
during the Asian financial crisis. Second, investments in political relationships stopped paying 
off when the Suharto Government was replaced. They suggest that investments in political 
ties are less desirable for long-term loans in such environments where political stability does 
not exist. An example is an Indonesian firm called Golden Key, which had a close political 
relation with the former Suharto regime. Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) state that ‘Golden Key 
is a little-known chemical and manufacturing group, which received an unsecured loan of 
$430 million from the state-owned Bank Pembangunan Indonesia. Court proceedings 
subsequently revealed that Hutomo Mandala Putra, the youngest son of President Suharto, 
                                                 
10
 Leuz and Oberholzer. (2006) also argue that firms closely connected with the Suharto regime tended to under- 
perform during the time of the Asian financial crisis. 
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was an early investor in Golden Key and had introduced the firm to bank officials who 
approved the loan at ‘neck-breaking speed’’(McBeth, 1994) 
This is a common phenomenon in emerging economies and the main reason that firms 
in emerging economies are less interested in raising capital globally. On the other hand, 
politically well-connected firms can receive cheap government funding and so a large 
proportion of well-connected firms in emerging markets are not keen to raise capital abroad. 
For example, Faccio et al (2006) and Wiwattanakantang et al (2006) show that firms with 
political connections often receive cheap loans from state-owned banks in emerging markets.  
Finally, Leuz and Oberholzer (2006) state that long-run political connections could be 
hazardous at times for emerging market firms. Political connections can lose their value 
overnight when the government fails to win an election, or when the current leaders are 
deposed. They suggest that the performance of firms with close political connections is very 
much dependent upon the political situation at the time. 
2.4.5   Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is an influential factor in determining stock 
synchronicity. It is argued that financial markets in high GDP per capita economies are 
diversified into a large number of firms, where as poor GDP per capita economies tend to 
concentrate on a few large firms, which could manipulate the share market and push share 
prices from their fundamental value. For example, Morck et al (2000) suggest that stock 
prices in economies with high per capita GDP move in a relatively unsynchronised manner in 
contrast to stock prices in low per capita GDP economies. They argue that low GDP per 
capita economies often cannot provide proper protection of property rights and country-wide 
political instability causes market-wide share price swings. Durnev et al. (2004a) also propose 
that stock returns in low-GDP per capita economies (including economies in transition) tend 
to move synchronously.  
In addition, low GDP per capita economies also tend to have higher corruption rates 
and smaller debt and equity markets, and private property rights are not properly respected in 
low GDP per capita economies in general. For example, Chan and Hameed (2006) show that 
poor information disclosure and lack of corporate transparency causes higher stock price co-
movements and market-wide share price swings in emerging markets. They argue that 
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emerging economies have higher inflation and higher unemployment rates, and that corporate 
governance mechanisms are less effective in these economies. 
2.4.6   Corporate governance mechanisms 
It is often argued that stock market synchronicity is closely related to the real market 
economy and this has implications for corporate governance. For example, Morck et al. 
(2000) show that corporate governance mechanisms are more effective when the stock market 
begins to fall. In addition, they suggest that strong property rights promote detailed firm-
specific information releases, leading to lower stock price synchronicity. Thus, it is argued 
that greater levels of stock synchronicity are expected in countries with poor corporate 
governance systems. 
Morck et al. (2000) found that corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder 
lawsuits, proxy contests and executive stock options, are the major influential factors in 
explaining the difference between poorly-run companies and well-developed firms. They state 
that corporate governance mechanisms are more effective when more differentiable, firm-
specific performance is available through existing information channels. This thesis uses two 
corporate governance indicators for the synchronicity analysis collected from the World 
Bank. These indicators are voice and accountability and the regulatory control of the 
government, which are explained in detail in the data chapter. 
 
2.5   Conclusion 
It has been argued that emerging economies produce higher stock synchronicity due to weak 
infrastructure and less respect for investor protection rights. Academics use a number of 
explanatory variables to justify higher stock market synchronicity in emerging markets. For 
example, Morck et al. (2000) find that country size and GDP per capita affect stock price 
synchronicity in emerging markets. Further, Leuz and Oberholzer (2006), Durnev et al. 
(2004a) and Fisman (2001) also find that political connection and legal environment have a 
strong impact on emerging market stock co-movement. This study focuses on a set of 
explanatory variables drawn from the literature in explaining stock market synchronicity at 
the country level; these are corporate transparency, regulatory control, voice and 
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accountability, inflation, trade openness, GDP per capita and country size index. The thesis 
does not include the firm-level explanatory variable as it is not the main objective of this 
research.  
Finally, it is found from the existing literature that stock markets in emerging 
economies are more synchronous over the time than in developed markets. Higher stock 
synchronicity is evident from countries that do not respect private property rights, and 
corporate governance mechanisms are less effective in those economies. It is also found that 
higher inflation and low levels of corporate transparency cause higher stock synchronicity in 
emerging economies.  
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CHAPTER 3 Methodology and data 
 
 
3.1   Research methodology 
This thesis uses three stock synchronicity measures to capture stock price co-movement. The 
first and second measures are proposed by Morck et al. (2000) and the third has been 
developed by Skaife et al. (2006).  In addition, this thesis also uses t  test statistics, ANOVA, 
VAR, autocorrelation, ADF test statistics and panel data analysis for time series and cross 
sectional analysis. The following sections discuss research methodology and different 
analytical tool used for this research. 
3.1.1 Measure One: Classical synchronicity measure 
The first stock synchronicity measure is the classical synchronicity measure. Developed by  
Morck et al. (2000), it is a model designed to capture the tendency for stock price co-
movement. It analyses market-wide share price movement in a particular period and focuses 
on the tendency of stocks to move in a same direction right across the market. The following 
equation illustrates the classical synchronicity measure developed by Morck et al. (2000). 
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(2)
 
Here, jtf
 
is the net change in price (whether up or down) of the stock of country j in 
week t . upjtn is the number of the stock in country j whose prices rise in week t  and 
down
jtn is the number of stocks whose prices fall.   
This measure has a maximum of 1.0 for markets where the share prices are perfectly 
synchronised and a minimum of 0.5 where there are equal numbers of rises and falls over the 
period, consistent with a market where prices are not synchronised. The classical stock 
synchronicity measure is further explained by the following example. 
  Assume country A has four listed firms available in its stock market, firms A, B, C and 
D (Table 3.1). The following table illustrates the weekly share prices of these listed firms over 
a five-week period. 
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Table  3.1  Example: Classical synchronicity measure 
 
Week Company A Company B Company C Company D 
    
1 5 5 10 8 
2 6 4 11 7 
3 7 5 12 6 
4 6 4 11 9 
5 7 4 10 9 
 
 
In week one, the share price for firm A is $5, firm B is $5, firm C is $10 and firm D is 
$8. In week two, the share prices of firm A and C increase, but share price for firm B and D 
drops. Now by inserting this information into the classical stock synchronicity measure 
developed by Morck et al. (2000) stock synchronicity for week two is: 
JTf       =  22
]2,2[
+
MAX
      (3) 
                                                            =   0.50 
Therefore, stock synchronicity for week two is 0.50 or 50%. This indicates that there 
are equal numbers of share price increases and decreases for this week. Stock synchronicity 
for week three, four and five can also be calculated by using the same formula. Table 3.2 
provides stock synchronicity measures for weeks two, three, four and five. 
 
Table  3.2  Results: Classical measure example 
 
 
  
 
 Table 3.2 shows that in week three stock synchronicity is 75% with three share prices up 
and one share price down. In week four, stock synchronicity is also 75% with three share 
prices down and one with share price up. For week five, one share price is up and one share 
price is down and two share prices remain unchanged, resulting in 50% stock synchronicity.  
Week Up % share Up Down % share down Synchronicity 
 
  
 
 
 
  
1 0 0 0 0 --- 
2 2 50% 2 50% 0.50 
3 3 75% 1 25% 0.75 
4 1 25% 3 75% 0.75 
5 1 25% 1 25% 0.50 
    
 
27 
Classical stock synchronicity is a relatively simple measure that is used to capture 
stock price co-movement. This study will use this model as the first measure to capture 
market wide share price synchronicity. 
3.1.2 Measure Two: R-square measure 
The R-square synchronicity measure is the most popular model in the literature for capturing 
stock market synchronicity. Chan and Hameed (2006) argue that R-square statistics provide 
an alternative measure of stock price synchronicity. They use this measure to explain analyst 
coverage for emerging markets and argue that emerging economies exhibit higher stock price 
co-movement due to the high cost of collecting firm-specific information in emerging 
economies. Further, Roll (1988) suggests that individual stocks in the USA exhibit low R-
square statistics, which indicates a low level of stock price co-movement for the US economy. 
He argues that the availability of firm-specific information in the USA stock market may 
explain the low R-square.  
Morck et al. (2000) are among first who propose R-square statistics as an alternative 
measure of stock synchronicity. They argue that lower firm-specific information is produced 
in emerging markets which results in higher R-square values, while higher firm-specific 
information produced in developed markets results in lower R-square values. They state that 
emerging economies often have higher stock synchronicity due to poor corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, Jin and Mayers (2006) argue that countries with higher R-square 
values experience more frequent market crashes.  
Given the simple market model, share return can be expressed as a fraction of share 
market return: 
    tiitmiiti RR ,,, εβα ++=       (4)
  
where tiR , is the firm i return for period t , itmR , is the market return of firm i for t period, 
ti ,ε is the error term and 1α  and iβ are estimated parameters. The 2R measure is the 
percentage of variation in weekly return of stock i in country j explained by variations in 
country j ’s market return, or: 
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where Cov( mi RR ) is the covariance between the share returns and share market returns and  
iσ  is the standard deviation for asset i  and mσ  is the standard deviation for asset m. 
A high R-square indicates a high degree of stock return synchronicity and a low R-
square indicates a low degree of stock return synchronicity for a given stock for a particular 
period of time. This study uses R-square as the second measure of stock return synchronicity.  
3.1.3 Measure Three: Zero-return measure 
The zero-return measure is a comparatively new model for capturing stock market 
synchronicity. Skaife et al. (2006) first proposed this measure, claiming that it is a better 
model to capture stock synchronicity. They argue that marginal investors have information 
about share prices in the market. If the value of an information signal is insufficient to exceed 
the trading cost, then the marginal investor will not trade the share and there is no change in 
price, leading to a zero-return days.  
The thesis defines zero-return measure as a model of the frequency of information 
arrival for a particular share in a given time. The zero-return measure can also be used as a 
model of information efficiency for a share market. 
The proportion of zero-return days is measured by calculating the number of zero-
return trading days over a fiscal year divided by the total number of trading days in that fiscal 
year. A zero-return day is a day on which the price of a particular share does not change  
The zero-return measure is calculated as follows: 
   100Re ×=
YeartheinDaysTradingTotal
DaysturnZeroofNoNOZRD      (6) 
 
The following example illustrates the calculation of the zero-return measure. Referring 
to the previous example, the number of zero-return days can be easily calculated. Table 3.3 
illustrates the number of zero-return days for firms A, B, C and D. 
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Table  3.3  Example: Zero return measure 
 
Week Firm A Return Firm B Return  Firm C Return  Firm D Return  
              
1 5 N/A 5 N/A 10 N/A 8 N/A 
2 6 0.200 4 -0.200 11 0.100 7 -0.125 
3 7 0.167 5 0.250 12 0.091 6 -0.143 
4 6 -0.143 4 -0.200 11 -0.083 9 0.500 
5 7 0.167 4 0* 10 -0.091 9 0* 
Average   0   25   0   25 
 
The figure with star illustrates the zero-return days for firms A, B, C and D. Week one 
provides no return data for this sample because of the lack of previous trading day data. 
Weeks two, three and four provide a mix of return data (positive and negative) for each firm. 
However, week five produces zero-return trading days for firms B and D in this example. In 
addition, the zero-return measure for firm B and D is 25 percent and the zero-return measure 
for this stock market is 12.5 percent ((0+0.25+0+0.25)/ 4).  
3.1.4 Panel data 
Panel data is one of the most important types of data analysis methods, combining both cross-
sectional and time series analysis. One of the major advantages of panel data is that it can 
observe multiple cases at two or more time periods for one firm. This study uses panel data 
analysis in chapter four, five and six. According to Dougherty (2007) the setup of the panel 
data model can be described by the following equation: 
ititi Xy εβα ++=           (7) 
 
Where,  
α  = intercept of the population 
β  = vector of parameter to be estimated on explanatory variable 
itX  = vector of observation on the explanatory variables for country i at time t . 
itε  = random error for country i at time t . 
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There are two types of panels, a balanced panel and an unbalanced panel. Balanced panels has 
the same number of time series observations for each cross sectional unit, where as 
unbalanced panels have some cross sectional elements with fewer observations or 
observations to different time to other. 
Panel data models can include group effects, time effects or both. These effects are 
modelled using either fixed effect or random effect. This thesis uses fixed effect panel 
analysis. The fixed effect model examines group differences in intercepts, assuming the same 
slopes and constant variance across groups. Fixed effect model can be described in the 
following equation. 
 
ittiitit uXy +++= ααβ          (8) 
 
Where,  
β  = vector of parameter to be estimated on explanatory variable 
itX  = vector of observation on the explanatory variables 
iα   = fixed effect to be estimated for each country 
tα  = fixed effect estimated for country i at time t . 
itu  = error term for country i at time t . 
 
3.1.5 ANOVA 
ANOVA is a general technique that is used to test the hypothesis that the means among two 
or more groups are equal; under the assumption that the sampled populations are normally 
distributed (Brooks, C., 2008). The thesis uses ANOVA test statistics for comparing the mean 
between groups of countries, especially between developed and emerging country group.  
 
The ANOVA test statistics can be describe by the following equation derived from Levine et 
al. (2005) 
MSW
MSAStatisticsTestANOVA =        (9) 
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Where, MSA = mean square among or variance of the group mean and MSW = mean square 
within or variance of mean within. The ANOVA F  statistics is F distributed. However, 
MSA and MSW can also be denoted by the following formula. 
 
1−
=
c
SSAMSA
            (10) 
SA is the sum of square among the group and c  is the number of groups or levels being 
compared, and  
 
cn
SSWMSW
−
=
          (11) 
Where, SSW is the sum of square within the group, n is the number of observation in group 
and c  is the number of group. 
 
3.1.6 VAR 
Vector Auto Regression (VAR) is a popular econometric model, which is used to capture the 
interdependencies between multiple time series. VAR is considered a kind of hybrid between 
the univariate time series models and it is a very useful for describing the dynamic behaviour 
of economic time series. The thesis uses VAR models for estimating and forecasting the 
relationship between geographical region time series behaviour. Following Wooldridge, J. 
(2006) and Brooks, C. (2008), VAR can be denoted by following equation: 
 
tttpttt eyAyAyAcy +++++= −−− ......2211        (12) 
 
Where c is a constants (intercept), 1A  is matrix, ty  is a vector of time series variables and te  
is vector of error terms. 
 
3.1.7 Auto Correlation  
Autocorrelation is the correlation between values of a process at different points in time 
(Dougherty, 2007; Levine et al., 2005). The Autocorrelation function is very useful for 
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finding repeating patterns in a signal or a time series. The autocorrelation function can be 
defined by the following equation: 
 
itt
ttCoviAC
−
−
= δδ
αα
,
1, ),()(
         (13) 
Where, ),( ittCov −αα  is the covariance of tα  and it−α  and tδ is the standard deviation of t  
and it − . 
An autocorrelation coefficient could have a value ranging from negative one to positive 
one. A value of positive one (+1) represents perfect positive correlation, which indicates an 
increase in one time series value lead to a proportionate increase in the next time series value. 
A value of negative one (-1) represents perfect negative correlation, that is an increase of one 
time series value result in a proportionate decrease in the next time series value. 
 
3.2  Sample Selections 
The thesis will analyse stock market data from 41 countries, including 34 emerging markets 
and seven developed economies. The emerging markets are taken from a range of 
geographical locations. The main criteria for selecting emerging markets include geographical 
location, legal origin, size of the equity market and the availability of data from DataStream. 
Legal origin of a country is one of the dominant factors in selecting an emerging 
economy for this study. It is argued that legal origin has an enormous effect on investor 
protection rights in both debt and equity markets. For example, La-Porta et al. (1998) conduct 
an empirical study on the legal origin of 49 countries around the world. They examine 
whether investor protection and minority shareholders’ rights are affected by the legal origin 
of the country. They suggest that countries with French-based civil law have the weakest 
investor protection and the least developed capital markets compared to common-law 
countries and German-based civil law countries. In addition they argue that German-based 
civil law countries have the strongest legal system implementation and that French-based civil 
law countries display the weakest implementation of law. 
This study divides emerging economies into three basic categories: English-based 
common law countries; French- and German-based civil law countries and the former 
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communist states. Developed economies are not classified into any specific legal origin but 
are allocated into a single category.  
However, among the emerging economies Zimbabwe requires some special 
consideration. According to the CIA (2007) website the Zimbabwean11 legal system is a 
mixture of Roman-Dutch law and English-based common law. Further, the Zimbabwean legal 
system modified the Criminal Law code to the Common Criminal Law code, which replaced 
the Roman-Dutch Criminal Law system. As a result Zimbabwe’s legal origin is classified as 
based on common law. The thesis uses DataStream and Yahoo finance for the data used in the 
analysis to follow.  
Table  3.4  Legal origin of selected countries 
Based on the legal system of the country 
 
Common law countries Civil law countries Post-communist  Developed countries 
Bangladesh Argentina China Australia 
Cyprus Brazil Poland France 
Egypt Chile Russia Germany 
Hong Kong Columbia  Japan 
India Czech Republic  New Zealand 
Kenya Ecuador  UK 
Malaysia Greece  USA 
Pakistan Hungary   
South Africa Indonesia   
Singapore Korea   
Sri-Lanka Mexico   
Zimbabwe Peru   
 Philippines   
 Portugal   
 Spain   
 Taiwan   
 Thailand   
 Turkey   
 Venezuela   
 
Table 3.4 provides a list of the selected emerging countries and developed countries 
used in this study. The list contain 12 emerging countries of English-based common law 
origin, 19 emerging countries of French- or German-based civil law origin, three countries of 
post-communist origin and the seven developed countries. The sample size from the post-
                                                 
11
 The CIA website access date 25/02/2005.  
    (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html) 
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communist countries is three, owing to a lack of reliable data for other countries that fall 
within this classification. Emerging countries have also been selected from various 
geographical locations around the world to capture the possibility of changes in stock 
synchronicity across different geographical locations.  
The geographical locations are further divided into six categories: South America, 
Africa, Europe, Asia Pacific, South Asia and Central Asia. The largest number of emerging 
countries is selected from the Asia Pacific geographical location (nine countries) and the 
South American region (eight countries) due to the greater number of emerging markets in 
these regions. Table 3.5 provides the geographical breakup of the emerging countries 
selected. 
Only two countries, Turkey and Cyprus, are selected from the Central Asian region 
due to the lack of reliable data from the other countries within that region. The main source of 
the weekly data is DataStream, although Yahoo finance is used to fill gaps as they arise. 
Neither database provides reliable and complete datasets for the other Central Asian 
countries. 
Table  3.5  Geographical segment of selected countries 
Based on the geographical location of the country 
 
Africa  South America  South Asia  Asia Pacific Central Asia  Europe  
        
Egypt  Argentina  Bangladesh  China  Cyprus  Czech Rep. 
Kenya  Brazil  India  Hong Kong Turkey  Greece  
South Africa Chile  Pakistan  Indonesia   Hungary  
Zimbabwe  Columbia  Sri-Lanka Korea   Poland  
  Ecuador   Malaysia   Portugal  
  Peru   Philippines  Russia  
  Mexico   Singapore   Spain  
  Venezuela   Taiwan     
    Thailand     
 
3.3   Stock synchronicity time series data 
Time-series data is collected from the DataStream database at the individual firm level for 
each of the countries following Morck et al. (2000). The data is fully adjusted for dividends 
and capitalisation changes. The data spans the period from January 1996 to December 2005 
and has been collected at weekly intervals for synchronicity analysis. Further, the data 
includes both live stocks and dead stock from DataStream to avoid survivorship bias. The 
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largest country sample size is obtained for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with 4,049 
stocks and the smallest country sample size is Ecuador with only 35 stocks. In total, data for 
40,014 firms has been collected which includes approximately 20.8 million weekly firm 
observations (total 20,847,294 observations). The data is further divided into two categories 
of full period and sub-period data. Full period data is from January 1996 to December 2005 
and sub-period data is from 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05.  
Table 3.6 illustrates the number of available firms for which data is available for each 
of the emerging and developed countries. The study period includes 521 weeks. 
Table  3.6  List of available firms from DataStream database12 
Country No of firms Country No of firms 
Argentina  216 Malaysia  1,316 
Australia  2,709 Mexico  646 
Bangladesh  256 New Zealand 269 
Brazil  1,179 Pakistan  413 
Chile 274 Peru  370 
China  1,905 Philippines  379 
Columbia  128 Poland  393 
Cyprus  144 Portugal  122 
Czech Republic 243 Russia  623 
Ecuador  35 Singapore  1,075 
Egypt  127 South Africa  1,546 
France  1,527 Spain  338 
Germany 1,506 Sri-Lanka 301 
Greece  443 Taiwan  1,145 
Hong Kong 2,705 Thailand  1,236 
Hungary  209 Turkey  515 
India  2,158 UK  2,707 
Indonesia  588 S&P 500 (USA) 500 
Japan  2,842 NYSE13 (USA) 4,049 
Kenya  62 Venezuela  111 
South Korea 2,604 Zimbabwe  100 
    Total firms 40,014 
 
 
                                                 
12
 As on February, 2007 
13
 The thesis uses two samples from the USA stock market, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with 4,049  
firms and the S&P 500 with 500 listed firms. However, the study uses the NYSE firms for stock synchronicity 
analysis and comparison with the emerging economies. 
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3.3.1 Data Problems 
 
There are number possible issues arising with the data, through DataStream which provides a 
most comprehensive coverage of world equity market by value. It should be noted that not all 
firms in the world equity markets are covered by DataStream and a number of companies in 
the dataset had limited trading. The study used individual firm level data wherever possible 
for analysis. We took considerable effort to avoid survivorship bias problems by selecting 
delisted and new listed stocks for the analysis. However, the study made no attempt to adjust 
or trim data for analysis; the data has been reported as it is presented by the DataStream. 
 
3.4   Calculated data 
This section presents data for the three synchronicity measures used for the thesis (classical 
synchronicity measure, R-square measure and zero-return measure).  
Five sub-periods are included in the study to allow for the possibility of structural 
break-up. The first sub-period includes the Asian financial market crisis (1996-97). The 
second covers the period 1998-99, which is the post-Asian financial market crisis period. The 
third period includes the Y2K crisis (internet crisis) in 2000-01. The fourth sub-period 
includes the post-internet crisis and Iraq war crisis (2002-03) periods and the fifth sub-period 
includes the high growth period for world international markets (2004-05).  
3.4.1   Classical Synchronicity Measure 
3.4.1.1 Full Period Data 
Table 3.7 illustrates the stock synchronicity descriptive statistics for the 41 countries 
observed. It is found the countries with highest stock price synchronicity for the full period 
are China (73 %), Ecuador (75%), Malaysia (73%), Russia (70%) and Turkey (76%) with the 
higher standard deviation (China 13%, Ecuador 18%, Malaysia 13%, Russia 12% and Turkey 
13%).  
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Table  3.7  Descriptive statistics for classical measure: Full period 
Data include NYSE and S&P 500 group of companies 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Argentina 0.69 0.68 0.99 0.50 0.11 0.25 2.12 
Australia 0.58 0.56 0.90 0.50 0.07 1.50 5.93 
Bangladesh 0.68 0.68 0.97 0.50 0.12 0.32 2.21 
Brazil 0.64 0.64 0.88 0.50 0.09 0.37 2.36 
Chile 0.65 0.64 0.90 0.50 0.09 0.45 2.38 
China 0.73 0.74 0.99 0.50 0.13 -0.04 1.88 
Columbia 0.66 0.65 0.95 0.50 0.11 0.46 2.30 
Cyprus 0.69 0.67 0.98 0.50 0.12 0.43 2.31 
Czech Republic 0.61 0.59 0.92 0.50 0.08 0.87 3.28 
Ecuador 0.75 0.71 1.00 0.50 0.18 0.21 1.68 
Egypt 0.65 0.65 0.95 0.50 0.10 0.34 2.21 
France 0.61 0.60 0.91 0.50 0.08 0.74 3.36 
Germany 0.59 0.58 0.82 0.50 0.06 0.64 2.74 
Greece 0.72 0.71 1.00 0.50 0.13 0.16 1.90 
Hong Kong 0.65 0.63 0.98 0.50 0.10 0.62 2.87 
Hungary 0.65 0.64 0.95 0.50 0.10 0.59 2.75 
India 0.65 0.65 0.93 0.50 0.10 0.44 2.50 
Indonesia 0.68 0.67 0.96 0.50 0.11 0.35 2.26 
Japan 0.67 0.66 0.95 0.50 0.11 0.39 2.25 
Kenya 0.61 0.59 0.97 0.50 0.09 1.10 3.91 
Korea 0.68 0.66 0.97 0.50 0.11 0.33 2.15 
Malaysia 0.73 0.71 0.99 0.50 0.13 0.13 1.89 
Mexico 0.66 0.65 0.91 0.50 0.10 0.28 2.18 
New Zealand 0.62 0.60 0.95 0.50 0.09 1.00 3.82 
Pakistan 0.67 0.66 0.96 0.50 0.10 0.34 2.36 
Peru 0.65 0.65 0.90 0.50 0.09 0.30 2.21 
Philippines 0.65 0.64 0.95 0.50 0.10 0.48 2.36 
Poland 0.66 0.63 1.00 0.50 0.12 0.72 2.72 
Portugal 0.63 0.62 0.93 0.50 0.09 0.72 2.89 
Russia 0.70 0.69 0.96 0.50 0.12 0.14 1.94 
South Africa 0.60 0.59 0.86 0.50 0.07 0.67 3.07 
Singapore 0.69 0.67 0.98 0.50 0.12 0.36 2.10 
Spain 0.66 0.64 0.94 0.50 0.10 0.40 2.25 
Sri-Lanka 0.67 0.65 0.99 0.50 0.11 0.52 2.44 
Taiwan 0.69 0.68 0.99 0.50 0.13 0.33 2.10 
Thailand 0.66 0.66 0.93 0.50 0.10 0.23 2.12 
Turkey 0.75 0.75 0.99 0.50 0.13 -0.13 1.89 
UK 0.63 0.62 0.93 0.50 0.09 0.72 3.24 
USA NYSE 0.63 0.62 0.90 0.50 0.09 0.50 2.55 
USA S&P 500 0.67 0.66 0.98 0.50 0.11 0.51 2.50 
Venezuela 0.67 0.65 0.97 0.50 0.12 0.59 2.37 
Zimbabwe 0.66 0.64 0.98 0.50 0.11 0.60 2.50 
Average 0.66 
      
Developed Avg. 0.62 
      
Emerging Avg. 0.67 
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In contrast, Germany (59%) and Australia (58%) produced the lowest stock price 
synchronicity during this period with lowest standard deviation (Australia 7% and Germany 
6%). The average synchronicity measure is 62 percent for the developed economies and 67 
percent for the emerging countries during the study period.  
 
3.4.1.2 Sub-period classical synchronicity measure 
 
To check for the possibility of changes in the level of stock market synchronisation during the 
observation period from 1996 to 2005, the study divides the time series into five sub-periods, 
1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. Table 3.8 illustrates the descriptive 
statistics for stock price synchronicity over these five sub-periods.  
Studies find that countries exhibiting higher stock return synchronicity during the full 
period also exhibit higher synchronicity for the sub-periods, examples of which include China 
and Poland. In addition, the level of synchronicity of five observed countries (Poland, Greece, 
Venezuela, Singapore and Malaysia) has fallen dramatically in these periods.  
Further, the Russian stock market synchronicity measure remains volatile during this 
time and stock markets in developed nations (other than Japan) show low levels of stock price 
synchronicity. The standard deviation for the developed markets remains lower over the 
whole period and within sub-periods. 
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Table  3.8  Descriptive statistics for classical measure: Sub-periods 
Data include the USA NYSE and S&P 500 group of companies 
 
 
  2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
   Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev. 
  2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
Argentina 0.69 0.69 0.12 0.66 0.65 0.10 0.68 0.67 0.10 0.72 0.72 0.12 0.72 0.72 0.13 
Australia 0.58 0.57 0.06 0.57 0.56 0.05 0.58 0.57 0.07 0.57 0.55 0.07 0.59 0.56 0.07 
Bangladesh 0.69 0.69 0.12 0.68 0.67 0.12 0.70 0.70 0.12 0.69 0.67 0.11 0.67 0.67 0.12 
Brazil 0.65 0.64 0.09 0.65 0.65 0.08 0.64 0.64 0.09 0.65 0.65 0.10 0.61 0.60 0.08 
Chile 0.65 0.65 0.08 0.64 0.61 0.10 0.64 0.62 0.10 0.67 0.66 0.09 0.63 0.62 0.08 
China 0.74 0.76 0.12 0.75 0.77 0.12 0.72 0.70 0.13 0.72 0.72 0.13 0.74 0.74 0.14 
Columbia 0.70 0.69 0.11 0.68 0.68 0.11 0.64 0.60 0.11 0.65 0.63 0.10 0.63 0.61 0.10 
Cyprus 0.62 0.59 0.09 0.67 0.66 0.10 0.75 0.76 0.13 0.70 0.68 0.13 0.68 0.68 0.11 
Czech Rep. 0.65 0.64 0.10 0.63 0.62 0.10 0.60 0.59 0.07 0.59 0.58 0.06 0.59 0.58 0.07 
Ecuador 0.77 0.75 0.19 0.76 0.67 0.21 0.80 0.80 0.19 0.72 0.71 0.15 0.69 0.67 0.15 
Egypt 0.67 0.67 0.11 0.64 0.64 0.09 0.65 0.65 0.10 0.67 0.66 0.11 0.65 0.63 0.11 
France 0.61 0.61 0.07 0.63 0.62 0.08 0.61 0.59 0.08 0.61 0.59 0.08 0.60 0.60 0.07 
Germany 0.59 0.58 0.06 0.60 0.59 0.06 0.60 0.59 0.07 0.59 0.58 0.07 0.59 0.57 0.06 
Greece 0.65 0.63 0.11 0.75 0.76 0.12 0.78 0.83 0.15 0.72 0.73 0.12 0.69 0.68 0.10 
Hong Kong 0.63 0.61 0.08 0.64 0.63 0.08 0.65 0.64 0.10 0.67 0.68 0.11 0.64 0.63 0.10 
Hungary 0.64 0.65 0.09 0.63 0.62 0.09 0.65 0.64 0.09 0.67 0.65 0.11 0.66 0.64 0.11 
India 0.69 0.69 0.11 0.65 0.63 0.10 0.64 0.64 0.08 0.63 0.60 0.09 0.66 0.66 0.09 
Indonesia 0.67 0.67 0.11 0.67 0.67 0.10 0.68 0.65 0.11 0.72 0.72 0.11 0.64 0.61 0.10 
Japan 0.68 0.67 0.11 0.69 0.68 0.10 0.65 0.64 0.11 0.66 0.65 0.10 0.68 0.66 0.11 
Kenya 0.64 0.63 0.09 0.64 0.61 0.11 0.59 0.57 0.08 0.59 0.56 0.09 0.62 0.60 0.09 
Korea 0.63 0.63 0.09 0.68 0.68 0.12 0.69 0.68 0.12 0.68 0.67 0.11 0.69 0.68 0.11 
Malaysia 0.66 0.67 0.10 0.71 0.70 0.12 0.75 0.77 0.14 0.79 0.82 0.13 0.73 0.72 0.13 
Mexico 0.68 0.67 0.09 0.65 0.63 0.09 0.63 0.63 0.08 0.69 0.69 0.10 0.67 0.68 0.11 
New Zealand 0.62 0.60 0.08 0.60 0.58 0.06 0.61 0.60 0.09 0.63 0.62 0.10 0.63 0.63 0.10 
Pakistan 0.67 0.66 0.09 0.67 0.68 0.10 0.65 0.64 0.10 0.65 0.65 0.10 0.68 0.67 0.10 
Peru 0.68 0.68 0.09 0.69 0.69 0.09 0.65 0.65 0.10 0.63 0.62 0.09 0.62 0.60 0.09 
Philippines 0.64 0.63 0.10 0.64 0.61 0.10 0.66 0.66 0.10 0.67 0.66 0.11 0.65 0.64 0.11 
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(continued) 
Descriptive statistics for classical measure: Sub-periods 
Data include the USA NYSE and S&P 500 group of companies 
 
 
 
 Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Med 
 Std. 
Dev. 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
Poland 0.62 0.62 0.08 0.61 0.59 0.07 0.64 0.62 0.10 0.69 0.68 0.13 0.74 0.74 0.14 
Portugal 0.62 0.61 0.09 0.63 0.60 0.09 0.62 0.61 0.09 0.64 0.62 0.09 0.63 0.62 0.09 
Russia 0.70 0.70 0.11 0.69 0.70 0.11 0.68 0.65 0.12 0.73 0.71 0.12 0.67 0.67 0.12 
Sth Africa 0.61 0.60 0.07 0.59 0.59 0.06 0.60 0.58 0.07 0.61 0.60 0.09 0.61 0.59 0.07 
Singapore 0.63 0.61 0.09 0.69 0.69 0.11 0.68 0.66 0.11 0.75 0.76 0.13 0.68 0.67 0.11 
Spain 0.66 0.64 0.11 0.65 0.64 0.10 0.64 0.62 0.09 0.66 0.65 0.12 0.68 0.68 0.10 
Sri-Lanka 0.68 0.68 0.11 0.69 0.68 0.12 0.66 0.63 0.11 0.66 0.64 0.10 0.65 0.63 0.10 
Taiwan 0.66 0.66 0.13 0.69 0.67 0.12 0.72 0.73 0.13 0.71 0.68 0.13 0.69 0.67 0.13 
Thailand 0.67 0.67 0.10 0.68 0.69 0.10 0.66 0.66 0.10 0.66 0.64 0.10 0.65 0.64 0.09 
Turkey 0.71 0.71 0.12 0.75 0.77 0.13 0.76 0.78 0.14 0.75 0.76 0.14 0.75 0.75 0.12 
UK 0.62 0.61 0.08 0.64 0.63 0.09 0.64 0.62 0.09 0.64 0.63 0.09 0.62 0.61 0.08 
USA NYSE 0.65 0.65 0.09 0.64 0.63 0.10 0.61 0.60 0.07 0.63 0.61 0.09 0.64 0.63 0.08 
USA- S&P 0.68 0.68 0.11 0.69 0.67 0.12 0.66 0.64 0.10 0.67 0.65 0.11 0.68 0.67 0.11 
Venezuela 0.63 0.60 0.11 0.65 0.64 0.10 0.63 0.62 0.09 0.72 0.74 0.14 0.74 0.73 0.13 
Zimbabwe 0.69 0.67 0.13 0.68 0.66 0.13 0.65 0.63 0.10 0.64 0.63 0.09 0.66 0.64 0.11 
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3.4.2   R-square measure 
3.4.2.1  Full period data 
 
Table 3.9 illustrates the descriptive statistics of R-square for 41 countries, which include 34 
emerging markets and seven developed economies. The data span the period from January 
1996 to December 2005.  
Table 3.9 shows the R-square value for the observed countries to be 0.084 with 
average standard deviation of 0.114. Malaysia exhibits the highest R-square (0.254), followed 
by China (0.241) and Turkey (0.239). The lowest R-square countries are Japan, (0.007), 
Greece (0.007), Germany (0.010) and Kenya (0.009), while Bangladesh (0.021), Ecuador 
(0.033), Hong Kong (0.015), Peru (0.024) and Singapore (0.023) also exhibit low R-square 
values during this period. 
 In addition, Turkey, China and Malaysia exhibit higher stock synchronicity for both the 
R-square measure and the classical synchronicity measure which is consistent with Morck et 
al. (2000). 
3.4.2.2  Sub-period data 
 
Table 3.10 illustrates R-square variation by sub-periods. Countries with the greatest R-square 
in sub-period one include China (0.387), Malaysia (0.376), Turkey (0.260) and Venezuela 
(0.266). This result is to be expected, as China, Malaysia and Turkey exhibit greater R-square 
estimates in the full period analysis, although the S&P 500 group of US companies exhibit 
quite high R-square values during the period. 
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Table  3.9  Descriptive statistics for R-square measure: Full period 
Data include the USA NYSE and S&P 500 group of companies 
 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Argentina  0.104 0.035 0.622 0.000 0.141 1.690 5.246 
Australia  0.041 0.017 1.000 0.000 0.087 7.050 69.169 
Bangladesh  0.021 0.010 0.586 0.000 0.047 8.333 89.807 
Brazil  0.070 0.006 0.995 0.000 0.131 2.522 10.057 
Chile  0.096 0.017 0.595 0.000 0.147 1.731 5.061 
China  0.241 0.260 1.000 0.000 0.127 0.285 5.919 
Columbia  0.042 0.003 0.526 0.000 0.099 3.016 11.826 
Cyprus  0.159 0.120 0.797 0.000 0.161 1.394 4.722 
Czech Republic  0.033 0.006 0.569 0.000 0.083 4.251 22.590 
Ecuador 0.033 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.155 4.364 20.047 
Egypt  0.089 0.037 0.630 0.000 0.118 1.965 7.487 
France  0.098 0.025 1.000 0.000 0.160 2.377 9.250 
Germany 0.010 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.069 12.497 169.539 
Greece  0.008 0.003 0.268 0.000 0.022 8.787 94.504 
Hong Kong  0.015 0.004 1.000 0.000 0.062 12.505 183.323 
Hungary 0.101 0.018 1.000 0.000 0.165 2.418 9.691 
India  0.081 0.028 1.000 0.000 0.107 1.800 7.614 
Indonesia  0.102 0.047 0.730 0.000 0.131 1.747 5.863 
Japan  0.007 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.060 14.079 212.741 
Kenya  0.009 0.003 0.092 0.000 0.015 3.358 17.060 
Korea  0.123 0.090 1.000 0.000 0.124 2.239 12.278 
Malaysia  0.254 0.255 0.848 0.000 0.179 0.330 2.230 
Mexico 0.092 0.012 0.956 0.000 0.162 2.272 7.898 
New Zealand  0.066 0.028 0.748 0.000 0.096 3.107 16.645 
Pakistan  0.084 0.011 0.726 0.000 0.151 2.268 7.464 
Peru  0.024 0.003 0.586 0.000 0.060 4.774 33.641 
Philippines  0.073 0.018 0.665 0.000 0.122 2.329 8.136 
Poland  0.067 0.034 0.545 0.000 0.094 2.448 9.678 
Portugal  0.102 0.035 0.592 0.000 0.143 1.695 5.102 
Russia  0.066 0.007 0.789 0.000 0.140 2.845 10.775 
Singapore  0.024 0.012 1.000 0.000 0.058 9.756 127.342 
South Africa  0.054 0.016 1.000 0.000 0.090 3.648 24.589 
Spain  0.083 0.042 0.663 0.000 0.116 2.549 10.686 
Sri-Lanka  0.121 0.044 0.762 0.000 0.157 1.702 5.751 
Taiwan  0.173 0.155 1.000 0.000 0.127 0.856 4.245 
Thailand  0.109 0.031 1.000 0.000 0.171 2.430 10.010 
Turkey  0.239 0.218 0.771 0.000 0.183 0.461 2.350 
UK  0.065 0.017 1.000 0.000 0.135 4.040 22.883 
USA - S&P 500 0.136 0.129 0.465 0.000 0.081 0.772 3.824 
USA - NYSE 0.030 0.014 1.000 0.000 0.060 9.699 141.646 
Venezuela  0.067 0.017 0.621 0.000 0.117 2.647 10.508 
Zimbabwe  0.122 0.076 0.590 0.000 0.134 1.024 3.386 
Average 0.084       
Developed Avg. 0.045       
Emerging Avg. 0.091       
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 Countries with the greatest R-square values in sub-period two include Argentina, China, 
Malaysia and Turkey. This result is consistent with sub-period one in which China, Malaysia 
and Turkey exhibit higher R-square values. The S&P 500 group of US companies exhibit an 
R-square of 0.213 during this period, which is lower than in sub-period one.  
 The greatest R-square values are evident in sub-period three and sub-period four are for 
China, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey. In addition, developed countries exhibit lower R-
square values during this period, (Australia 0.015, France 0.117, Germany 0.011, the UK 
0.098 and USA 0.049), while the S&P 500 group of US companies exhibit R-square values 
of 0.109, which is lower than for the previous two sub-periods.  
 In sub-period five, the countries with higher R-square values include China, India and 
Zimbabwe. Surprisingly Malaysia has an R-square equal to 0.112 during this sub-period. The 
data suggests that the Malaysian R-square varies considerably from one sub-period to 
another. For example, the R-square for Malaysia is 0.450 in 1998-99, 0.324 in 2000-01, 0.186 
in 2002-03 and 0.112 in 2004-05. Zimbabwe is another country with considerable R-square 
values during these sub-periods. 
 
Table  3.10  Descriptive statistics for R-square measure: Sub-periods  
Data include the USA NSYE and S&P 500 group of companies 
 
Name 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
Country R-square R-square R-square R-square R-square 
Argentina  0.246 0.238 0.128 0.099 0.176 
Australia  0.015 0.028 0.015 0.026 0.019 
Bangladesh  0.016 0.012 0.014 0.021 0.020 
Brazil  0.077 0.090 0.085 0.085 0.104 
Chile 0.116 0.132 0.106 0.091 0.084 
China  0.387 0.306 0.252 0.321 0.201 
Columbia  0.074 0.072 0.049 0.108 0.134 
Cyprus  0.176 0.163 0.283 0.251 0.093 
Czech Republic 0.080 0.067 0.046 0.037 0.070 
Ecuador  0.011 0.016 0.007 0.015 0.052 
Egypt  0.189 0.150 0.112 0.081 0.084 
France  0.091 0.093 0.117 0.128 0.107 
Germany  0.017 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.021 
Greece  0.040 0.020 0.015 0.025 0.013 
Hong Kong  0.032 0.026 0.022 0.017 0.019 
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(continued) 
Descriptive statistics for R-square measure: Sub-periods  
Data include the USA NSYE and S&P 500 group of companies 
 
Name 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
Country R-square R-square R-square R-square R-square 
Hungary  0.203 0.206 0.087 0.074 0.106 
India  0.110 0.085 0.089 0.114 0.218 
Indonesia  0.163 0.148 0.112 0.108 0.131 
Japan  0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.019 
Kenya  0.018 0.008 0.019 0.028 0.028 
Korea  0.149 0.175 0.180 0.192 0.096 
Malaysia  0.376 0.450 0.324 0.186 0.112 
Mexico  0.181 0.179 0.121 0.130 0.120 
New Zealand  0.132 0.119 0.115 0.075 0.076 
Pakistan  0.129 0.089 0.106 0.123 0.125 
Peru  0.069 0.077 0.033 0.024 0.048 
Philippines 0.114 0.135 0.085 0.077 0.079 
Poland  0.258 0.185 0.065 0.038 0.034 
Portugal  0.142 0.141 0.109 0.104 0.107 
Russia  0.194 0.104 0.080 0.068 0.106 
South Africa 0.071 0.104 0.068 0.042 0.067 
Singapore  0.030 0.038 0.039 0.030 0.023 
Spain  0.015 0.079 0.076 0.151 0.162 
Sri-Lanka 0.089 0.098 0.185 0.162 0.149 
Taiwan  0.233 0.231 0.254 0.223 0.162 
Thailand  0.121 0.131 0.151 0.117 0.164 
Turkey  0.259 0.317 0.366 0.284 0.181 
UK  0.077 0.089 0.098 0.085 0.074 
USA- NYSE 0.070 0.100 0.049 0.029 0.017 
USA- S&P 500 0.257 0.213 0.109 0.139 0.099 
Venezuela  0.267 0.226 0.048 0.054 0.070 
Zimbabwe  0.157 0.100 0.081 0.211 0.238 
Average 0.130 0.126 0.103 0.100 0.095 
 
 
3.4.3   Zero-return measure 
3.4.3.1  Full period data 
 
Table 3.11 provides descriptive statistics for the zero-return measure. The proportion of zero-
return measure for the full sample is 42.9 percent with standard deviation of 30.1 percent.  
The study finds that Ecuador and Russia exhibit the greatest proportion of zero-return 
measure during this period. In contrast, the lowest proportion of zero-return measure is 
exhibited by the USA S&P 500. However, the most surprising results are exhibited by China  
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Table  3.11  Descriptive statistics for zero-return measure: Full period 
Data include the USA NYSE and the S&P 500 group of companies 
 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation 
Argentina  59.1 64.3 100.0 0.0 36.6 
Australia  42.8 30.1 100.0 0.0 34.9 
Bangladesh  22.6 11.9 100.0 0.0 25.4 
Brazil  61.9 74.9 100.0 0.0 36.0 
Chile  49.4 52.1 100.0 0.0 34.1 
China  11.5 4.2 100.0 0.0 19.5 
Columbia  77.5 93.2 100.0 0.0 29.8 
Cyprus  26.9 21.4 81.5 0.6 19.4 
Czech Republic  59.7 62.9 100.0 0.0 23.1 
Ecuador  84.3 94.5 100.0 5.2 22.9 
Egypt  26.8 13.8 100.0 0.0 30.0 
France  23.7 9.8 100.0 0.0 28.4 
Germany 31.3 17.9 100.0 0.0 31.6 
Greece  14.9 4.8 100.0 0.0 23.5 
Hong Kong  41.6 33.8 100.0 0.0 30.6 
Hungary  57.9 62.2 100.0 0.0 36.6 
India  48.3 52.1 100.0 0.0 38.2 
Indonesia  52.6 47.9 100.0 0.0 29.0 
Japan  12.9 5.2 100.0 0.0 20.3 
Kenya  45.3 34.0 100.0 0.0 31.7 
South Korea  23.1 5.6 100.0 0.0 30.9 
Malaysia  26.5 13.4 100.0 0.0 27.7 
Mexico  66.6 81.1 100.0 0.0 36.5 
New Zealand  27.1 20.7 100.0 0.0 20.7 
Pakistan  53.3 55.0 100.0 0.0 33.5 
Peru  74.1 90.2 100.0 0.0 32.0 
Philippines  59.2 61.3 100.0 0.0 30.7 
Poland  28.1 11.7 100.0 0.0 29.8 
Portugal  35.1 20.5 100.0 0.8 33.7 
Russia  64.6 77.5 100.0 0.0 33.2 
Singapore  35.9 26.2 100.0 0.0 28.6 
South Africa  56.2 62.4 100.0 0.0 32.1 
Spain  24.8 9.3 100.0 0.0 31.0 
Sri-Lanka  55.0 52.8 100.0 0.0 29.5 
Taiwan  16.8 5.6 100.0 0.0 25.4 
Thailand  53.6 56.0 100.0 0.0 37.8 
Turkey  30.0 9.6 100.0 0.0 32.4 
UK  38.5 31.0 100.0 0.0 31.1 
USA – S&P 500 1.4 1.1 10.3 0.0 1.0 
USA - NYSE 25.1 6.3 100.0 0.0 35.4 
Venezuela  69.3 77.2 100.0 0.0 29.8 
Zimbabwe  44.5 30.2 100.0 0.0 29.1 
Average All 42.9    30.1 
Emerging Avg. 45.7    30.3 
Developed Avg. 28.8    28.9 
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and Taiwan during this sample period. China shows little evidence of higher zero-return 
measure during this time, which is inconsistent with both the classical synchronicity and the 
R-square measures.  
Further, Morck et al. (2000) have found countries with considerable stock price 
variation during their study period to be China and Malaysia. Malaysia also exhibits a lower 
proportion of zero-return measure for the sample period, which is inconsistent with the 
previous synchronicity measures and Morck et al. (2000).  
Among the developed economies, Australia exhibits a greater proportion of zero-
return measure relative to Japan (12.9 percent). In addition, the S&P 500 group of US 
companies exhibits a zero-return measure of 1.5 percent (standard deviation 1.0 percent) for 
this period, which is the lowest for all countries in the sample. The NYSE exhibits a higher 
proportion of zero-return measure than S&P 500 group of companies, which conflicts with 
the classical synchronicity and R-square measures. In addition, there are some interesting 
variations between mean and median for some of the sample countries. For example, 
Australia has a mean of 42.8 for the full period but a median of 30.1. This implies that half of 
the Australian sample has measures on the metric below 30.1. Further, Egypt has a mean of 
26.8 but a median of 13.8. This implies that at least half of the Egyptian observations are 
below 13.8% non trading days.  
 
3.4.3.2 Sub-period data 
Table 3.12 exhibits the proportion of zero-return measures for sub-period data. In 1996-97, 
1998-99 and 2000-01 Ecuador and Columbia exhibit a greater proportion of zero-return 
measure and China exhibits fewer zero-return measures. Surprisingly, the S&P 500 group of 
US companies show the smallest proportion of zero-return measure for all the sub-periods, 
followed by China and Japan.  
The study finds some variation in sub-period analysis during the observation period in 
that the zero-return measure for 1996-97 is only 32.2 days, whereas for 2002-03 it is 46.6 
days. There is evidence of a higher proportion of zero-return measures in sub-periods three, 
four and five.  
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Table  3.12  Descriptive statistics for zero-return measure: Sub-periods 
Data include the USA NYSE and the S&P 500 group of companies 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Argentina 45.2 54.9 65.5 66.0 61.5 
Australia 43.2 46.7 47.2 51.9 49.3 
Bangladesh 29.0 22.4 23.4 20.5 25.3 
Brazil 56.8 61.3 63.0 69.0 65.1 
Chile 38.3 47.3 51.5 54.0 49.1 
China 4.8 5.6 7.7 10.4 13.3 
Columbia 71.5 76.7 82.9 83.2 78.9 
Cyprus 35.5 18.2 5.7 26.1 37.1 
Czech Republic 21.4 40.4 65.2 81.5 82.8 
Ecuador 62.1 73.7 84.9 85.0 87.4 
Egypt 20.7 21.7 29.1 32.7 26.5 
France 18.8 19.6 21.1 25.7 21.7 
Germany 30.1 28.9 28.7 36.8 40.0 
Greece 8.4 11.4 11.0 13.3 14.5 
Hong Kong 23.1 30.5 37.2 46.0 43.7 
Hungary 31.0 40.1 46.5 60.6 66.2 
India 35.8 47.4 52.4 56.7 57.2 
Indonesia 40.7 48.9 53.1 58.2 57.5 
Japan 10.5 11.3 12.6 15.7 16.8 
Kenya 40.1 45.7 51.5 50.2 42.4 
Korea 19.9 21.6 20.2 26.9 31.6 
Malaysia 12.4 22.7 30.2 33.2 35.0 
Mexico 53.5 63.3 70.2 75.2 74.1 
New Zealand 25.7 24.0 23.2 28.8 26.6 
Pakistan 53.0 65.3 55.8 48.2 49.6 
Peru 57.5 69.5 74.7 78.7 77.4 
Philippines 39.9 48.7 59.3 69.8 65.5 
Poland 13.6 13.7 22.6 38.8 37.7 
Portugal 32.4 31.1 31.9 38.8 36.7 
Russia 49.7 73.0 67.0 67.4 64.8 
Singapore 20.3 22.2 35.7 41.3 42.4 
South Africa 32.7 40.7 62.6 73.8 71.0 
Spain 17.1 18.6 25.5 24.2 21.1 
Sri-Lanka 61.5 59.7 65.7 54.1 44.5 
Taiwan 10.6 11.1 15.2 20.8 24.2 
Thailand 43.7 56.0 63.3 59.5 57.9 
Turkey 15.5 18.9 29.5 36.5 31.3 
UK 37.7 34.2 34.7 38.8 36.5 
USA – S&P 500 3.3 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.6 
USA - NYSE 30.9 27.0 25.8 24.6 30.4 
Venezuela 25.8 40.4 65.4 80.8 79.7 
Zimbabwe 26.9 37.7 51.7 47.2 55.6 
Average 32.2 37.0 42.2 46.5 46.0 
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For example, Venezuela and Cyprus exhibit a higher proportion of zero-return 
measures during 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05 compared to the previous sub-periods. The 
average proportion of zero-return measures for these sub-periods are 32.2 days in 1996-97, 
37.0 days in 1998-99, 42.2 days in 2000-01, 46.5 days in 2002-03 and 46.0 days in 2004-05. 
 
3.5   Stock synchronicity explanatory variables 
Several academics use different explanatory variables for cross-sectional analysis. These 
include country-level variables (examples include GDP per capita, good governance indices, 
inflation and geographical size) and industry-level variables (examples include earning co-
movement index, percentage of sales by firm and average weekly turnover). However, one 
main objective of this study is to analyse country-level stock market synchronicity using the 
classical measure and to compare the findings with the R-square and zero-return measures. 
Therefore, the study uses only the country-level stock synchronicity explanatory variables for 
its analysis; these include corporate governance indices, GDP per capita, inflation, 
geographical size of a country, trade openness and corruption index. 
Morck et al. (2000) are among the first to use country-level explanatory variables for 
stock synchronicity analysis. They find that most of their explanatory variables are correlated 
with each other, although some variables are statistically significant. This study uses the 
following explanatory variables for the cross-sectional analysis. 
3.5.1   Corporate governance indicators 
A good governance system is an important factor for the social and economic development of 
a society, including both the government and civil sectors. The civil sector includes all large 
and small private organisations in a society. Corporate governance appears to perform best 
under a democratic political system, in which all social sectors are free to trade in 
competitive markets.  
This thesis uses two corporate governance indicators for the cross-sectional analysis − 
regulatory control and voice and accountability. These governance indicators reflect the 
statistical compilation of responses to questions concerning the quality of governance. It is 
noted that the World Bank uses six corporate governance indicators for measuring good 
    
 
49 
governance, which are divided into three clusters. The first cluster includes two indicators, 
voice and accountability and political stability. According to the World Bank, the voice and 
accountability indicator measures various aspects such as political process, civil liberties, 
political rights and independence of the public and private media (for example, newspapers, 
radio and TV). In contrast, the political stability indicator includes measures of domestic 
violence and terrorism. The study uses the voice and accountability indicator from this cluster 
for the cross-sectional analysis. 
Cluster two includes the government effectiveness and regulatory control indicators.  
The World Bank suggests government effectiveness to be a combined indicator for the 
quality of public service provision, bureaucracy and the independence of the civil service 
from political pressures. In contrast, the regulatory control indicator focuses primarily on 
price controls, bank supervision, foreign trade and business development. This indicator 
focuses mainly on the quality of business and economic development for a given country. 
The thesis uses the second indicator (regulatory control) from this cluster for the cross-
sectional analysis. 
Cluster three includes the rule of law and control of corruption indicators. Rule of law 
measures the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary system 
and the enforceability of contracts. The second indicator, control of corruption, measures 
perceptions of corruption within a country. Neither of these indicators is used for the cross-
sectional analysis in this study, however, a similar type of corruption indicator named the 
corruption perception index (CPI) from the German organisation Transparency International 
has been used for the cross-sectional analysis owing to its greater reliability. 
The governance indicators are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher 
values correspond to better governance outcomes and lower values correspond to poorer 
outcomes. For example, a country that ranks 2.0 in terms of corporate transparency maintains 
strong transparency in government and private sectors. This also indicates that there is a 
strong flow of information in the market.  By contrast, if a country has a rank of -2.0 for the 
rule of law index, this would indicate a relatively poor-quality legal system.  
These two governance variables provide important criteria for measuring a country’s 
social and economic standards. For example, Nabli and Nugent (1992) argue that stronger 
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property rights can increase economic efficiency and accelerate economic progress. In 
addition, Douglass (1987) finds a close relationship between economic progress and the 
development of specific institutions. He argues that without proper economic development, 
institutional development could not be possible and economic development is only possible 
through the implementation of a system of good governance − particularly in emerging 
countries. Further, he suggests that an efficient market can only function within a well-
governed institutional system. Corporate governance mechanisms also help emerging 
countries to distribute wealth properly. For example, the World Bank (1998) report suggests 
that development assistance is effective only for those aid-receiving developing countries that 
possess good institutions and implement good policies. They find that emerging countries 
with a sound policy background and strong governance system grow much faster than those 
without a strong governance system (on average 2.7 percent per capita).  
Leftwich (1994) argues that the main measure of effective corporate governance 
should include accountability (government officials must be responsible for their actions), 
legal structure (legal origin and structure of a country), information disclosure (availability of 
information about economic conditions and government policies) and transparency (open 
government systems whose decision-making procedures are clear to all who wish to know 
about them). 
This study includes two highly effective corporate governance indicators to capture 
the corporate governance system of a country. In addition, the study also includes corruption 
index, GDP per capita, trade openness measure and inflation indicators to capture country-
level stock price co-movement.  
Table 3.13 illustrates data for the two good governance indices for 34 emerging 
markets and seven developed economies published bi-yearly by the World Bank. The study 
period is divided into five different sub-periods: 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 
2004-05. In addition, the study uses two-year average index data for annually published 
indices (corruption index, GDP per capita and inflation data). 
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Table  3.13  Regulatory control and accountability indices (1996-97 to 2004-05) 
 
This table includes regulatory control and accountability indices from 1996 to 2005, collected from the World 
Bank. The study is divided into 5 sub periods 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. The 
governance indices are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher value correspond better governance 
outcome and lower value correspond poorer governance outcome.  
 
Country  Regulatory control Voice and accountability 
  
96-97 98-99 00-01 02-03 04-05 96-97 98-99 00-01 02-03 04-05 
Argentina  0.66 0.87 0.44 -0.84 -0.81 0.58 0.35 0.44 0.12 0.49 
Australia  1.15 1.28 1.48 1.64 1.62 1.65 1.5 1.61 1.5 1.4 
Bangladesh  -0.53 -0.08 -0.02 -1.05 -1.15 -0.31 -0.17 -0.34 -0.57 -0.69 
Brazil  0.13 0.29 0.36 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.6 0.53 0.28 0.34 
Chili 1.28 1.22 1.35 1.5 1.62 0.89 0.63 0.56 1.12 1.09 
China  -0.1 -0.07 -0.2 -0.41 -0.45 -1.22 -1.51 -1.37 -1.38 -1.54 
Columbia  0.37 0.51 0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 -0.29 -0.53 -0.55 -0.47 
Cyprus  0.63 1.13 1.06 1.24 1.23 1.01 1.06 1.22 0.94 1 
Czech Republic  0.98 0.78 0.66 1.12 0.97 1.01 1.14 0.99 0.9 1.03 
Ecuador  -0.1 0.19 -0.19 -0.6 -0.6 0.07 0.24 -0.14 -0.06 -0.19 
Egypt  -0.18 0.16 0.1 -0.45 -0.58 -0.7 -0.83 -0.81 -0.87 -1.04 
France  0.98 0.97 0.77 1.25 0.91 1.43 1.09 1.07 1.29 1.24 
Germany  1.29 1.19 1.36 1.59 1.29 1.48 1.36 1.35 1.51 1.38 
Greece  0.65 0.83 0.91 1.13 0.85 0.93 0.92 1.01 1.05 0.91 
Hong Kong  1.75 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.89 0.6 -0.16 -0.45 0.15 0.21 
Hungary  0.47 1.15 1.09 1.21 1.22 1.01 1.15 1.14 1.17 1.16 
India  -0.13 -0.08 -0.16 -0.34 -0.59 0.27 0.26 0.45 0.38 0.27 
Indonesia  0.19 0.1 -0.43 -0.68 -0.42 -1.08 -1.33 -0.52 -0.49 -0.44 
Japan  0.68 0.55 0.82 0.97 1.04 1.03 1.05 0.99 0.99 0.98 
Kenya  -0.48 -0.18 -0.11 -0.5 -0.43 -0.45 -0.77 -0.84 -0.58 -0.34 
Korea  0.55 0.3 0.46 0.86 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.76 0.63 0.73 
Malaysia  0.7 0.57 0.35 0.58 0.44 -0.05 -0.25 -0.27 -0.27 -0.36 
Mexico  0.46 0.78 0.66 0.49 0.55 -0.21 -0.17 0.09 0.33 0.36 
New Zealand  1.67 1.6 1.42 1.69 1.78 1.58 1.37 1.51 1.6 1.47 
Pakistan  -0.56 -0.15 -0.4 -0.77 -1.03 -0.93 -0.62 -1.53 -1.1 -1.31 
Peru  0.51 0.89 0.58 0.24 0.17 -0.69 -0.75 -0.01 0.22 -0.04 
Philippines  0.34 0.71 0.35 0.1 -0.06 0.16 0.46 0.4 0.17 0.02 
Poland  0.34 0.83 0.6 0.67 0.64 0.95 1.01 1.12 1.11 1.13 
Portugal  1.22 1.19 1.03 1.47 1.14 1.25 1.38 1.35 1.31 1.31 
Russia  -0.41 -0.37 -1.55 -0.3 -0.51 -0.34 -0.26 -0.44 -0.52 -0.81 
South Africa  0.18 0.33 0.13 0.6 0.44 0.65 0.87 1.05 0.73 0.86 
Singapore  1.95 1.65 2.27 1.89 1.87 0.38 0.01 -0.05 0.51 -0.13 
Spain  0.96 1.16 1.36 1.41 1.13 1.1 1.27 1.1 1.24 1.17 
Sri-Lanka 0.24 0.72 0.46 0.12 0.21 -0.19 -0.29 -0.37 -0.06 -0.16 
Taiwan  0.97 1.11 0.93 1.06 1.29 0.53 0.71 0.81 0.89 0.95 
Thailand  0.38 0.27 0.68 0.34 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.25 0.2 0.24 
Turkey  0.39 0.86 0.24 0.08 -0.07 -0.39 -0.92 -0.65 -0.47 -0.15 
UK  1.54 1.6 1.66 1.75 1.62 1.32 1.4 1.39 1.47 1.37 
USA  1.31 1.51 1.5 1.51 1.22 1.46 1.41 1.18 1.32 1.21  
Venezuela  -0.12 0.13 -0.54 -0.54 -1.24 0.06 0.14 -0.33 -0.41 -0.46 
Zimbabwe  -0.81 -0.35 -1.82 -1.61 -2.15 -0.28 -0.74 -0.97 -1.5 -1.48 
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3.5.2   Corruption perception index data 
The corruption perception index is produced by the German organisation Transparency 
International in Berlin. Transparency International first presented their corruption index (CP) 
in 1995. The corruption index is based on the past three years’ corruption perception data and 
uses public opinion surveys to measure the level of corruption in a country. The corruption 
scale ranges from 0 to 10 points. Countries with greater transparency are awarded higher 
points (maximum 10) and countries with lower transparency are awarded fewer points 
(minimum 0) 
However, when Transparency International first published the corruption perception 
indices in 1995 only 41 countries were included. The number of countries measured was 
increased gradually every year but, surprisingly, the number was reduced from 99 in 1999 to 
90 in 2000, and in 2001 only 91 countries were included. Transparency International claim 
that due to a lack of reliable data it was necessary to decrease the number of observed 
countries. However, in 2002 they were able to increase the number of observed countries to 
102 and then to 159 in 2005. As a result, the study lacks some data in the early years from 
1996 to 2001. The missing countries include Bangladesh, Cyprus, Peru, Sri-Lanka and 
Zimbabwe. The CP index included Bangladesh for the first time in 1996, Cyprus was 
included in 2003 and Zimbabwe in 1998. Both Kenya and Egypt were included in the CP 
index in 1996, although data was not available in 1997 due to the lack of reliable 
observations. However, in 1998 the CP index was again supplied for these countries.  
If an observed country does not have sufficient index values (corruption index, GDP 
and inflation) for two consecutive years, then the study uses whatever observations are 
available for the index. For example, Argentina ranks 3.41 in 1996 and 2.81 in 1997 given 
the corruption index. The average corruption index for Argentina in 1996-97 is 3.11 (3.41 + 
2.81 /2). But if Argentina had only one index value for 1996 and 1997 (e.g. 3.41 in 1996 and 
nothing for 1997), then the study uses the 1996 index value of 3.41 for 1996-97. 
Table 3.14 illustrates corruption index data for the 41 countries in the sample. The 
data is divided into five panels, each of which includes two-year average corruption index 
values. 
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Table  3.14  Two-year average corruption index data 
The following table illustrates corruption perception index collected from Transparency International (TI) database. The table includes 41 countries in the 
sample divided into five panels, each of which includes two years average corruption index value. The full period data is from 1996 to 2005. The scale range 
from 0 to 10 points, higher points awarded for greater transparency and lower points awarded for poorer transparency.              
     
Country 1996 1997 Avg. 1998 1999 Avg. 2000 2001 Avg. 2002 2003 Avg. 2004 2005 Avg. 
Argentina  3.41 2.81 3.11 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.50 3.50 2.80 2.50 2.65 2.50 2.80 2.65 
Australia  8.60 8.86 8.73 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.30 8.50 8.40 8.60 8.80 8.70 8.80 8.80 8.80 
Bangladesh  2.29 NA 2.29 NA NA NA NA 0.40 0.40 1.20 1.30 1.25 1.50 1.70 1.60 
Brazil  2.96 3.56 3.26 4.00 4.10 4.05 3.90 4.00 3.95 4.00 3.90 3.95 3.90 3.70 3.80 
Chili 6.80 6.05 6.43 6.80 6.90 6.85 7.40 7.50 7.45 7.50 7.40 7.45 7.40 7.30 7.35 
China  2.43 2.88 2.66 3.50 3.40 3.45 3.10 3.50 3.30 3.50 3.40 3.45 3.40 3.20 3.30 
Columbia  2.73 2.23 2.48 2.20 2.90 2.55 3.20 3.80 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.65 3.80 4.00 3.90 
Cyprus  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 6.10 6.10 5.40 5.70 5.55 
Czech Republic 5.37 5.20 5.29 4.80 4.60 4.70 4.30 3.90 4.10 3.70 3.90 3.80 4.20 4.30 4.25 
Egypt  2.84 NA 2.84 2.90 3.30 3.10 3.10 3.60 3.35 3.40 3.30 3.35 3.20 3.40 3.30 
France  6.96 6.66 6.81 6.70 6.60 6.65 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.30 6.90 6.60 7.10 7.50 7.30 
Germany  8.27 8.23 8.25 7.90 8.00 7.95 7.60 7.40 7.50 7.30 7.70 7.50 8.20 8.20 8.20 
Greece  5.01 5.35 5.18 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.20 4.55 4.20 4.30 4.25 4.30 4.30 4.30 
Hong Kong  7.01 7.28 7.15 7.80 7.70 7.75 7.70 7.90 7.80 8.20 8.00 8.10 8.00 8.30 8.15 
Hungary  4.86 5.18 5.02 5.00 5.20 5.10 5.20 5.30 5.25 4.90 4.80 4.85 4.80 5.00 4.90 
India  2.63 2.75 2.69 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.80 2.70 2.75 2.70 2.80 2.75 2.80 2.90 2.85 
Indonesia  2.65 2.72 2.69 2.00 1.70 1.85 1.70 1.90 1.80 1.90 1.90 1.90 2.00 2.20 2.10 
Japan  7.05 6.57 6.81 5.80 6.00 5.90 6.40 7.10 6.75 7.10 7.00 7.05 6.90 7.30 7.10 
Kenya  2.21 NA 2.21 2.50 2.00 2.25 2.10 2.00 2.05 1.90 1.90 1.90 2.10 2.10 2.10 
Korea  5.02 4.29 4.66 4.20 3.80 4.00 4.00 4.20 4.10 4.50 4.30 4.40 4.50 5.00 4.75 
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(continued) 
Two-year average corruption index data for 1996 to 2005 
 
The following table illustrates corruption perception index collected from Transparency International (TI) database. The table includes 41 countries in the 
sample divided into five panels, each of which includes two years average corruption index value. The full period data is from 1996 to 2005. The scale range 
from 0 to 10 points, higher points awarded for greater transparency and lower points awarded for poorer transparency.              
 
Country 1996 1997 Avg. 1998 1999 Avg. 2000 2001 Avg. 2002 2003 Avg. 2004 2005 Avg. 
Malaysia  5.32 5.01 5.17 5.30 5.10 5.20 4.80 5.00 4.90 4.90 5.20 5.05 5.00 5.10 5.05 
Mexico  3.30 2.66 2.98 3.30 3.40 3.35 3.30 3.70 3.50 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.50 3.55 
New Zealand  9.43 9.23 9.33 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.40 9.50 9.50 9.50 9.60 9.60 9.60 
Pakistan  1.00 2.53 1.77 2.70 2.20 2.45 NA 2.30 2.30 2.60 2.50 2.55 2.10 2.10 2.10 
Peru  NA NA NA  4.50 4.50 4.50 4.40 4.10 4.25 4.00 3.70 3.85 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Philippines 2.69 3.05 2.87 3.30 3.60 3.45 2.80 2.90 2.85 2.60 2.50 2.55 2.60 2.50 2.55 
Poland  5.57 5.08 5.33 4.60 4.20 4.40 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.00 3.60 3.80 3.50 3.40 3.45 
Portugal  6.53 6.97 6.75 6.50 6.70 6.60 6.40 6.30 6.35 6.30 6.60 6.45 6.30 6.50 6.40 
Russia  2.58 2.27 2.43 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.10 2.30 2.20 2.70 2.70 2.70 2.80 2.40 2.60 
South Africa 5.68 4.95 5.32 5.20 5.00 5.10 5.00 4.80 4.90 4.80 4.40 4.60 4.60 4.50 4.55 
Singapore  8.80 8.66 8.73 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.20 9.15 9.30 9.40 9.35 9.30 9.40 9.35 
Spain  4.31 5.90 5.11 6.10 6.60 6.35 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.10 6.90 7.00 7.10 7.00 7.05 
Sri-Lanka NA NA NA  NA NA NA NA NA NA  3.70 3.40 3.55 3.50 3.20 3.35 
Taiwan  4.98 5.02 5.00 5.30 5.60 5.45 5.50 5.90 5.70 5.60 5.70 5.65 5.60 5.90 5.75 
Thailand  3.33 3.06 3.20 3.00 3.20 3.10 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.30 3.25 3.60 3.80 3.70 
Turkey  3.54 3.21 3.38 3.40 3.60 3.50 3.80 3.60 3.70 3.20 3.10 3.15 3.20 3.50 3.35 
Ecuador  3.19 NA 3.19 2.30 2.40 2.35 2.60 2.30 2.45 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.50 2.45 
UK  8.44 8.22 8.33 8.70 8.60 8.65 8.70 8.30 8.50 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.60 8.60 8.60 
USA 7.66 7.61 7.64 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.80 7.60 7.70 7.70 7.50 7.60 7.50 7.60 7.55 
Venezuela  2.50 2.77 2.64 2.30 2.60 2.45 2.70 2.80 2.75 2.50 2.40 2.45 2.30 2.30 2.30 
Zimbabwe  NA NA NA  4.20 4.10 4.15 3.00 2.90 2.95 2.70 2.30 2.50 2.30 2.60 2.45 
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3.5.3   GDP, inflation and geographical size data 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and inflation data were collected from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (2007) databases. The study uses 
five panels for cross-sectional analysis and two-year averages of historical data for each 
panel. For example, if country A has a GDP per capita of $100 for 2006 and $200 for 2007, 
the study uses the average GDP data for the years 2006-07 in this panel (i.e. $150). The only 
country with missing GDP and inflation data for the cross-sectional analysis is Peru as it was 
not possible to find any reliable source of data for these measures. Further GDP per capita is 
divided by 10,000 in cross sectional analysis to reduce the size of the variable. 
In addition, geographical size data for the sample countries is collected from the CIA 
(2007) world factbook. The CIA world factbook is published by the Central Intelligence 
Agency, USA. The CIA website provides accurate and reliable country-level data including 
geographical size.  
Table 3.15 illustrates GDP per capita, inflation and sample country geographical size 
data. The data is arranged into five panels, each panel including two-year average data for 
GDP per capita and inflation for the sample countries. Country geographical size data is 
provided in the last column. 
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Table  3.15  Two-year average GDP per capita, inflation and geographical size data 
 
Table 3.15 illustrates inflation and GDP per capita data in five panels (1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05) and geographical size of a country 
in the last panel (1996-2005). The study uses two years average inflation (annual percentage) and GDP per capita (US $) data for each of the five panels. 
Geographical size data is in square kilometer for each country collected from CIA website. 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 1996-2005 
Name Inflation GDP  Inflation GDP  Inflation GDP  Inflation GDP  Inflation GDP  
Geographical 
size  
Argentina  100.93 8169.9 101.54 8248.6 99.46 7665.8 132.90 3056.6 154.61 4430.8 2766890 
Australia  1.45 22642.4 1.2 20550.5 4.45 19641.8 2.9 23748.7 2.5 33180.9 7686850 
Bangladesh  3.75 332.2 7.4 341.7 1.85 338.0 4.6 357.2 6.55 396.7 144000 
Brazil  11.45 4869.7 4.05 3960.1 6.95 3248.1 11.6 2717.8 6.75 3820.3 8511965 
Chili 6.75 5459.07 4.2 5107.9 3.7 4698.1 2.65 4486.1 2.1 6471.7 756950 
China  5.55 735.0 -1.1 839.1 0.55 991.8 0.2 1200.8 2.85 1594.3 9596960 
Columbia  9.6 2667.0 6.4 2328.2 -0.05 2011.8 2.25 1880.8 4.85 2475.2 1138910 
Cyprus  3.3 5987.8 1.9 6637.5 3.05 7542.0 3.45 8221.6 2.45 9128.7 9250 
Czech Rep. 8.65 5818.3 6.35 5895.5 4.3 5688.1 0.95 8055.7 2.3 11328.5 78866 
Egypt  6.65 1206.9 4.2 1409.3 2.6 1505.4 2.8 1255.2 10.85 1225.8 1001450 
Ecuador  27.5 1899.0 44.15 1626.8 66.9 1494.7 10.25 2019.1 2.55 2413.1 283560 
France  1.7 25135.1 0.65 24364.0 1.8 21972.2 2.05 26436.3 2.1 33316.4 547030 
Germany  1.35 28075.0 0.65 26407.7 1.6 23086.6 1.2 27103.5 1.85 33656.1 357021 
Greece  5.8 11409.0 3.35 11373.9 3.3 10548.4 3.7 13955.2 3.25 19404.7 131940 
Hong Kong 6.05 25819.0 -0.55 24976.6 -2.65 24891.0 -2.8 23637.2 0.35 24712.1 1092 
Hungary  20.8 4475.2 12.1 4715.7 9.5 4975.9 4.95 7524.0 5.1 10743.9 93030 
India  8.1 422.9 8.95 441.8 3.9 465.7 4.05 512.7 4 668.4 3287590 
Indonesia  6.6 1224.2 39.35 630.9 7.65 796.3 9.3 1029.4 8.3 1217.4 1919440 
Japan  1 35208.3 0.15 32499.3 -0.8 34421.7 -0.6 31951.3 -0.15 35850.1 377835 
Kenya  10.4 454.5 6.25 458.4 7.9 416.1 5.9 442.9 10.95 531.9 582650 
Korea  4.65 11742.0 4.15 8508.7 3.2 10530.5 3.15 12098.1 3.15 15278.6 98480 
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(continued)  
Two-year average GDP per capita, inflation and geographical size data 
 
Table 3.15 illustrates inflation and GDP per capita data in five panels (1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05) and geographical size of a country 
in the last panel (1996-2005). The study uses two years average inflation (annual percentage) and GDP per capita (US $) data for each of the five panels. 
Geographical size data is in square kilometer for each country collected from CIA website. 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 1996-2005 
Name Inflation GDP Inflation GDP Inflation GDP Inflation GDP Inflation GDP 
Geographical 
Size 
Malaysia  3.05 4693.7 3.95 3369.5 1.5 3754.4 1.45 4021.7 2.2 4842.9 329750 
Mexico  27.5 3935.3 16.25 4702.2 7.95 6097.4 4.75 6343.0 4.35 6941.5 1972550 
New Zealand  1.75 18208.0 0.6 14632.5 2.6 13418.1 2.25 17440.3 2.65 25250.1 268680 
Pakistan  10.9 583.3 5.3 534.2 3.75 511.3 3.05 570.3 8.25 726.9 803940 
Peru  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1285220 
Philippines 7.5 1188.2 8.2 964.6 5.2 954.1 3.2 971.5 6.8 1100.5 300000 
Poland  17.4 4054.5 9.55 4390.1 7.8 4699.5 1.35 5424.1 2.8 7242.4 312685 
Portugal  2.4 11552.6 2.2 12034.7 3.6 11150.8 3.5 13614.0 2.3 17169.4 92391 
Russia  31.25 2693.4 56.7 1585.5 21.15 1943.2 14.75 2685.8 11.75 4742.7 17075200 
South Africa  7.95 8898.7 6.05 9108.5 5.55 9870.5 7.5 10687.1 2.4 11818.0 1219912 
Singapore  1.7 25242.6 -0.15 20959.3 1.15 21900.1 0.05 21529.1 1.1 25866.4 692.7 
Spain  2.75 15195.6 2 15416.7 3.15 14798.3 3.35 19270.8 3.25 26269.0 504782 
Sri-Lanka 12.75 823.5 6.7 870.2 6.8 862.4 6.4 909.3 9.25 1114.9 65610 
Taiwan  2 13638.5 0.95 13063.5 0.65 13726.9 -0.25 13173.8 1.95 14662.3 35980 
Thailand  5.75 2766.8 4.2 1906.8 1.65 1901.2 1.2 2110.9 3.65 2535.1 514000 
Turkey  82.2 2947.3 73.55 3025.5 54.1 2647.2 35 3069.1 8.4 4675.2 780580 
USA 2.6 29300.1 1.85 31987.6 3.1 34646.4 1.95 36499.3 3.05 40388.2 9631420 
UK  2.15 21633.5 1.5 24671.7 1 24415.8 1.35 28441.7 1.7 36120.2 244820 
Venezuela  74.95 3469.9 29.7 4030.2 14.35 4938.3 26.75 3506.9 18.8 4637.9 912050 
Zimbabwe  20.2 3469.9 44.65 4030.2 64.5 4938.3 249.1 3506.9 293.9 4637.9 390580 
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3.6   Trade openness 
The thesis also uses the trade openness measure variable for the stock market synchronicity 
analysis. Morck et al. (2000) argue that more open economies have a lower level of stock 
synchronicity than less open economies. They find that emerging countries tend to have less 
open economic policies than developed countries and the communist states especially used to 
have closed economic policies. This argument is further supported by La-Porta et al. (1998), 
who suggest that post-communist countries provide very little protection to their market 
shareholders. However, this study uses the trade openness measure developed by Li et al. 
(2003).  
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Here ntI  is the total import of a country n  in year t  and ntGDP  is the gross domestic 
product (GDP) for country n  for the same period. ∑
n
ntGDP is the world aggregate GDP at 
period t . 
The trade openness measure calculates the total domestic consumption = one minus 
the nation’s share of world production (country GDP / world aggregate GDP). The value of 
the individual country openness measure is zero. In a completely closed economy, this 
measure is negative one plus the country’s GDP as a fraction of world GDP. However, as the 
economy become more and more open, the measure shifts toward a zero value. 
The study collects the total import data and country GDP data from the DataStream 
database and then calculates the trade openness measure using the above formula (equation 
6). It uses the two-year average trade openness measure for the cross-sectional analysis. It 
should be noted that it is possible to have a positive trade openness measure for entrepôt14 
countries. However, the trade openness variable is always negative for the sample countries, 
except for Singapore and Hong Kong. This result is consistent with Li et al. (2003) who 
argue that Singapore and Hong Kong are the most important entrepôt states in the world; in 
                                                 
14
 An entrepôt (from the French ‘warehouse’) is a trading post where merchandise can be imported and exported 
without paying import duties, often at a profit. 
 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entrep%C3%B4t) 
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particular Hong Kong is a unique example, having switched from being a UK colonial state 
to a Chinese special administration region during the observation period. Li et al. (2003) 
suggest that trade openness is a direct measure of the openness of an individual country’s 
stock market to foreign investors. In addition, they argue that trade openness reflects the 
value of stocks that can be purchased by foreign investors as a percentage of total domestic 
market capitalisation.  
The study calculates trade openness measures for the sample countries from 1996 to 
2005. A summary of the trade openness measure is shown in table 3.16. 
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Table  3.16  Trade openness measures for the sample countries  
 
Table 3.16 illustrates the trade openness measure for the observed 41 countries following the equation in section 
3.6. The study uses a 2 years average trade openness measure for cross sectional analysis. The full dataset is 
divided into five sub periods, which are 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 20004-05. In a completely 
closed economy, this measure is negative one, as the economy becomes more and more open this measure 
moves towards zero. It is found that the trade openness variable is always negative for sample countries except 
for Singapore and Hong Kong consistent with Li et al (2003).  
 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Argentina -0.894 -0.892 -0.908 -0.960 -0.949 
Australia -0.828 -0.814 -0.808 -0.813 -0.811 
Bangladesh -0.832 -0.831 -0.815 -0.822 -0.774 
Brazil -0.900 -0.897 -0.882 -0.889 -0.889 
Chile -0.745 -0.762 -0.748 -0.740 -0.729 
China -0.818 -0.820 -0.779 -0.726 -0.663 
Columbia -0.634 -0.672 -0.738 -0.756 -0.715 
Cyprus -0.064 -0.241 -0.261 -0.352 -0.329 
Czech Republic -0.509 -0.508 -0.389 -0.418 -0.366 
Ecuador -0.793 -0.784 -0.755 -0.754 -0.734 
Egypt -0.814 -0.813 -0.855 -0.845 -0.807 
France -0.782 -0.766 -0.707 -0.750 -0.762 
Germany -0.739 -0.722 -0.658 -0.696 -0.702 
Greece -0.802 -0.811 -0.776 -0.772 -0.771 
Hong Kong 0.220 0.109 0.240 0.372 0.667 
Hungary -0.567 -0.435 -0.350 -0.433 -0.408 
India -0.888 -0.883 -0.877 -0.867 -0.823 
Indonesia -0.799 -0.732 -0.748 -0.808 -0.753 
Japan -0.768 -0.786 -0.770 -0.791 -0.787 
Kenya -0.754 -0.775 -0.740 -0.752 -0.697 
Korea -0.976 -0.979 -0.977 -0.977 -0.976 
Malaysia -0.213 -0.179 -0.161 -0.222 -0.160 
Mexico -0.704 -0.674 -0.682 -0.705 -0.681 
New Zealand -0.779 -0.758 -0.735 -0.757 -0.759 
Pakistan -0.832 -0.862 -0.847 -0.845 -0.787 
Peru -0.827 -0.831 -0.834 -0.839 -0.822 
Philippines -0.559 -0.550 -0.555 -0.514 -0.517 
Poland -0.741 -0.723 -0.720 -0.697 -0.653 
Portugal -0.695 -0.683 -0.650 -0.718 -0.713 
Russia -0.790 -0.762 -0.799 -0.794 -0.803 
South Africa -0.779 -0.786 -0.765 -0.742 -0.745 
Singapore 0.403 0.311 0.409 0.357 0.626 
Spain -0.771 -0.752 -0.723 -0.740 -0.724 
Sri-Lanka -0.611 -0.629 -0.618 -0.644 -0.627 
Taiwan -0.630 -0.610 -0.586 -0.598 -0.484 
Thailand -0.588 -0.598 -0.476 -0.475 -0.367 
Turkey -0.729 -0.811 -0.724 -0.730 -0.747 
UK -0.722 -0.732 -0.725 -0.739 -0.737 
USA -0.613 -0.578 -0.543 -0.566 -0.584 
Venezuela -0.841 -0.839 -0.852 -0.871 -0.839 
Zimbabwe -0.592 -0.599 -0.667 -0.517 0.183 
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3.7   Conclusion 
The thesis uses three stock synchronicity measures for the analysis − the classical synchronicity 
measure, the R-square measure and the zero-return measure. Additionally, a number of explanatory 
variables are used for the cross-sectional analysis. The individual firm stock return data and the 
market indices are collected from the DataStream database, supplemented where necessary by data 
from Yahoo finance. The data span the period from January 1996 to December 2005 in an analysis of 
34 emerging markets and seven developed markets. In addition, two sets of time series data are used 
for US firms (NYSE and S&P 500). The study has selected 12 emerging countries of common law 
origin, 19 emerging countries of civil law origin and three emerging countries of post-communist 
origin for the analysis. 
Further, corporate governance index data are collected from the World Bank database 
(biannual data), geographical size data is collected from the CIA database, corruption index data is 
collected from the Transparency International website, and inflation and GDP per capita data are 
collected from the IMF and World Bank databases.   
 
    
 
62 
CHAPTER 4 Classical synchronicity measure∗ 
 
4.1   Introduction 
This chapter analyses the stock market synchronicity of the developed and emerging markets 
using the classical stock synchronicity measure developed by Morck et al. (2000).  The 
chapter also investigates reasons for higher stock price synchronicity in emerging markets 
using cross-sectional analysis for both the emerging markets and the developed economies.  
The study covers the period from January 1996 to December 2005. It should be noted 
that the study uses both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and S&P 500 shares for the 
analysis. However, the S&P 500 shares are used only in descriptive statistics whereas the 
NYSE shares are used for both the descriptive statistics and the cross-sectional analysis.  
 
4.2   Full period: Legal segment and geographical segment 
The descriptive statistics for legal origin reported in table 4.1 shows that Malaysia (73 
percent), Bangladesh (69 percent), Singapore (69 percent) and Cyprus (69 percent) have the 
highest stock return synchronicity within the group of countries with common law origin. 
South Africa (60 percent) and Kenya (61 percent) exhibit the lowest level of stock return 
synchronicity during the observation period, whereas the average synchronicity for countries 
of common law origin is 66 percent.  
                                                 
∗
 Some of the results reported in this chapter for counties in the South Asian region were presented in 
conference paper entitled ‘Stock Synchronicity in South-Asia: An Analysis of Monthly Changes Over the 
Periods’.  This paper, co-authored with my supervisor (Richard Heaney), was presented by me at the 11th 
FINSIA Banking and Finance conference on 26th September, 2006 at RMIT University.  The key results from 
this of this chapter form the basis a further conference paper entitled ‘Do emerging markets have higher stock 
price synchronicity? The International evidence’ which has been accepted for the presentation at 9th 
International Business Research Conference on 24-26th November, 2008. 
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Table  4.1  Descriptive statistics for classical measure: Legal segment analysis 
Data include emerging common law, civil law and post-communist countries and the developed countries 
 
Emerging common law 
countries 
Emerging 
civil law countries 
Emerging post-communist 
countries  
Developed nations 
 
Country Sync. Country Sync. Country Sync. Country Sync. 
Bangladesh 0.69 Argentina 0.69 China 0.73 Australia 0.58 
Cyprus 0.69 Brazil 0.64 Poland 0.66 France 0.61 
Egypt 0.66 Chile 0.65 Russia 0.69 Germany 0.59 
Hong Kong 0.65 Columbia 0.66   Japan 0.67 
India 0.65 Czech Republic 0.61   New Zealand 0.62 
Kenya 0.61 Ecuador 0.75     UK 0.63 
Malaysia 0.73 Greece 0.72     USA - NYSE 0.63 
Pakistan 0.67 Hungary 0.65         
South Africa 0.6 Indonesia 0.68       
Singapore 0.69 Korea 0.68         
Sri-Lanka 0.67 Mexico 0.66         
Zimbabwe 0.66 Peru 0.65         
    Philippines 0.65         
    Portugal 0.63         
    Spain 0.66         
    Taiwan 0.69         
    Thailand 0.66         
    Turkey 0.74         
    Venezuela 0.67         
Average 0.66   0.67   0.69   0.62 
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Civil law origin countries have higher levels of synchronicity (67 percent) on average, 
with Greece having 72 percent, Ecuador 75 percent and Turkey 74 percent. The Czech 
Republic shows an unexpectedly low average of 61 percent for its synchronicity measure.  
 At the same time, emerging post-communist countries show higher levels of 
synchronicity than those of common law and civil law origin. However, the study has selected 
three samples from post-communist countries, which are China (73 percent), Poland (66 
percent) and Russia (69 percent). The average synchronicity for post-communist countries is 
69 percent.  
By contrast, developed countries show lower levels of stock synchronicity during this 
observation period regardless of their legal origin. The synchronicity data for New Zealand 
(62 percent), Australia (58 percent), France (61 percent), Germany (59 percent), the UK (63 
percent) and the USA (63 percent) average 62 percent during the observation period. Japan is 
the only country with high levels of stock price co-movement amongst the developed nations 
during this period. The analysis suggests that Japanese stocks are more volatile on average. 
This market has a long history of higher stock price co-movement, as noted by Morck et al. 
(2000).  
Table 4.2 illustrates the data for stock return synchronicity by geographical location, 
the initial analysis suggesting that geographical location has a very small impact on stock 
price synchronicity. 
 South America and South Asia both average 67 percent stock return co-movements 
while in European market the average synchronicity is 66 percent and the Asia/Pacific 
average synchronicity is 68 percent. 
Central Asian countries have somewhat higher levels of stock price co-movement. 
However, the sample size for this location includes only Cyprus (69 percent) and Turkey (74 
percent). African countries exhibit lower levels of stock synchronicity (63 percent) with South 
Africa and Kenya having the lowest level of stock market synchronisation. Overall the results 
are consistent with Morck et al. (2000) who find that the five most synchronised countries 
were Poland, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Turkey. Similar results are also exhibited in table 
4.2.
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Table  4.2  Descriptive statistics for classical measure: Geographical segment analysis 
 
 Emerging − Africa 
 
Emerging −  
South America 
Emerging − South Asia 
 
Emerging − Asia/Pacific 
 
Emerging −  
Central Asia 
Emerging − Europe 
 
Country Sync. Country Sync. Country Sync. Country Sync. Country Sync. Country Sync. 
                  
Egypt 0.66 Argentina 0.69 Bangladesh 0.69 China 0.73 Cyprus 0.69 Czech Republic 0.61 
Kenya 0.61 Brazil 0.64 India 0.65 Hong Kong 0.65 Turkey 0.74 Greece 0.72 
South Africa 0.60 Chile 0.65 Pakistan 0.67 Indonesia 0.68    Hungary 0.65 
Zimbabwe 0.66 Columbia 0.66 Sri-Lanka 0.67 Korea 0.68    Poland 0.66 
   Ecuador 0.75    Malaysia 0.73    Portugal 0.63 
   Peru 0.65    Philippines 0.65    Russia 0.69 
   Mexico 0.66    Singapore 0.69    Spain 0.66 
   Venezuela 0.67    Taiwan 0.69       
        Thailand 0.66      
                 
                  
Average 0.63   0.67   0.67   0.68   0.72   0.66 
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4.3   Sub-period: Legal and geographical segment 
Appendix A-4.1 illustrates the data for legal segment analysis for the classical synchronicity 
measure. It appears that common law countries exhibit lower stock synchronicity than civil 
law or post-communist countries. Among the common law countries Malaysia exhibits the 
highest stock synchronicity, and Ecuador and Turkey exhibit the highest synchronicity among 
the civil law countries. Of the post-communist countries, China exhibits a high stock price co-
movement over all sub-periods. On average, post-communist country stock synchronicity is 
the highest among the legal origin groups.  
Appendix A-4.2 illustrates the data for analysis by geographical segment sub-periods 
for the classical synchronicity measure. There is evidence that Central Asian countries exhibit 
higher stock synchronicity during these sub-periods, followed by South Asian countries. In 
addition, developed economies exhibit the lowest synchronicity measure for all sub-periods. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the variation in stock return synchronicity evident from 
Germany, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, China and Turkey, with a 10-week moving average 
classical synchronicity measure based on stock return data from January 1996 to December 
2005. This figure shows that stock return co-movements for Chinese and Turkish markets are 
more synchronous than for the Australian and German markets. During this period the 
Chinese and Turkish stock markets show average synchronicity of 74 percent and 75 percent 
respectively, whereas the Australian and German markets show average synchronicity of 58 
percent and 59 percent respectively. 
Appendix A-4.7 graphs the 10-week moving average synchronicity for the US, 
Australian and Chinese stock markets for the period 1996-2005. It is found that the Chinese 
stock market moves 73 percent in the same direction during these periods, whereas Australian 
stock synchronicity is about 58 percent. Further, the USA (63 percent) exhibits somewhat 
average synchronicity. This suggests that stock synchronicity in emerging economies is 
higher than in developed markets. Further, the NYSE share group exhibits lower levels of 
stock synchronicity than S&P 500 shares, although it should be noted that the NYSE includes 
approximately 4,049 stocks while the S&P includes only 500 stocks. This suggests that larger 
stocks in the S&P group move more synchronously than NYSE shares (appendix A-4.8). 
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Figure 4.1:  The 10 Weeks Moving Average Synchronicity for Selected Markets. 
The study graphs both the lowest synchronous countries and highest synchronous countries. It is found that China and Turkey exhibit the highest synchronicity 
during the observation period and lowest level of synchronicity are evident from Germany and Australia. The graph also includes stock synchronicity for the 
NYSE and the S&P 500 group of companies. The data shows that the S&P 500 group of companies exhibits higher stock price co-movement than the NYSE 
(please refer Appendix A-4.8 for more detail). 
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 Table 4.3 shows the t test statistics between the emerging economies and the 
developed economies. The study finds a significant mean difference between the two groups 
at α 0.01 level. Further, while not reported here, a comparison of mean across the sub-periods 
is reported in appendix A-4.3 (panels A to E). There is evidence of statistical mean difference 
between the sub-periods at the one percent significance level. 
 
 
Table  4.3  t-test statistics for the classical measure 
Developed vs. emerging country groups (equal variance estimate) 
 
 t test statistics Degrees of freedom Sig. (2-tailed) 
3.606 39 0.001 
 
To test whether synchronicity differs across the sample country group, ANOVA tests 
also run across the synchronicity measures between the groups (table 4.4). The test statistic 
indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in the mean variance at the one 
percent significant level.  
 
Table  4.4  ANOVA test statistics for the classical measure 
Developed vs. emerging country groups (equal variance estimate) 
The data include two sets of countries, the emerging and the developed groups. Emerging countries include 
34 sample countries and developed countries include seven sample developed nations. 
 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 
.016 1 .016 13.002 .001 
Within groups 
.047 39 .001   
Total 
.062 40    
 
 
In addition, panel F of appendix A-4.4 reports the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics to 
show that there is a significant difference in the median for the groups of observed countries 
(emerging and developed country groups) from January 1996 to December 2005.  
 
 
    
 
69 
Table 4.5 illustrates the ANOVA test statistics between the legal origin groups of 
countries (the common law, civil law and post-communist countries). However, the study did 
not find significant difference between mean variance in legal origin groups.  
 
Table  4.5  ANOVA test statistics for the classical measure: Legal segment analysis 
Developed vs. emerging country groups (equal variance estimate) 
 
The data include three emerging country groups: emerging common law countries (12), emerging civil law 
countries (19) and emerging post-communist countries (3).  
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 
.002 2 .001 .807 .455 
Within groups 
.039 31 .001   
Total 
.041 33    
 
Table 4.6 illustrate autocorrelation coefficient to estimate the repenting pattern of error 
term for stock synchronicity time series data. There is statistically significant autocorrelation 
during the observed period for most of the countries. Exceptions include Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Brazil, China, Egypt, Hungary, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey from the 
emerging market group, and the USA and Japan from the developed economy group.  
Table  4.6  Autocorrelation coefficient for the classical synchronicity measure 
From January 1996 to December 2005 
 
  Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 PAC 
Prob. 
(6 lags) 
Auto 
Lag 
Prob. 
(Auto lags) 
Argentina 0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.00 1 0.00 
Australia 0.19 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 n/a 0.00 
Bangladesh 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.42 n/a 0.13 
Brazil 0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.13 n/a 0.07 
Chile 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 n/a 0.00 
China 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.12 n/a 0.06 
Columbia 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 n/a 0.00 
Cyprus 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.05 -0.08 0.00 1 0.00 
Czech Rep. 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.00 1 0.00 
Ecuador 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03 n/a 0.03 
Egypt 0.11 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.26 n/a 0.02 
France 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 1 0.02 
Germany 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 1 0.15 
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(continued) 
Autocorrelation coefficient for the classical synchronicity measure 
From January 1996 to December 2005 
 
  Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 PAC 
Prob. 
(6 lags) 
Auto 
Lag 
Prob. 
(Auto lags) 
Greece 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.08 -0.01 0.00 3 0.00 
Hong Kong 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 n/a 0.00 
Hungary 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 n/a 0.06 
India 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 n/a 0.01 
Indonesia 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 
Japan -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 n/a 0.14 
Kenya 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.15 -0.03 -0.11 0.00 1 0.00 
Korea 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 n/a 0.06 
Malaysia 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.00 3 0.00 
Mexico -0.01 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.01 n/a 0.90 
New Zealand 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 n/a 0.01 
Pakistan 0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.77 n/a 0.13 
Peru 0.29 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.06 -0.02 0.00 n/a 0.00 
Philippines 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 n/a 0.06 
Poland 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.00 5 0.00 
Portugal 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.10 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 n/a 0.04 
Russia 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.00 n/a 0.02 
South Africa 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.01 n/a 0.03 
Singapore 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 1 0.00 
Spain 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.02 n/a 0.20 
Sri-Lanka 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 n/a 0.00 
Taiwan 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.02 n/a 0.52 
Thailand -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.60 n/a 0.16 
Turkey 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.40 n/a 0.02 
UK 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 n/a 0.00 
USA-NYSE 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.40 n/a 0.96 
 S&P 500 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 n/a 0.05 
Venezuela 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.00 1 0.00 
Zimbabwe 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.10 0.00 n/a 0.00 
 
 
However, the study arbitrarily chooses six (6) lags for autocorrelation coefficient. In 
the last column, we also include the probability of automatic lag selection from ADF test 
statistics. The result is fairly consistent with some variation in result for some countries. 
The study also runs an Augmented Dickey Fuller test (model includes intercept, no 
time frame) to determine whether the stock synchronicity measures are stationary over the 
period. The ADF test is an important test statistics for determining the quality of the data. 
Table 4.7 reports the ADF test statistics which are statistically significant and consistent with 
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the synchronicity measures being stationary over the period of the study. This suggests that 
the time series data has constant mean and constant mean variance.  
 
Table  4.7  ADF test statistics for the classical synchronicity measure 
 
ADF test statistics 
Argentina  -13.54 Mexico  -22.94 
Australia  -18.98 New Zealand  -20.15 
Bangladesh  -21.25 Pakistan  -21.28 
Brazil  -21.08 Peru  -16.92 
Chile -19.88 Philippines  -20.94 
China  -20.92 Poland  -5.47 
Columbia  -19.73 Portugal  -20.82 
Cyprus  -11.19 Russia  -20.47 
Czech Republic -12.40 South Africa -20.95 
Egypt  -20.42 Singapore  -13.19 
France  -13.23 Spain  -21.57 
Germany -13.73 Sri-Lanka -19.29 
Greece  -7.69 Taiwan  -22.18 
Hong Kong -19.78 Thailand  -24.22 
Hungary  -21.11 Ecuador  -3.44 
India  -20.14 Turkey  -20.60 
Indonesia  -13.23 UK  -19.13 
Japan  -24.28 USA  -22.70 
Kenya  -12.36 Venezuela  -12.07 
Korea  -21.00 Zimbabwe  -19.05 
Malaysia  -7.03    
 
 
 Table 4.8 illustrates the correlation coefficients for the sample of countries using the 
classical measure over the period from January 1996 to December 2005 to test the 
relationship between synchronicity values. The study finds evidence of considerable variation 
in correlation coefficient sign and significance at the 5 percent significant level across the 
countries for the full period.  
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Table  4.8  Correlation-coefficient of the sample countries 
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(continued) 
 Correlation-coefficient of the classical synchronicity measure for observed countries 
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 It is found that among the South American countries Argentina is positively 
correlated with Mexico (27 percent) and South Africa (22 percent). There is also some 
positive correlation with the European countries (examples include Poland, Spain and the 
UK) and the USA. Chile is correlated with Mexico, Russia and South Africa. In addition, 
Mexico has strong positive correlation with the USA (31 percent), Spain (26 percent) and 
South Africa (24 percent). Finally, Brazil and Ecuador shows no sign of significant 
correlation with any of the other countries in the sample. 
South Africa is positively correlated with Australia, Argentina, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Mexico, the UK and the USA. Surprisingly, however, Egypt, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe show no sign of significant correlation with any countries in Africa or the rest of 
the world. This finding suggests that synchronicity measures for common law origin 
countries are somewhat more correlated with each other than with other countries in the same 
region. However, in South Asia, the study finds no significant correlation for Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan with other countries of the world; whereas Sri-Lanka is positively 
correlated with Columbia, France and Mexico. 
Among the Asia/Pacific group, Hong Kong shows significant positive correlation 
with Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, France, Germany and the UK and also shows some 
significant positive correlation with other Asian and European countries. Indonesia exhibits 
positive correlation only with the Philippines and Singapore, while Malaysia shows strong 
positive correlation with Singapore and Hong Kong but negative correlation with Peru. The 
other Asia/Pacific countries show somewhat mixed correlations. 
Hungary shows some positive correlation with Asian and European countries, such as 
Poland (29 percent) and the UK (23 percent), and there is mixed correlation with other 
countries in the sample. Portugal is positively correlated with France and Germany, and 
Spain is correlated with France, Germany and Mexico.  
Developed countries are somewhat more positively correlated with each other than 
with the emerging countries. For example, the Australian synchronicity measure is 
significantly correlated with France, Germany, Hong Kong, New Zealand and the UK. In 
Europe the UK measure is strongly correlated with Germany, France, Spain and Portugal. 
Further, the USA is correlated with France, Germany, Spain, Mexico and the UK. The 
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strongest correlation evident in table 4.8 is between Germany with France (67 percent). This 
suggests that strong economic and political relationships exist between these two countries. 
However, the study finds no significant positive correlation between Japan and the other 
Asian countries. The Japanese synchronicity measure is significantly correlated only with 
France (19 percent), Germany (19 percent) and Spain (17 percent). 
In summary, there is evidence that synchronicity measures for the common law 
countries are somewhat more correlated with each other than is the case with civil law 
countries. It is also found that developed countries exhibit higher levels of synchronicity 
correlation than do the emerging countries.  
4.3.1 Regional synchronicity time series links: A VAR analysis 
The previous sections looked at the time series behaviour of stock synchronicity measures for 
individual countries. It is also important to look at the direction of these relationships. The 
study provides a first order auto-regression model to study the links that exists between the 
geographical region synchronicity measures. The study includes a Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) model (reported in table 4.9, test includes one lag) to test the relationship and the 
direction of the relationship that exists between geographical region stock synchronicity. 
It is found that the synchronicity of a geographical region is most affected by the past 
synchronicity values of its own geographical region. However, there also appears to be some 
link with other geographical regions, such as the developed economies appearing to predict 
South America and South Asia, and Central Asia appearing to predict Africa. 
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Table  4.9  The vector auto-regression (VAR) analysis 
 
The data include six emerging geographical region groups and the developed country group. The emerging 
country groups are South America, South Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Europe and Asia/Pacific. The developed 
country group includes Australia, France, Germany, New Zealand, Japan, the UK and the USA. The data span 
the period from January 1996 to December 2005. Further, two values are reported below the estimated 
coefficient. The first value in parenthesis is the P value and the second value in brackets is the t statistic. 
 
 
South 
America 
South 
Asia Europe Developed 
Central 
Asia 
Asia/ 
Pacific Africa 
        
South America 0.1929 -0.0103 -0.0213 -0.0584 -0.1675 -0.0685 -0.0552 
(-1) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) 
 [ 4.33] [-0.19] [-0.43] [-1.22] [-1.78] [-1.31] [-1.11] 
        
South Asia 0.0051 0.1316 -0.0064 0.0472 -0.0259 -0.0647 0.0880 
(-1) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [ 0.14] [ 2.90] [-0.16] [ 1.24] [-0.35] [-1.56] [ 2.22] 
        
Europe 0.0005 0.0084 0.0221 -0.0034 0.2046 0.0511 0.0786 
(-1) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) 
 [ 0.01] [ 0.15] [ 0.43] [-0.07] [ 2.14] [ 0.96] [ 1.55] 
        
Developed 0.1274 0.1266 -0.0089 0.0964 -0.1296 0.0467 0.0320 
(-1) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) 
 [ 2.64] [ 2.11] [-0.16] [ 1.86] [-1.27] [ 0.82] [ 0.59] 
        
Central Asia -0.0189 -0.0149 0.0165 -0.0084 0.1460 0.0278 -0.0553 
(-1) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
 [-0.91] [-0.58] [ 0.70] [-0.38] [ 3.32] [ 1.14] [-2.38] 
        
Asia/Pacific 0.0183 -0.0717 0.0579 0.0095 0.0327 0.0908 0.0054 
(-1) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) 
 [ 0.46] [-1.44] [ 1.28] [ 0.22] [ 0.39] [ 1.93] [ 0.12] 
        
Africa -0.0028 0.0814 0.0088 0.0288 -0.1498 -0.0336 0.1855 
(-1) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) 
 [-0.07] [ 1.67] [ 0.20] [ 0.68] [-1.81] [-0.73] [ 4.23] 
        
 R-squared 0.070 0.045 0.006 0.017 0.049 0.029 0.070 
 Adj. R-squared 0.057 0.032 -0.007 0.003 0.036 0.016 0.058 
 F-statistic 5.520 3.422 0.473 1.247 3.792 2.214 5.530 
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4.4   Panel data analysis 
The study uses two corporate governance indicators for cross-sectional analysis (regulatory 
control and voice & accountability). These governance indicators reflect the statistical 
compilation of responses concerning the quality of governance and are measured in units 
ranging from -2.5 to +2.5. The higher values correspond with better governance outcomes 
and lower values correspond with poor governance outcomes. In addition the study also the 
corporate transparency index (CPI), country geographical size, a trade openness measure, 
GDP per capita and an inflation index in cross-sectional analysis. 
Country geographical size is collected from the CIA15 world factbook website, and 
GDP per capita and inflation rate are collected from the World Bank16 database. Further, the 
trade openness measure is calculated using the Li et al. (2003) trade openness approach, 
which was discussed in the data section. The corruption index was collected from the 
Transparency International database17.  
4.4.1  The model 
The study uses the following model to explain stock return synchronicity: 
 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSYNC εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  (15) 
 
where for each country i iSYNC  represents stock return synchronicity and α is a constant. iRC  is 
the regulatory control index, iVC  is the voice and accountability index, iIN  is the inflation, 
iCP  is the corruption perception index, iGDP  is the gross domestic product per capita / 
10,000, iTR  is the trade openness measure, iSIZE is geographical size and iε  is the error 
term. The natural log of geographical size is used to minimise the impact of skewness in this 
variable.  
                                                 
15
  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
 
16
 http://www.worldbank.org/ 
 
17
 http://www.transparency.org/ 
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4.4.2  Panel analysis 
The study uses white adjusted standard errors in a fixed effect model for the panel analysis. 
Table 4.10 illustrates analysis for all countries, developed countries and emerging countries. 
Correlations between the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix A-4.5. The results 
obtained from the equation (8) to the data are reported in table 4.10. The thesis uses 41 
sample countries for the analysis, 34 of which are emerging countries. Analysis of the 
descriptive statistics in table 3.8 shows that most of the emerging countries rank lower in the 
corruption index due to higher levels of corruption present, while developed economies rank 
higher in the corruption index due to their lower levels of corruption.  
The country corruption index is negatively correlated with synchronicity at the 1 
percent significance level for the all country group and positively correlated with the 
developed country group. However, this effect is insignificant for the emerging country 
group, although the corruption index is negatively correlated with synchronicity in this case. 
In addition, the inclusion of Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong in the emerging country 
sample could exacerbate the problem, as the corruption index is quite high (low corruption) 
for these countries. However, to check the variation in the analysis the study runs the cross-
sectional analysis without Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea for the all country group 
and the emerging country group. It is found that corruption become statistically significant at 
the 15 percent level for the emerging country group, which was statistically insignificant in 
the prior analysis. This suggests a significant impact of these countries within the emerging 
country group. Further, there is no other strong evidence of significant difference between 
the findings. The result of this analysis is provided in Appendix A-4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
79 
Table  4.10  Panel data analysis: Classical measure 
 
The panel of this table contains estimates of: 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSYNC εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  
where SYNC, the dependent variable, is the stock synchronicity measure and α is a constant. Control (RC) is 
regulatory control index, Corruption (CP) is the corruption index produced by Transparency International, GDP 
is gross domestic product per capita / 10,000, Inflation (IN) is a country’s inflation rate, Trade (TR) is the trade 
openness measure, Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the natural log 
of the geographical size of a country. Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first in 
parenthesis is the t statistic using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value for 
the statistic. 
 
 
Variables All countries Developed countries Emerging countries 
Control 0.01603 0.00951 0.00972 
 (3.83) (1.83) (1.98) 
 [0.00] [0.08] [0.05] 
Corruption -0.00789 0.00953 -0.00317 
 (-5.48) (31.25) (-1.21) 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.23] 
GDP 0.00325 0.01262 0.01198 
 (1.62) (1.04) (1.77) 
 [0.11] [0.31] [0.08] 
Inflation 0.00018 -0.00273 0.00020 
 (1.15) (-0.81) (1.18) 
 [0.25] [0.42] [0.24] 
Trade -0.01257 0.04789 -0.01726 
 (-1.18) (0.56) (-1.32) 
 [0.24] [0.58] [0.19] 
Accountability -0.02376 -0.12679 -0.02129 
 (-6.39) (-3.09) (-6.45) 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Log (Size) -0.00381 -0.00355 -0.00044 
 (-3.45) (-1.10) (-0.35) 
 [0.00] [0.28] [0.73] 
R-square 0.269 0.614 0.128 
 
 The same effect also appears for inflation and GDP per capita. It is often argued that 
high inflation is bad for the real market economy and that synchronicity is positively 
correlated with higher inflation (Morck et al., 2000). Regardless, inflation is positively 
correlated with stock synchronicity for the all country group and for the emerging country 
group, but the effect is statistically insignificant. It is found that few emerging countries 
(Singapore, Taiwan, and Argentina) exhibit low inflation rates during the sample period, 
while the remaining emerging countries exhibit higher inflation. This variation in inflation 
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rates between the emerging countries appears to cause inflation to be positively correlated 
with the synchronicity measure but the effect remains statistically insignificant.  
 The voice and accountability variable is negatively correlated with stock 
synchronicity at the one percent significance level for the all country group, the developed 
country group and the emerging country group. Voice and accountability is one of the most 
important corporate governance mechanisms identified in the panel analysis. The World 
Bank produces six good governance indicators in three clusters and three of these indicators 
are used in this study for measuring good governance. Voice and accountability and political 
stability are included in the first of the three clusters.  
 The World Bank states that the voice and accountability indicators include various 
aspects of civil rights, political rights and independence of public and private media. This 
provides a measure of a country’s legal environment and legal enforcement quality. Morck et 
al. (2000) argue that synchronicity is higher for countries that do not respect private property 
rights and have less enforcement quality in their legal system. This argument is further 
supported by Roll (1988). It is argued that strong civil and property rights produce lower 
levels of stock synchronicity.  
 Surprisingly, regulatory control exhibits a positive correlation with the stock return 
synchronicity at the one percent significance level for the all country group, and at the five 
percent significance level for the emerging country group. It was predicted in section 3.4.1 
that regulatory control and voice and accountability would have the same impact on stock 
synchronicity. However, it is found that some among the sample of emerging countries 
exhibit strong positive regulatory control systems (examples include Poland, Malaysia and 
Singapore) during the observation period, while these countries exhibit higher stock market 
co-movement in the same period. This may explain the reason for the positive correlation 
between regulatory control and stock price co-movement for the panel analysis. 
 Log geographical size is used to control for country size. It is found that the 
geographical size of a country is negatively correlated with stock synchronicity at the one 
percent significance level for the all country group but the effect disappears for the developed 
country and emerging country groups. Emerging countries generally have small geographical 
size (except for China, India and Brazil), while developed countries are generally larger in 
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size. Therefore, geographical size becomes statistically significant within groups rather than 
between groups. 
4.4.3  Panel data analysis: Legal origin effects 
Separate analysis is also conducted for groups based on legal origin (common law countries 
and civil law countries) to check for variation across legal groups (table 4.11). Post-
communist countries are not analysed separately due to the small size of the sample.  
 It is found that inflation and accountability in common law countries is negatively 
correlated with stock synchronicity at the 10 percent significance level and trade openness is 
positively correlated with synchronicity at the 5 percent level.  In contrast, accountability is 
negatively correlated with stock synchronicity at the 10 percent significance level for the 
civil law country group and trade openness, geographical size and corruption are negatively 
correlated at the one percent significance level. 
 There is evidence that stock synchronicity in civil law countries is driven mainly by 
weak corporate governance systems and high inflation, whereas the effect is less significant 
for the common law countries. Additionally, the trade openness measure has the same effect 
for both the common law and the civil law country groups. 
Regulatory control is positively corrected with stock synchronicity at the 10 percent 
level for civil law countries. This may be due to the weak regulatory control systems appears 
in the emerging civil law country group (La-Porta et al., 1998). However, this effect is 
insignificant for common law countries.  
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Table  4.11  Panel data analysis between legal origin groups: Classical measure 
The study compares the panel data analysis between the common law country group and the civil law country 
group. The post-communist countries are not analysed separately due to the small sample size.  
The panel of this table contains estimates of: 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSYNC εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  
where SYNC, the dependent variable, is the stock market synchronicity ands α is a constant. Control (RC) is the 
regulatory control, Corruption (CP) is the corruption index produce by transparency international, GDP is the 
gross domestic product per capita / 10,000, Inflation (IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the 
trade openness measure, Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the 
natural log of a country’s geographical size. Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first, 
in parenthesis, is the t statistics using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value 
for the statistics. 
 
 Common law countries Civil law countries 
Control -0.01031 0.01846 
 (-0.75) (1.82) 
 [0.46] [0.07] 
Corruption -0.00106 -0.01350 
 (-0.30) (-2.69) 
 [0.77] [0.01] 
GDP 0.00247 0.00396 
 (-0.33) (0.87) 
 [0.75] [0.39] 
Inflation -0.00014 0.00102 
 (-1.69) (3.98) 
 [0.10] [0.00] 
Trade 0.05513 -0.10639 
 (2.12) (-3.52) 
 [0.04] [0.00] 
Accountability -0.00935 -0.01287 
 (-1.98) (-1.69) 
 [0.05] [0.09] 
Log (Size) 0.00015 -0.01254 
 (0.06) (-4.07) 
 [0.95] [0.00] 
R-square 0.391 0.469 
 
 
4.5   Discussion 
The study finds evidence that emerging economies exhibit greater levels of stock 
synchronicity over the study period. It is found that measures of stock synchronicity for 
developed economies average 62 percent, whereas emerging countries exhibit higher average 
stock synchronicity (66 percent) (see table 3.7) 
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Further, synchronicity is lower in more transparent economies such as Australia, the 
UK, France and Germany than in less transparent economies. These developed economies 
have low corruption rates and rank higher in terms of voice and accountability measures. In 
contrast, the Japanese stock market exhibits high stock return synchronicity relative to the 
developed countries. This result is consistent with Morck et al. (2000) who also note the high 
Japanese stock market synchronicity. 
There is also evidence that stock price synchronicity is associated with a country’s 
legal origin. Post-communist countries exhibit higher stock synchronicity than countries of 
common law or civil law origin. However, the sample size for the post-communist country 
group is small and China exhibits the highest stock return synchronicity among the post-
communist countries (73 percent). Ex-communist countries like Poland, that are reforming 
their economic system, have exhibited lower levels of stock synchronisation in recent years 
relative to the early 1990s. Further, stock synchronicity for civil law origin countries is 
associated with corruption rate, inflation, country size and accountability, whereas for 
common law countries synchronicity is associated mainly with inflation and accountability.  
It is found that stock synchronicity is negatively correlated with country geographical 
size, consistent with Morck et al. (2000), which suggests that large countries like the USA, 
Australia and Mexico exhibit lower stock price co-movement than small countries such as 
Singapore  and Ecuador. In addition, there is evidence that higher synchronicity is associated 
with higher inflation rates (examples include Ecuador, Russia, Turkey and Argentina).  
Finally, voice and accountability is negatively correlated with stock synchronicity for 
the all countries group as well as for the emerging economies, suggesting that countries with 
low corporate governance systems often exhibit higher levels of stock synchronicity (for 
example, Turkey, Ecuador and China) and this finding is consistent with Morck et al. (2000). 
 
4.6   Conclusion 
This study presents empirical analysis of the classical measure of stock return synchronicity. 
It is found that the highest stock synchronicity is exhibited by China (73 percent), Malaysia 
(73 percent) and Turkey (75 percent) during the study period, while the developed countries 
average 62 percent. In addition, the study finds statistically significant correlation in the time 
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series data and this correlation is significantly different from zero for most common law 
countries. The study finds that corruption is negatively correlated with stock price 
synchronicity. This suggests that more corrupt economies exhibit higher stock return 
synchronicity than less corrupt economies and these results are also consistent with Morck et 
al. (2000). There is also evidence that country stock synchronicity is associated with higher 
inflation rate. High-inflation economies such as Turkey exhibit higher synchronicity during 
the study period. In contrast, low-inflation economies, such as Australia and Germany, 
exhibit low level of stock return synchronicity. 
It is also found that voice and accountability has a strong impact on country stock co-
movement. The study used the voice and accountability index as an alternative measure for 
the quality of law enforcement and civil rights indices. Voice and accountability is negatively 
correlated with stock synchronicity. Countries that are highly accountable for civil and 
private property rights rank higher in the accountability index and exhibit lower stock 
synchronicity, while countries that do not respect private property rights and civil rights rank 
lower in the accountability index and exhibit higher stock return synchronicity.  
There is evidence that the trade openness measure is negatively correlated for civil 
law countries but the effect is insignificant for the common law country group. The 
synchronicity measures are stationary over the 10-year period of study. 
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4.7   Appendices 
 
A  4.1  Classical measure descriptive statistics for sub-periods: Legal origin 
 
Panel A 
Common law countries 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Bangladesh  0.69 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.67 
Cyprus  0.62 0.67 0.75 0.70 0.68 
Egypt  0.67 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.65 
Hong Kong 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.64 
India  0.69 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.66 
Kenya  0.64 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.62 
Malaysia  0.66 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.73 
Pakistan  0.67 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.68 
South Africa 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.61 
Singapore  0.63 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.68 
Sri Lanka 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.65 
Zimbabwe  0.69 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.66 
Average 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 
 
 
Panel B 
Civil law countries 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Argentina  0.69 0.66 0.68 0.72 0.72 
Brazil  0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.61 
Chile  0.65 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.63 
Columbia  0.70 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.63 
Czech Rep. 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.59 
Ecuador  0.77 0.76 0.80 0.72 0.69 
Greece  0.65 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.69 
Hungary  0.64 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.66 
Indonesia  0.67 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.64 
Korea  0.63 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69 
Mexico  0.68 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.67 
Peru  0.68 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.62 
Philippines  0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.65 
Portugal  0.62 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.63 
Spain  0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.68 
Taiwan  0.66 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.69 
Thailand  0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.65 
Turkey  0.71 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75 
Venezuela  0.63 0.65 0.63 0.72 0.74 
Average 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.66 
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Panel C 
Post-communist countries 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
China  0.74 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.74 
Poland  0.62 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.74 
Russia  0.70 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.67 
Average 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.72 
 
 
Panel D 
Developed countries 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Australia 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.59 
France  0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.60 
Germany  0.59 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 
Japan  0.68 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.68 
New Zealand 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.63 
UK  0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.62 
US - NYSE 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.64 
Average 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.62 
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A  4.2  Classical measure descriptive statistics for sub-periods: Geographical segments 
 
Panel A 
Geographical segment: Europe 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Czech Republic 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.59 
Greece  0.65 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.69 
Hungary 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.66 
Poland  0.62 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.74 
Portugal  0.62 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.63 
Russia  0.70 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.67 
Spain  0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.68 
Average 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 
 
 
Panel B 
Geographical segment: Asia/Pacific 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
China  0.74 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.74 
Hong Kong 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.64 
Indonesia  0.67 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.64 
Korea  0.63 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69 
Malaysia  0.66 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.73 
Philippines  0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.65 
Singapore  0.63 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.68 
Taiwan  0.66 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.69 
Thailand  0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.65 
Average 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.68 
 
 
Panel C 
Geographical segment: Africa 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Egypt  0.67 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.65 
Kenya  0.64 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.62 
South Africa 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.61 
Zimbabwe  0.69 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.66 
Average 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.64 
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Panel D 
Geographical segment: South America 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Argentina  0.69 0.66 0.68 0.72 0.72 
Brazil  0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.61 
Chile  0.65 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.63 
Columbia  0.70 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.63 
Ecuador  0.77 0.76 0.80 0.72 0.69 
Peru  0.68 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.62 
Mexico  0.68 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.67 
Venezuela  0.63 0.65 0.63 0.72 0.74 
Average 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.66 
 
 
Panel E 
Geographical segment: South Asia 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Bangladesh  0.69 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.67 
India  0.69 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.66 
Pakistan  0.67 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.68 
Sri-Lanka 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.65 
Average 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 
 
 
Panel F 
Geographical segment: Central Asia 
 
 2004-05 2002-03 2000-01 1998-99 1996-97 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Cyprus  0.62 0.67 0.75 0.70 0.68 
Turkey  0.71 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75 
Average 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.72 
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A  4.3  ANOVA test statistics between the sub-periods: Classical measure 
Developed vs. emerging country group 
 
Panel A 
1996-97 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups .013 1 .013 7.844 .008 
Within groups .062 39 .002   
Total .075 40    
 
 
Panel B 
1998-99 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups .022 1 .022 11.284 .002 
Within groups .075 39 .002   
Total .097 40    
 
 
Panel C 
2000-01 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups .018 1 .018 7.811 .008 
Within groups .090 39 .002   
Total .108 40    
 
 
Panel D 
2002-03 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups .012 1 .012 7.659 .009 
Within groups .062 39 .002   
Total .074 40    
 
 
Panel E 
2004-05 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups .011 1 .011 8.656 .005 
Within groups .048 39 .001   
Total .059 40    
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A  4.4  Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for full period: Classical measure 
January 1996 to December 2005 
 
Chi-square Degrees of freedom Probability 
3.818 2 0.148 
 
 
 
A  4.5  Correlation-coefficient between explanatory variables 
 
Here, Control is the regulatory control, Corruption is the corruption index produced by Transparency 
International, GDP is the gross domestic product per capita, Inflation is the inflation rate of a country, Trade is 
the trade openness measure, Account is the voice and accountability index and Size is the geographical size of a 
country. Values in bold letters indicate significance at the 5 percent level and values in bold letters including 
star ‘*’ indicate significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Panel A 
1996-97 
 
  Sync Inflation Control Account GDP Corruption Size 
Inflation 0.156           
Control -0.601 -0.466         
Accountability -0.637 -0.377 0.798        
GDP -0.553 -0.145 0.726 0.68      
Corruption -0.596 -0.214 0.88 0.681 0.87     
Size 0.201 -0.049 -0.136 -0.19 0.002 -0.083   
Trade -0.111 0.32 0.236 -0.139 0.124 0.292(*) -0.218 
 
 
 
Panel B 
1998-99 
 
  Sync Inflation Control Account GDP Corruption Size 
Inflation 0.335           
Control -0.108 -0.41         
Accountability -0.407 -0.447 0.615        
GDP -0.302(*) -0.389 0.68 0.608      
Corruption -0.284 -0.469 0.843 0.641 0.807     
Size 0.008 0.215 -0.245 -0.107 -0.014 -0.12   
Trade 0.313 -0.164 0.449 0.006 0.243 0.403 -0.209 
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Panel C 
2000-01 
 
 Sync Inflation Control Account GDP Corruption Size 
Inflation 0.367           
Control -0.175 -0.513         
Accountability -0.284(*) -0.32 0.636        
GDP -0.289(*) -0.28(*) 0.651 0.553      
Corruption -0.328 -0.318(*) 0.83 0.638 0.804     
Size -0.075 0.013 -0.286(*) -0.108 -0.001 -0.096   
Trade 0.11 -0.138 0.476 0.006 0.29 0.411 -0.225 
 
 
 
Panel D 
2002-03 
 
 Sync Inflation Control Account GDP Corruption Size 
Inflation 0.113           
Control -0.366 -0.439         
Accountability -0.507 -0.401 0.871        
GDP -0.308(*) -0.168 0.757 0.697      
Corruption -0.383 -0.235 0.895 0.731 0.835     
Size 0.018 -0.034 -0.13 -0.156 -0.003 -0.064   
Trade 0.064 0.009 0.376 0.051 0.239 0.392 -0.208 
 
 
 
Panel E 
2004-05 
 
 Sync Inflation Control Account GDP Corruption Size 
Inflation 0.156           
Control -0.601 -0.466         
Accountability -0.637 -0.377 0.798        
GDP  -0.553 -0.145 0.726 0.68      
Corruption -0.596 -0.214 0.88 0.681 0.87     
Size 0.201 -0.049 -0.136 -0.19 0.002 -0.083   
Trade -0.111 0.32 0.236 -0.139 0.124 0.292(*) -0.218 
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A  4.6  Panel data analysis: excluding Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong 
 
The study compares the panel data analysis between the all country group and the emerging country group 
without Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea. The panel of this table contains estimates of: 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSYNC εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  
where SYNC, the dependent variable, is the stock synchronicity measure and α is a constant. Control (RC) is 
regulatory control index, Corruption (CP) is the corruption index produced by transparency international, GDP 
is gross domestic product per capita / 10,000, Inflation (IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the 
trade openness measure, Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the 
natural log of the geographical size of a country. Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The 
first, in parenthesis, is the t statistic using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P 
value for the statistic. 
 
 All country group Emerging country group 
Control 0.01872 0.01087 
 (3.73) (2.14) 
 [0.00] [0.03] 
Corruption -0.00884 -0.00470 
 (-5.25) (-1.54) 
 [0.00] [0.13] 
GDP 0.00503 0.02289 
 (1.85) (1.69) 
 [0.07] [0.09] 
Inflation 0.00017 0.00015 
 (1.00) (0.88) 
 [0.32] [0.38] 
Trade 0.00199 0.00763 
 (0.14) (0.32) 
 [0.89] [0.75] 
Accountability -0.02585 -0.02578 
 (-5.90) (-7.20) 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
Log (Size) -0.00335 0.00042 
 (-2.35) (0.24) 
 [0.02] [0.81] 
   
R-squared 0.283 0.149 
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Australia, USA and China Stock Synchronicity
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A  4.7  Weekly Stock Market Synchronicity for the USA, Australia and China 
The figure exhibits the US, Australian and Chinese weekly stock market synchronicity for 1996-2005. The study graphs the 10-week moving average 
synchronicity for these markets. It is found that Australian stock synchronicity is about 58% in a given week, which is lower than the USA (63 percent) and 
China (73 percent). It is also found that the Chinese stock market moves more synchronously than developed markets, which is consistent with Morck et al. 
(2000). 
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NYSE vs S&P 500 Shares
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A  4.8  The 10 Weeks Moving Average Synchronicity for the NYSE (USA) and S&P 500.  
The figure illustrates 10 weeks moving average synchronicity data for the NYSE and S&P 500 group of companies from 1996 to 2005. The study compares both 
stock markets and finds variation across the series. It is found that S&P 500 group of companies’ shares are more synchronous than those of the NYSE shares. 
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CHAPTER 5 R-Square measure 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analyses the classical synchronicity measure to capture stock return 
synchronicity for the 41 countries sampled. It is found that stock synchronicity is higher in 
emerging economies than developed economies. Further, English-origin common law 
countries have lower stock synchronicity than the post-communist and civil law origin 
countries. This chapter uses the R-square synchronicity measure to capture stock 
synchronicity for the same sample of countries from January 1996 to December 2005. 
 
5.2   Full period: Legal and geographical segments 
The study uses weekly stock return data and weekly stock indices to calculate R-square for 
individual firms. This measure relies on individual firm-level R-squares for determining the 
stock synchronicity of emerging and developed financial markets. A higher R-square value 
indicates higher stock market co-movement and a lower R-square indicates a lower level of 
stock market synchronicity. The Full period and sub-period R-square data already having 
been discussed in the data chapter, this section will discuss the legal and geographical 
segments of the R-square measure. 
5.2.1   Geographical segment 
To determine the regional effect of R-square the full dataset is further divided into six 
geographical locations and compared with the developed economies. The six geographical 
segments are Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, Asia/Pacific, South America and Europe. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the geographical segments for the observed emerging markets and 
the developed economy segment. The average R-square for Africa (0.069), South America 
(0.066), Europe (0.081) and South Asia (0.077) are somewhat similar. Further, Asia/Pacific 
and Central Asian emerging economies exhibit a higher level of R-square values than other 
emerging markets. Asia/Pacific emerging economies exhibit average R-square values of 
0.124, with China 0.241 and Malaysia 0.254. Central Asia, on the other hand, exhibits the  
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Table  5.1  Descriptive statistics for the R-square measure: Geographical segments 
Full period data  
From January 1996 to December 2005 
 
Emerging 
Africa  
Emerging 
South America  
Emerging 
South Asia  
Emerging 
Asia/ Pacific 
Emerging 
Central Asia 
Emerging 
Europe  
Developed 
Countries 
Country 
2R  Country 
 
2R  Country 2R  Country 2R    Country 2R  Country 2R   Country  2R  
                      
Egypt  0.089 Ecuador  0.033 Bangladesh  0.021 China  0.241 Cyprus  0.159 Hungary  0.101 Australia  0.041 
Kenya  0.009 Argentina  0.104 India  0.081 Hong Kong 0.015 Turkey  0.239 Czech Rep. 0.033 France  0.098 
Sth. Africa 0.054 Brazil  0.070 Pakistan  0.084 Indonesia  0.102   Poland  0.067 Germany 0.010 
Zimbabwe  0.122 Chile 0.096 Sri-Lanka 0.121 Korea  0.123   Portugal  0.102 Japan  0.007 
   Columbia  0.042   Malaysia  0.254   Russia  0.102 New Zealand 0.066 
   Peru  0.024   Philippine 0.073   Spain  0.083 UK  0.066 
   Venezuela  0.067   Singapore  0.024   Greece  0.008 USA NYSE 0.030 
   Mexico  0.092   Taiwan  0.173       
         Thailand  0.109          
Average 0.069  Average 0.066 Average 0.077 Average 0.124 Average 0.199  Average 0.081  Average 0.046 
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highest average R-square value (0.199). However, the Central Asian segment includes only 
two emerging country (Turkey and Cyprus). Descriptive analysis from the full period R-
square data shows that Turkey is the third most synchronous equity market in terms of R-
square values. In contrast, developed economies exhibit considerably lower R-square values 
during this period (0.046), which is consistent with Morck et al. (2000).  
 
A t test for the mean difference between R-square values for the emerging countries 
and developed countries is reported in panel A of table 5.2. The t statistics illustrates a 
significant mean difference between the R-square values at the 10 percent significance level 
for the emerging countries and five percent significance level for the developed countries. 
 
Table  5.2  t-test statistics for the R-square measure 
Emerging vs. developed country groups 
(Equal variance estimates) 
 
t- statistics Degrees of freedom Sig. (2-tailed) 
1.869 39 0.069 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 reports the ANOVA test statistics between the emerging and developed 
country groups. The ANOVA test statistics indicate that there is a statistically significant 
difference in R-square variance between the two groups at the 10 percent significance level. 
 
Table  5.3  ANOVA test statistics for the R-square measure 
The data include two sets of countries, the emerging and the developed group. Emerging countries include 34 
sample countries and developed countries include seven sample nations. 
 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F- statistics Sig. 
Between groups 
.012 1 .012 3.492 .069 
Within groups 
.139 39 .004   
Total 
.151 40    
 
In addition, Table 5.4 illustrates ANOVA test statistics between the emerging country 
/ geographical segment groups to check the statistical significant mean difference between 
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these groups. It is found that there is a statistically significant difference in R-square variance 
between the geographical region groups at the five percent significant level. 
 
Table  5.4  ANOVA test statistics for the R-square measure: Geographical segments 
The data include six emerging geographical region groups. The emerging country groups are South America, 
South Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Europe and Asia/Pacific. The data span the period from January 1996 to 
December 2005. 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F- statistics Sig. 
Between groups 
.044 5 .009 2.759 .038 
Within groups 
.089 28 .003   
Total 
.132 33    
 
 
5.2.2   Legal segment 
Table 5.5 exhibits the impact of legal origin for the same dataset. Legal origin is divided into 
three basic categories: common law countries, civil law countries and the post-communist 
countries. The study does not classify the developed countries by legal category.  
There is some small variation between English-origin common law country R-square 
values and French- and German-origin civil law country R-square values. Common law 
countries exhibit R-square values of 0.085 and civil law countries exhibit R-square values of 
0.088 on average. Further, post-communist countries exhibit higher R-square values than the 
other two groups, on average exhibiting R-square values of 0.137. This finding is also 
consistent with Morck et al. (2000), La-Porta et al. (1998) and the classical synchronicity 
measure in chapter four. 
Further, La-Porta et al. (1998) suggest that English-origin common law countries 
provide better protection to investors than do their counterparts, although this difference is not 
particularly evident in the R-square measured synchronicity. The average R-square 
synchronicity for the developed economies remains the lowest of the groups, consistent with  
Morck et al. (2000) and is considerable difference in synchronicity between developed 
countries and emerging countries. 
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Table  5.5  Descriptive statistics for the R-square measure: Legal segments 
 
Emerging common law 
countries 
Emerging civil law 
countries 
Emerging post-
communist 
Developed countries  
 
Country R-square Country R-square Country R-square Country R-square 
Bangladesh  0.021 Argentina  0.104 China  0.241 Australia  0.041 
Cyprus  0.159 Brazil  0.070 Poland  0.067 France  0.098 
Egypt  0.089 Chile  0.096 Russia  0.102 Germany 0.010 
Hong Kong 0.015 Columbia  0.042     Japan  0.007 
India  0.081 Czech Rep 0.033     New Zealand 0.066 
Kenya  0.009 Ecuador  0.033     UK  0.066 
Malaysia  0.254 Greece  0.008     USA  0.030 
Pakistan  0.084 Hungary  0.101       
Singapore  0.024 Indonesia  0.102        
South Africa 0.054 Mexico  0.092        
Sri-Lanka 0.121 Peru  0.024        
Zimbabwe  0.122 Philippines  0.073        
    Portugal  0.102        
    Korea  0.123        
    Spain  0.083        
    Taiwan  0.173        
    Thailand  0.109        
    Turkey  0.239        
    Venezuela  0.067        
Average 0.086 Average 0.088 Average 0.137 Average 0.046 
 
In addition, table 5.6 illustrates the ANOVA test statistics of R-square synchronicity 
between the legal origin groups. The study did not find any statistically significant mean 
difference between the groups. However, there is a strong difference in mean variance within 
groups than between groups, suggesting that R-square synchronicity varies between countries. 
 
Table  5.6  ANOVA test statistics for R-square measure: Legal origin groups 
The data include three emerging country groups − emerging common law countries, emerging civil law 
countries and emerging post-communist countries. The common law group includes 12 sample countries, the 
civil law group 19 sample countries and the post-communist group only three sample countries.  
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups .008 2 .004 .044 .957 
Within groups 5.857 65 .090   
Total 5.865 67    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
100 
5.3   Sub-period: Legal and geographical segments 
5.3.1   Geographical segment 
The sub-period data is also analysed and further divided into six geographical segments. 
Panel A of appendix 5.1 illustrates five sub-period R-square data for South Asian countries. 
The average R-square for South Asian countries is 0.086 (1996-97), 0.071 (1998-99), 0.099 
(2000-01), 0.105 (2002-03) and 0.128 (2004-05). There is some variation in R-square values 
for South Asian countries in 2004-05. In addition, Pakistan and Sri-Lanka exhibit higher R-
square values, whereas Bangladesh exhibits lower R-square values during this sub-period. 
R-square values are somewhat higher for China and Malaysia during these sub-periods 
for the Asia/Pacific group. The average R-square values for these sub-periods is 0.178 (1996-
97) 0.182 (1998-99), 0.158 (2000-01), 0.141 (2002-03) and 0.110 (2004-05). The lowest R-
square values are evident for Singapore and Hong Kong during these periods, which is 
consistent with the classical synchronicity measure and with the finding of Morck et al. 
(2000).  
In Europe, most of the countries exhibit somewhat moderate R-square values except 
for Poland in 1996-97 and Hungary in 1996-97 and 1998-99. In addition, R-square values for 
the Central Asian countries are 0.217 (1996-97), 0.240 (1998-99), 0.325 (2000-01), 0.267 
(2002-03) and 0.137 (2004-05), which is the highest of all geographical segments. It is found 
that historically Central Asian equity markets are more volatile − for example, the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange, Turkey (Alper and Yilmaz, 2004). 
Surprisingly, African countries exhibit low levels of R-square values. The average R-
square values for these countries are 0.109 in 1996-97, 0.090 in 1998-99, 0.070 in 2000-01, 
0.090 in 2002-03 and 0.104 in 2004-05; which are the lowest among the emerging economy 
groups. Among African countries the exception is Zimbabwe, which shows somewhat higher 
R-square values during 2001-02 and 2004-05. 
In developed economies Germany exhibits the lowest R-square synchronicity, while 
the highest R-square synchronicity is exhibited by France and New Zealand. Further, the S&P 
500 group of companies exhibit higher R-square than the NYSE group, which is consistent 
with the classical synchronicity measure results. 
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5.3.2   Legal segment 
Panels A, B and C of appendix 5.2 illustrate the legal segment average R-square values for the 
five sub-periods. It is found that R-square values for the common law countries is 0.087 
(1996-97), 0.085 (1998-99), 0.093 (2000-01), 0.111 (2002-03) and 0.119 (2004-05). Malaysia 
exhibits the highest R-square values from the common law country group. Civil law origin 
countries, on the other hand, exhibit somewhat higher R-square values during these five sub-
periods, particularly Turkey and Taiwan. The other countries with higher R-square values 
during these sub-periods include Argentina in 1996-97 and 1998-99; Hungary in 1996-97 and 
1998-99, and Venezuela in 1996-97 and 1998-99.  
Post-communist countries exhibit greater R-square values than common law and civil 
law countries. China exhibits the highest R-square values among the post-communist 
countries, followed by Poland and Russia. The average R-square values for post-communist 
countries are 0.280, 0.199, 0.132, 0.143 and 0.114 respectively. It is found that post-
communist countries exhibit higher R-square values for all sub-periods while in contrast, 
common law countries exhibit the lowest R-square values. This result is consistent with 
Morck et al. (2000) and La-Porta et al. (1998). 
 
5.4   Panel data analysis 
5.4.1   The model 
This chapter uses the following R-square regression model to explain the stock market 
synchronicity. 
 
 iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSquR εβββββββα ++++++++=− 7654321 )log(  (16) 
 
where iSquR − represents R-square measure for stock synchronicity of country i and α is a 
constant. iRC  is the regulatory control index, iVC  is the voice and accountability index, iIN  
is inflation, iCP  is the corruption perception index, iGDP  is the gross domestic product per 
capita / 10,000, iTR  is the trade openness measure, iSIZE is geographical size and iε  is the 
error term. The natural log of geographical size is used to limit the effect of skewness on this 
variable. 
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5.4.2   Panel data analysis 
Table 5.7 illustrates fixed effect panel analysis using white adjusted standard error for the all- 
country, developed and emerging country groups. Here, the dependent variable is the R-
square measure and explanatory variables are voice and accountability, corruption index, 
GDP per capita, inflation, regulatory control, trade openness measure and log geographical 
size.  
 Voice and accountability is negatively correlated with R-square measure at the one 
percent significance level for the all-country and emerging country groups but the impact is 
insignificant for the developed country group. Voice and accountability is an important 
governance mechanism thought necessary to establish a good governance system in a country 
and this measure is also used to capture property rights. Morck et al. (2000) argue that 
countries with less investor protection rights exhibit higher stock return synchronicity, hence 
a higher R-square value. Additionally, the classical synchronicity measure found that 
accountability is negatively correlated with stock synchronicity, which is consistent with the 
R-square based results in table 5.7. 
It is found that regulatory control is positively correlated with the R-square measure at 
the one percent significance level for the all-country and emerging country groups. This result 
is surprising, as both corporate governance mechanisms reflect the quality of a country’s the 
governance system and this mechanism should negatively correlate with the R-square 
measure. 
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Table  5.7  Panel data analysis: R-square measure 
The panel of this table contains estimates of: 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSquR εβββββββα ++++++++=− 7654321 )log(  
where iSquR −  is the dependent variable ands α is a constant, Control (RC) is the regulatory control, Corruption 
(CP) is the corruption index produce by transparency international, GDP is the gross domestic product per capita 
/ 10,000, Inflation (IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the trade openness measure, 
Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the natural log of the geographical 
size of a country.  
Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first, in parenthesis, is the t statistic using white 
adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value for the statistic. 
 
  All countries Developed countries Emerging countries 
Control 0.04639 0.05171 0.03728 
  (2.98) (1.30) (2.63) 
  [0.00] [0.21] [0.01] 
Corruption 0.00407 -0.01595 0.01030 
  (1.46) (-0.91) (7.58) 
  [0.15] [0.37] [0.00] 
GDP -0.03399 -0.05327 -0.01677 
  (-8.05) (-3.15) (-1.86) 
  [0.00] [0.01] [0.07] 
Inflation 0.00064 0.00912 0.00065 
  (6.71) (0.78) (7.62) 
  [0.00] [0.44] [0.00] 
Trade -0.01346 0.17039 -0.00861 
  (-0.58) (2.13) (-0.33) 
  [0.57] [0.04] [0.74] 
Accountability -0.03340 -0.07945 -0.03039 
  (-3.28) (-1.07) (-2.91) 
  [0.00] [0.30] [0.00] 
Log (Size) 0.00689 -0.00755 0.01455 
  (2.45) (-1.26) (4.29) 
  [0.02] [0.22] [0.00] 
R-square 0.240 0.460 0.210 
 
 
There is evidence that several of the emerging countries exhibit relatively high 
regulatory control (examples include Singapore and Hong Kong) and this may be driving this 
unexpected result. It should be noted that positive correlation is also found between 
regulatory control and the classical synchronicity measure in chapter four. 
Corruption is positively correlated with the R-square synchronicity measure at the 15 
percent significance level for the all-country group and at the one percent significance level 
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for the emerging country group. This is a significant result, as it is argued that higher 
corruption causes higher stock price synchronicity. This finding is also consistent with Morck 
et al. (2000) and the classical synchronicity measure in chapter four. It is found that emerging 
countries rank lower in the corruption index produced by Transparency International. In 
contrast, developed economies rank higher due to their lower corruption levels. Further, 
Morck et al. (2000) found positive correlation between corruption rates and lower respect for 
private property rights. They argue that higher corruption indicates weak political and civil 
rights and so causes corrupt economies to rank lower in the property rights index. This study 
also found that countries ranked lower in the corruption index also rank lower in the voice and 
accountability index. Stock market synchronicity for these countries is higher and negatively 
correlated with the governance indicator (examples include China and Indonesia). 
Inflation is positively correlated with the R-square synchronicity measure at the one 
percent significance level for the all-country and emerging country groups but this effect is 
insignificant for the developed economies. Morck et al. (2000) argue that higher inflation 
causes higher stock market co-movement. For example, the Polish economy exhibits higher 
inflation due to the fall of communism and its inflation attained 100 percent during the study 
period. Further, Morck et al. (2000) include Poland in their list of countries with higher stock 
market synchronicity during the 1990s. They argue that economies in transition exhibited 
higher stock return synchronicity during the 19th century (examples include Turkey and 
Malaysia). 
GDP per capita is negatively correlated with the R-square measure at the ten percent 
significance level for the all-country, the emerging country and the developed country groups. 
This is an expected result as it is assumed that high GDP per capita countries produce lower 
stock market synchronicity and lower R-square values.  
Geographical size is positively correlated with R-square synchronicity measures at the 
five percent significance level for the all-country and the emerging country groups but is 
statistically insignificant for the developed country group. This result is inconsistent with the 
classical synchronicity measures in chapter four and Morck et al. (2000). Previous studies 
have found that country geographical size was negatively correlated with stock market 
synchronicity. However, there is evidence that large emerging countries, such as Russia, 
    
 
105 
China and Argentina exhibit higher R-square values during the sample period, whereas 
smaller emerging countries such as Singapore and Bangladesh exhibit lower levels of R-
square synchronicity. It is assumed that the R-square values for the larger emerging countries 
might influence the geographical size effect. 
 
5.4.3   Legal origin effects 
Separate panel analysis is also conducted between the common law / emerging country group 
and the civil law / emerging country group to check the variation across legal origin groups. 
Table 5.8 illustrates the fixed effect panel analysis result for the common law and civil law 
country groups. Post-communist countries are not analysed separately due to the small sample 
size. 
There is evidence that inflation is positively correlated with R-square measure at the 
10 percent significance level for the common law country group and at the one percent 
significance level for the civil law country group. Additionally, voice and accountability and 
geographical size are negatively correlated with the civil law countries at the 10 percent and 
15 percent significance levels respectively. 
In addition, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with both the common law 
country and the civil law country group at one percent significant level. Unexpectedly, the 
trade openness measure is positively correlated with the common law country group and 
negatively correlated with the civil law country group. This result suggests a stronger 
international trade participation effect in the civil law country group than in the common law 
country group.  
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Table  5.8  Panel data analysis between the legal origin groups: R-square measure 
 
The study compares the panel data analysis between the common law and civil law country groups.  The panel of 
this table contains estimates of: 
 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCSquR εβββββββα ++++++++=− 7654321 )log(  
where iSquR −  is the dependent variable ands α is a constant, Control (RC) is the regulatory control, Corruption 
(CP) is the corruption index produce by transparency international, GDP is the gross domestic product per capita 
/ 10,000, Inflation (IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the trade openness measure, 
Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the natural log of the geographical 
size of a country.  Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first, in parenthesis, is the t 
statistic using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value for the statistic. 
 
Variables Common law countries Civil law countries 
    
Control 0.04592 0.05031 
  (1.16) (2.17) 
  [0.25] [0.03] 
Corruption 0.00540 -0.00180 
  (0.60) (-0.23) 
  [0.55] [0.82] 
GDP -0.06234 -0.01739 
  (-3.43) (-5.51) 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
Inflation 0.00052 0.00138 
  (1.98) (5.15) 
  [0.05] [0.00] 
Trade 0.08940 -0.04676 
  (1.34) (-1.32) 
  [0.19] [0.19] 
Accountability -0.00825 -0.03387 
  (-0.49) (-1.86) 
  [0.63] [0.07] 
Log (Size) 0.01714 -0.00689 
  (1.64) (-1.60) 
  [0.11] [0.11] 
R-square 0.306 0.256 
 
 
Further, geographical size is positively correlated with synchronicity for the common 
law country group and negatively correlated for civil law country group at the 15 percent 
significance level. It is found that some large emerging countries of common law exhibit high 
R-square values (examples include India and Indonesia) and small emerging common law 
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countries exhibit lower R-square values, for example Singapore. In contrast, large civil law 
countries exhibit low R-square values (examples include Brazil and Columbia). 
Finally, there is evidence that corporate governance mechanisms are more effective in 
the civil law country group than the common law country group, and that country 
geographical size and inflation effect are more visible in the civil law country group than in 
the common law country group. 
 
5.5   Discussion 
It is found that R-square values for emerging economies are higher than for developed 
economies. On average, emerging economies exhibit R-square values of 0.091, whereas 
developed economies exhibit R-square values of 0.046 during the sample period (table 5.1). 
The high R-square values are evidenced for China, Malaysia and Turkey, a result which is 
consistent with Morck et al. (2000) and with the classical synchronicity measure results 
reported in Chapter 4. Additionally, low R-square values are evident for Japan and Germany. 
In the USA, the S&P 500 group of companies exhibits higher R-square values than the NYSE 
shares, which is consistent with classical synchronicity measures. 
There is evidence that R-square values for Central Asian countries are higher than for 
other geographical regions and for the developed country group. However, Central Asia 
includes only two countries − Turkey and Cyprus − both of which exhibit high levels of R-
square synchronicity. This result is consistent with Alper and Yilmaz (2004), who argue that 
the Turkish stock market is historically volatile and exhibits high levels of stock co-
movement. 
It is found that R-square synchronicity is lower in high inflationary economies than 
low inflationary economies. The study also finds a statistically significant positive correlation 
between R-square values and inflation (examples include Turkey and China). Further, the 
common law country group exhibits lower R-square synchronicity (0.086) than the civil law 
(0.088) and post-communist country (0.137) groups.  
 
    
 
108 
5.6   Conclusion 
The study presents empirical analyses using the R-square stock synchronicity measure. It is 
found that emerging economies exhibit higher R-square values (0.091) than developed 
economies (0.045). Further, R-square values for the post-communist country group are higher 
than for the common law country and civil law country groups, which is consistent with 
Morck et al. (2000) and classical synchronicity measures. 
There is evidence that a higher R-square value is associated with higher inflation and 
lower GDP per capita. Additionally, countrywide corruption can affect the value of the stock 
market and could influence stock market co-movement. Countries ranking lower in the 
corruption index (high corruption) are often found to exhibit greater levels of synchronicity 
than the average country (for example, Turkey). The corruption index is also positively 
correlated with R-square values at the 15 percent significance level for the all-country and 
emerging country groups.  
There is also evidence that corporate governance mechanisms have more effect in the 
civil law country group than in the common law country group. It is found that higher R-
square values are associated with the civil law country group, a result that is consistent with 
La-Porta et al. (1998)). Additionally, the trade openness measure suggests trade environment 
has a greater impact on synchronicity in civil law countries. 
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5.7   Appendices 
 
A  5.1  R-square measure descriptive statistics for sub-periods: Geographical segments 
Panel A 
South Asia  
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Bangladesh  0.016 0.012 0.014 0.021 0.02 
India  0.11 0.085 0.089 0.114 0.218 
Pakistan  0.129 0.089 0.106 0.123 0.125 
Sri-Lanka 0.089 0.098 0.185 0.162 0.149 
Average 0.086 0.071 0.099 0.105 0.128 
 
Panel B 
Asia/Pacific 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
China  0.387 0.306 0.252 0.321 0.201 
Hong Kong  0.032 0.026 0.022 0.017 0.019 
Indonesia  0.163 0.148 0.112 0.108 0.131 
Korea  0.149 0.175 0.18 0.192 0.096 
Malaysia  0.376 0.45 0.324 0.186 0.112 
Philippines 0.114 0.135 0.085 0.077 0.079 
Singapore  0.03 0.038 0.039 0.03 0.023 
Taiwan  0.233 0.231 0.254 0.223 0.162 
Thailand  0.121 0.131 0.151 0.117 0.164 
Average 0.178 0.182 0.158 0.141 0.11 
 
Panel C 
Central Asia 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Cyprus  0.176 0.163 0.283 0.251 0.093 
Turkey  0.259 0.317 0.366 0.284 0.181 
Average 0.217 0.24 0.325 0.267 0.137 
 
Panel D 
Africa 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Egypt  0.189 0.15 0.112 0.081 0.084 
Kenya  0.018 0.008 0.019 0.028 0.028 
South Africa 0.071 0.104 0.068 0.042 0.067 
Zimbabwe  0.157 0.1 0.081 0.211 0.238 
Average 0.109 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.104 
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Panel E 
Europe 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Hungary  0.203 0.206 0.087 0.074 0.106 
Czech Republic  0.08 0.067 0.046 0.037 0.07 
Poland  0.258 0.185 0.065 0.038 0.034 
Portugal  0.142 0.141 0.109 0.104 0.107 
Greece  0.04 0.02 0.015 0.025 0.013 
Russia  0.194 0.104 0.08 0.068 0.106 
Spain  0.015 0.079 0.076 0.151 0.162 
Average 0.133 0.115 0.068 0.071 0.085 
 
 
Panel F 
South America 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Ecuador  0.011 0.016 0.007 0.015 0.052 
Argentina  0.246 0.238 0.128 0.099 0.176 
Brazil  0.077 0.09 0.085 0.085 0.104 
Chile 0.116 0.132 0.106 0.091 0.084 
Columbia  0.074 0.072 0.049 0.108 0.134 
Peru  0.069 0.077 0.033 0.024 0.048 
Mexico  0.181 0.179 0.121 0.13 0.12 
Venezuela  0.267 0.226 0.048 0.054 0.07 
Average 0.13 0.129 0.072 0.076 0.098 
 
 
Panel G 
Developed Countries 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Australia  0.015 0.028 0.015 0.026 0.019 
France  0.091 0.093 0.117 0.128 0.107 
Germany 0.017 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.021 
Japan  0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.019 
New Zealand  0.132 0.119 0.115 0.075 0.076 
UK  0.077 0.089 0.098 0.085 0.074 
USA 0.07 0.1 0.049 0.029 0.017 
Average 0.059 0.066 0.059 0.052 0.048 
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Panel H 
Developed countries including S&P 500 group of companies 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Australia  0.015 0.028 0.015 0.026 0.019 
France  0.091 0.093 0.117 0.128 0.107 
Germany 0.017 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.021 
Japan  0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.019 
New Zealand  0.132 0.119 0.115 0.075 0.076 
UK  0.077 0.089 0.098 0.085 0.074 
USA S&P 500 0.257 0.213 0.109 0.139 0.099 
Average 0.085 0.082 0.068 0.068 0.059 
 
 
 
 
A  5.2  R-square measure descriptive statistics for sub-periods: Legal segments 
 
Panel A 
Common law countries 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Bangladesh  0.016 0.012 0.014 0.021 0.02 
Cyprus  0.176 0.163 0.283 0.251 0.093 
Egypt  0.189 0.15 0.112 0.081 0.084 
Hong Kong 0.032 0.026 0.022 0.017 0.019 
India  0.11 0.085 0.089 0.114 0.218 
Kenya  0.018 0.008 0.019 0.028 0.028 
Malaysia  0.376 0.45 0.324 0.186 0.112 
Pakistan  0.129 0.089 0.106 0.123 0.125 
Singapore  0.03 0.038 0.039 0.03 0.023 
South Africa 0.071 0.104 0.068 0.042 0.067 
Sri-Lanka 0.089 0.098 0.185 0.162 0.149 
Zimbabwe  0.157 0.1 0.081 0.211 0.238 
Average 0.116 0.110 0.112 0.106 0.098 
 
 
Panel B 
Post-communist countries 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
China  0.387 0.306 0.252 0.321 0.201 
Poland  0.258 0.185 0.065 0.038 0.034 
Russia  0.194 0.104 0.08 0.068 0.106 
Average 0.28 0.199 0.132 0.143 0.114 
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Panel C 
Civil law countries 
 
Country 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 
  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  R-square  
Argentina  0.246 0.238 0.128 0.099 0.176 
Brazil  0.077 0.09 0.085 0.085 0.104 
Chile 0.116 0.132 0.106 0.091 0.084 
Columbia  0.074 0.072 0.049 0.108 0.134 
Czech Republic  0.08 0.067 0.046 0.037 0.07 
Ecuador  0.011 0.016 0.007 0.015 0.052 
Greece  0.04 0.02 0.015 0.025 0.013 
Hungary 0.203 0.206 0.087 0.074 0.106 
Indonesia  0.163 0.148 0.112 0.108 0.131 
Mexico  0.181 0.179 0.121 0.13 0.12 
Peru  0.069 0.077 0.033 0.024 0.048 
Philippines 0.114 0.135 0.085 0.077 0.079 
Portugal  0.142 0.141 0.109 0.104 0.107 
Korea  0.149 0.175 0.18 0.192 0.096 
Spain  0.015 0.079 0.076 0.151 0.162 
Taiwan  0.233 0.231 0.254 0.223 0.162 
Thailand  0.121 0.131 0.151 0.117 0.164 
Turkey  0.259 0.317 0.366 0.284 0.181 
Venezuela  0.267 0.226 0.048 0.054 0.07 
Average 0.135 0.141 0.108 0.105 0.108 
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CHAPTER 6 Zero-return measure 
 
6.1   Introduction 
The previous two chapters analyse stock market synchronicity using the classical 
synchronicity and R-square synchronicity measures. There is evidence that stock markets in 
emerging economies are somewhat more synchronous than the developed markets. This 
chapter uses the third measure of stock synchronicity proposed by Skaife et al. (2006) 
(proportion of zero-return measure) to analyse the across-country variation in this measure. 
 
6.2   Zero-return measure: Full period data 
6.2.1   Geographical segment 
It is found from the full period sample data that emerging economies exhibit a zero-return 
measure of 45.7 percent, whereas the developed economies exhibit a zero-return measure of 
28.8 percent during the sample period (see table 3.11). In addition, to check whether zero-
return measures vary across geographical regions, the full period data is divided into six 
geographical regions. Table 6.1 illustrates variation in the proportion of zero-returns across 
geographical regions. 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka exhibit quite high zero-return measures, yet the Bangladesh 
zero-return measure (22.6 percent) is considerably smaller than for the South Asian countries 
(the average zero-return measure for South Asian countries is 44.8 percent). This result 
conflicts with the classical synchronicity measure and the R–square measure, as South Asian 
classical and R-square synchronicity is generally lower than for other geographical regions. 
Additionally, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (Bangladesh) exhibits higher classical and R-square 
stock synchronicity than other South-Asian countries due to its higher volatility, which is not 
fully reflected in the zero-return measure of synchronicity (Hassan et al., 2007).  
Within Africa, most countries exhibit a high proportion of zero-returns except for 
Egypt. (26.8 percent). The zero-return measure for the African countries as a group is 43.2 
percent, which is lower than for other regions. 
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Table  6.1  Descriptive statistics for the zero-return measure: Geographical segments 
From January 1996 to December 2005 
 
Emerging   
Africa  
Emerging  
South Asia  
Emerging 
Central Asia 
Emerging  
South America  
Emerging  
Asia/Pacific 
Emerging 
Europe  
Developed  
Country 
Country Return Country Return Country Return Country Return Country Return Country Return Country Return 
                      
Egypt  26.8 Bangladesh  22.6 Cyprus  26.9 Ecuador  84.3 China  11.5 Hungary  57.9 Australia  42.8 
Kenya  45.3 India  48.3 Turkey  30.0 Argentina  59.1 HongKong  41.6 Czech Rep. 59.7 France  23.7 
Sth. Africa 56.2 Pakistan  53.3     Brazil  61.9 Indonesia  52.6 Poland  28.1 Germany 31.3 
Zimbabwe  44.5 Sri-Lanka 55.0     Chile 49.4 S. Korea  23.1 Portugal  35.1 Japan  12.9 
          Columbia  77.5 Malaysia  26.5 Greece  14.9 NewZealand  27.1 
          Peru  74.1 Philippines  59.2 Russia  64.6 UK  38.5 
          Venezuela  69.3 Singapore  35.9 Spain  24.8 USA 25.1 
          Mexico  66.6 Taiwan  16.8       
            Thailand  53.6       
                      
Total 43.2 Total 44.8 Total 28.5 Total 67.8 Total 35.6 Total 40.7 Total 28.8 
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Surprisingly, Turkey and Cyprus exhibit lower zero-return measures. On average, 
these two Central Asian countries exhibit zero-return measures of 28.5 percent, which is 
lower than for many of the developed economies. In contrast, findings from the classical 
synchronicity and R-square measures show that Turkey exhibits higher stock synchronicity 
for the sample period. The results from the zero-return based analysis are not consistent with 
Morck et al. (2000) who argue that the Turkish stock market exhibits high stock 
synchronicity, and Alper and Yilmaz (2004) who argue that the Turkish stock market is 
historically quite volatile and synchronous. 
One-way ANOVA test statistics are reported in tables 6.2 and 6.3. Table 6.2 illustrates 
a significant difference in mean zero return measures for the emerging country group and 
developed economies at the five percent significance level. 
 
Table  6.2  ANOVA test statistics for the zero-return measure 
Emerging country vs. developed country groups 
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups 1682.091 1 1682.091 5.085 .030 
Within groups 12901.253 39 330.801   
Total 14583.344 40    
 
 
Further, Table 6.3 exhibits the ANOVA test statistics for the geographical segments. 
The analysis uses six geographical segments for the emerging country groups, which include 
emerging South Asian, emerging African, emerging European, emerging Asia/Pacific, 
emerging South American and emerging Central Asian countries. The ANOVA test statistics 
find a significant difference in the average zero-return measure at one percent significance 
level.  
Table  6.3  ANOVA test statistics for zero-return measure: Geographical segments 
The data include zero-return measures for six emerging geographical region groups. The six emerging country 
groups are South America, South Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Europe and Asia/Pacific. The data span the period 
from January 1996 to December 2005. 
 
  Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups 5604.542 5 1120.908 4.681 .003 
Within groups 6704.977 28 239.463   
Total 12309.519 33    
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6.2.2   Legal segment 
Table 6.4 illustrates the country zero-return results sorted by legal segment for zero-return 
measures. It is found that the proportion of zero-returns is lower in post-communist countries 
than in common law and civil law countries, which is inconsistent with the classical 
synchronicity measure and R-square measure results. Among the post-communist countries, 
China and Poland exhibit lower levels of zero-returns during the sample period. However, the 
Russian stock market exhibits a somewhat higher proportion of zero-returns.  
 
Table  6.4  Descriptive statistics for the zero-return measure full period: Legal segments 
From January 1996 to December 2005 
 
Emerging common law  
countries 
Emerging civil law  
countries 
Emerging post-communist 
countries 
Country Return Country Return  Country Return  
            
Bangladesh  22.6 Argentina  59.1 China  11.5 
Cyprus  26.9 Brazil  61.9 Poland  28.1 
Egypt  26.8 Chile  49.4 Russia  64.6 
Hong Kong 41.6 Columbia  77.5    
India  48.3 Czech Republic 59.7    
Kenya  45.3 Ecuador  84.3    
Malaysia  26.5 Greece  14.9    
Pakistan  53.3 Hungary  57.9    
Singapore  35.9 Indonesia  52.6    
South Africa 56.2 Mexico  66.6    
Sri-Lanka 55 Peru  74.1    
Zimbabwe  44.5 Philippines  59.2    
    Portugal  35.1    
    Korea  23.1    
    Spain  24.8    
    Taiwan  16.8    
    Thailand  53.6    
    Turkey  30    
    Venezuela  69.3     
Average 40.2   51.0   34.7 
 
 
In common law countries, Bangladesh exhibits fewer zero-return measures while 
South-Africa exhibits greater levels of zero-returns. The average proportion of zero-returns 
for common law countries is 40.2 percent, which is higher than for post-communist countries. 
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In addition, the proportion of zero-returns among the civil law countries is the highest for all 
the groups. This result is surprising; as there is evidence that stock synchronicity for post-
communist country is higher when using the classical measure and R-square measure. 
Table 6.5 shows the ANOVA test statistics for the legal segment group of countries, 
which include common law and civil law countries. There is a variation in legal origin across 
the groups at the 15 percent significant level. Further, the study also reports Kruskal-Wallis 
test statistics in appendix A-6.3 for the legal origin countries group, which includes common 
law and civil law countries. It is found that there is a median difference between the legal 
origin groups, though the effect is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
Table  6.5  ANOVA test statistics for the zero-return measure: Legal origin 
Common law country group vs. civil law country group  
 
 Sum of squares 
Degrees of 
freedom Mean square F-statistics Sig. 
Between groups 858.774 1 858.774 2.602 .118 
Within groups 9572.397 29 330.083   
Total 10431.171 30    
 
 
 
6.3     Zero-return measure: Sub-period data 
6.3.1   Geographical segments 
 
Geographical segments by sub-period are also analysed for the zero-return measures to check 
for variation between the groups (appendix A-6.1). African countries exhibit comparatively 
fewer zero-return measures during the observation period. In contrast, higher proportions of 
zero-returns are exhibited by South American countries. Further, China and the S&P 500 
group of companies exhibit the lowest levels of zero-returns for all sub-periods, which is 
surprising and conflicting with the classical synchronicity measure, R-square measure and 
Morck et al. (2000).  Of the developed economies Japan exhibits the lowest proportion of 
zero-returns, which is consistent with Skaife et al. (2006) who found that Japanese and US 
stock markets exhibit the lowest zero-return measures during their study period.  
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6.3.2   Legal segment 
Panels A and B of appendix A-6.2 illustrate sub-period zero-return measures for the common 
law, civil law and post-communist country groups. The study finds that the post-communist 
country group exhibits a lower level of zero-returns than common law and civil law countries 
for all sub-periods. Additionally, the common law country group exhibits fewer zero-returns 
than the civil law country group.  
This is an unexpected result and conflicts with both the R-square and classical 
synchronicity measures. For example, it is found that China and Poland exhibit fewer zero-
returns for the study period, whereas the classical synchronicity measure and R-square 
measure show that both Poland and China exhibit higher synchronicity for the same period. In 
addition, zero-return measures for post-communist countries are smallest for all sub-periods, 
which conflicts with the classical synchronicity measure and R-square synchronicity results in 
chapters four and five.  
 
6.4   Panel data analysis 
6.4.1   The model 
The study uses the following model to explain stock return synchronicity: 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCZRET εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  (17) 
 
where iZRET  represents proportion of zero-return measure for country i  and α is a constant. 
iRC  is the regulatory control index, iVC  is the voice and accountability index, iIN  is the 
inflation, iCP  is the corruption perception index, iGDP  is the gross domestic product per 
capita / 10,000, iTR  is the trade openness measure, iSIZE is geographical size and iε  is the 
error term. Natural log for geographical size been used to minimise the impact of skewness in 
this analysis. This model is described in greater detail in previous chapters. 
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6.4.2   Panel data analysis 
Table 6.6 illustrates fixed effect panel analysis for the zero-return measure. For this model, 
the dependent variable is the proportion of zero-returns and explanatory variables are voice 
and accountability, corruption index, GDP per capita, inflation, regulatory control, trade 
openness measure and geographical size, consistent with previous studies.    
 
Table  6.6  Panel data analysis: Zero-return measure 
 
The panel of this table contains estimates of: 
 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCZRET εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  
where iZRET  is the zero-return measure of stock synchronicity and α is a constant. Control (RC) is the 
regulatory control index, Corruption (CP) is the corruption index produced by transparency international, GDP is 
gross domestic product per capita / 10,000, Inflation (IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the 
trade openness measure, Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the natural 
log of the geographical size of a country. Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first, in 
parenthesis, is the t statistic using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value for 
the statistic. 
 
  All countries Developed countries Emerging countries 
Control 0.77944 18.09835 1.67845 
  (0.35) (2.280 (0.69) 
  [0.73] [0.03] [0.49] 
Corruption -2.75819 -2.11969 -4.84351 
  (-5.13) (-0.81) (-3.46) 
  [0.00] [0.43] [0.00] 
GDP -7.96318 2.64978 -7.37127 
  (-6.07) (0.68) (-3.40) 
  [0.00] [0.50] [0.00] 
Inflation -0.00296 0.59291 -0.01335 
  (-0.13) (0.83) (-0.53) 
  [0.90] [0.41] [0.60] 
Trade 27.77115 -61.80561 33.89200 
  (11.270 (-2.66) (14.65) 
  [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Accountability 7.88461 25.21017 8.31786 
  (3.66) (1.67) (3.94) 
  [0.00] [0.11] [0.00] 
Log (Size) 3.76442 2.50366 3.68596 
  (30.98) (6.58) (17.52) 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 R square 0.36 0.74 0.33 
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It is found that corruption index is negatively correlated with the zero-return measure 
at the one percent significance level for the all-country and emerging country groups. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant for the developed economies.  
Transparency International ranks the economies on the basis of various characteristics 
and this index tends to capture the level of corruption. The countries are ranked on a scale of 
0 to 10; higher points are awarded for lower corruption. On average there is an inverse 
relationship between corruption and the zero-return measure. Additionally, Skaife et al. 
(2006) argues that when markets do not have enough information about share prices, then the 
marginal investor will not trade and this results in zero-return days.  
Further, there is evidence that in emerging economy stock markets there is insufficient 
information provided for accurate share valuation due to higher levels of corruption and poor 
disclosure practices. This finding is consistent with Morck et al. (2000), the classical 
synchronicity and R-square measure results. All three synchronicity measures show that 
corruption is negatively correlated with stock market synchronicity and higher synchronicity 
is associated with higher countrywide corruption rates. 
GDP per capita is negatively correlated with the zero-return measure for the all-
country and emerging country groups at the one percent significance level, but the impact is 
insignificant for the developed country group due to the small sample size. However, when 
the developed country group merge with the emerging country group (the all country group), 
this effect disappear. The finding is consistent with the R-square measure in chapter five and 
Morck et al. (2000), who argue that poor GDP per capita economies can not provide proper 
protection for their shareholders and essentially, countrywide political instability causes 
higher stock market synchronisation. Further, Skaife et al. (2006) argue that the zero-return 
measure is a better model of stock market synchronicity. They argue that poor GDP per capita 
economies produce more zero-return days in a year than do developed economies, which is 
consistent with this analysis and with Morck et al. (2000). However, among the emerging 
economies China exhibits the lowest proportion of zero-return measure for the sample period, 
which is surprising and inconsistent with the analyses in chapters four and five for the 
classical measure and the R-square measure. 
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Trade openness is positively correlated with the zero-return measure at the one percent 
significance level for the all-country and emerging country groups. The trade openness 
measure ranges from zero to one with most open countries having a value of zero (as a 
country becomes more open, the measure shifts toward to zero). However, some of the 
entrepôt18 countries could have a positive trade openness measure due to their higher trading 
volume. In addition, few emerging countries rank highly on the trade openness measure due 
to the large volumes of imports (examples include Cyprus, Thailand and Hungary) as a 
percentage of GDP, which might cause the trade openness measure to be positively correlated 
with the zero-return measure. 
Accountability is positively correlated with the zero-return measure at the one percent 
significance level for the all-country and emerging country groups. There is evidence that 
some emerging economies exhibit very low zero-return measures during the study period (e.g. 
China, Greece and Taiwan), even though these countries rank lower in terms of the corporate 
governance index. Perhaps these newly booming, emerging economies result in the zero-
return measure being positively correlated with the voice and accountability indicator. 
Country geographical size is positively correlated with the zero-return measure at the 
one percent significance level for the-all country, developed country and emerging country 
groups − which is again an unexpected result. However, there is evidence that a number of the 
large countries in the analysis exhibit higher zero-return measures during the sample period 
(examples include Russia, India and Brazil). In contrast, a number of small emerging 
countries exhibit very low zero-return measures (e.g. Taiwan and Bangladesh) during the 
study period. This might cause the impact of geographical size to be positively correlated with 
the zero-return-measures. This finding is consistent with the R-square measure but 
inconsistent with the classical synchronicity measure and with Morck et al. (2000). 
6.4.3   Legal origin effects 
Table 6.7 illustrates panel data analysis results for the common law and civil law country 
groups. The study does not include the post-communist country group due to the small sample 
size. 
                                                 
18
 An entrepôt  is a trading post where merchandise can be imported and exported without paying import duties. 
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 Table 6.7  Panel data analysis between the legal origin groups: Zero-return measure 
 
The study compares the panel data analysis between the common law and civil law country groups The post-
communist countries are not analysed separately due to the small sample size. The panel of this table contains 
estimates of: 
 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCZRET εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  
where iZRET  is the zero-return measure of stock synchronicity ands α is a constant. Control (RC) is regulatory 
control index, Corruption (CP) is the corruption index produced by Transparency International, GDP is gross 
domestic product per capita / 10,000, Inflation (IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the trade 
openness measure, Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size (SIZE) is the natural log 
of the geographical size of a country. Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first, in 
parenthesis, is the t statistic using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value for 
the statistic. 
 
   Emerging common law countries Emerging civil law countries 
Control -0.48759 -7.71994 
  (-0.09) (-3.25) 
  [0.93] [0.00] 
Corruption -0.73735 -0.56613 
  (-0.55) (-1.00) 
  [0.58] [0.32] 
GDP -3.68447 -11.17116 
  (-1.20) (-12.29) 
  [0.24] [0.00] 
Inflation 0.03466 -0.22523 
  (1.23) (-3.03) 
  [0.22] [0.00] 
Trade 4.96750 40.98045 
  (0.77) (19.10) 
  [0.44] [0.00] 
Accountability 4.55112 1.47108 
  (2.89) (1.34) 
  [0.01] [0.19] 
Log (Size) 0.86952 6.56606 
  (1.03) (9.20) 
  [0.31] [0.00] 
R-square 0.250 0.660 
 
 
Regulatory control, inflation and GDP are negatively correlated with the zero-return 
measure at the one percent significance level, and the trade openness measure is positively 
correlated at the one percent significance level for the civil law country group. In contrast, the 
common law country group exhibits negative correlation between both corruption index and 
regulatory control with synchronicity but the effect is not statistically significant.  
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The civil law country group’s zero-return measure is associated with regulatory 
control, GDP per capita and inflation, whereas these effects are insignificant for the common 
law county group. It is also evident that corporate governance mechanisms are more effective 
in the civil law county group than in the common law country group. The R-square value for 
the civil law country group (0.66) is higher than for the common law country group (0.25), 
suggesting that the model better explains variation in civil law country synchronicity. In 
general, the results are consistent with the previous discussion detailed in chapters four and 
five. 
 
6.5   Discussion 
Emerging economies exhibit greater levels of zero-return measures than the developed 
economies. On average emerging economies exhibit 45.7 percent zero-return whereas 
developed economies exhibit 28.8 percent (see table 3.11). South American countries exhibit 
the greatest zero-return measure during the study period (67.8 percent) and the lowest zero-
return measure is exhibited by Central Asian countries. However, this is inconsistent with the 
classical synchronicity measure and R-square synchronicity measure (chapters four and five), 
where it is found that stock synchronicity is the highest for Central Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, all three synchronicity measures suggest that synchronicity is higher for 
emerging economies than for developed economies. 
It is found that regulatory control is negatively correlated with the zero-return measure 
and this effect is more significant in the civil law country group than the common law country 
group (table 6.7). In addition, voice and accountability is positively correlated with the zero-
return measure. This result is unexpected, as the previous analysis shows that voice and 
accountability is negatively correlated with the classical synchronicity and R-square 
measures. There is also evidence that some emerging countries exhibit low zero-return 
measures (e.g. China), even though these countries rank lower in terms of corporate 
governance indicators such as voice and accountability.  
GDP per capita is negatively correlated with the zero-return measure at the one 
percent significance level for the all-country and the emerging country groups. This is an 
expected result, as one of the hypotheses of this study is to determine whether high GDP per 
    
 
124 
capita economies exhibit lower levels of stock synchronisation. The finding is consistent with 
Morck et al. (2000), who argue that poor GDP per capita economies exhibit higher stock 
synchronicity. They suggest that poor GDP per capita economies can not provide proper 
protection of investor rights, so that countrywide share price swings can result in higher stock 
synchronicity. The finding is also consistent with the R-square measure in chapter five, 
Durnev et al. (2004a) and Chan and Hameed (2006). 
The study finds that corruption is negatively correlated with the zero-return measure, a 
finding that is consistent with the classical synchronicity measure and Morck et al. (2000). 
Further, Shleifer (1994) argues that politicians in emerging economies can be very influential. 
A politician can shut down a business or even refuse to start a business using a variety of 
tactics. This interference could result in emerging financial markets being more synchronous 
as the share markets are more generally subject to political whims.                                                                          
 
6.6   Conclusion 
There is evidence that the zero-return measure is higher in emerging economies than in 
developed economies. Yet the lowest zero-return measures are found for China and the USA 
S&P 500 firms. In contrast, the highest zero-return measure is calculated for Ecuador. In 
addition, corruption is found to be negatively correlated with the zero-return measure at the 
one percent significance level. This finding is consistent with both Morck et al. (2000) and the 
classical synchronicity measure. Additionally, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with 
the zero-return measure at the one percent significance level.  
Finally, corporate governance mechanisms are more pronounced for the civil law 
country group relative to the common law country group. It is found also that GDP per capita 
and inflation are negatively associated with the civil law country group at the one percent 
significance level, but this impact is insignificant for the common law country group. 
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6.7   Appendices 
 
A  6.1  Descriptive statistics for the zero-return measure sub-periods: Geographical segments 
 
Panel A 
South Asia 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Bangladesh  29 22.4 23.4 20.5 25.3 
India  35.8 47.4 52.4 56.7 57.2 
Pakistan  53 65.3 55.8 48.2 49.6 
Sri-Lanka 61.5 59.7 65.7 54.1 44.5 
Average 44.8 48.7 49.3 44.9 44.2 
 
 
Panel B 
Africa 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Egypt  20.7 21.7 29.1 32.7 26.5 
Kenya  40.1 45.7 51.5 50.2 42.4 
South Africa 32.7 40.7 62.6 73.8 71 
Zimbabwe  26.9 37.7 51.7 47.2 55.6 
Average 30.1 36.5 48.7 51 48.9 
 
 
Panel C 
South America 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Ecuador  62.1 73.7 84.9 85 87.4 
Argentina  45.2 54.9 65.5 66 61.5 
Brazil  56.8 61.3 63 69 65.1 
Chile 38.3 47.3 51.5 54 49.1 
Columbia  71.5 76.7 82.9 83.2 78.9 
Peru  57.5 69.5 74.7 78.7 77.4 
Venezuela  25.8 40.4 65.4 80.8 79.7 
Mexico  53.5 63.3 70.2 75.2 74.1 
Average 51.3 60.9 69.8 74 71.7 
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Panel D 
 Europe 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Hungary  31 40.1 46.5 60.6 66.2 
Czech Republic 21.4 40.4 65.2 81.5 82.8 
Poland  13.6 13.7 22.6 38.8 37.7 
Portugal  32.4 31.1 31.9 38.8 36.7 
Greece  8.4 11.4 11 13.3 14.5 
Russia  49.7 73 67 67.4 64.8 
Spain  17.1 18.6 25.5 24.2 21.1 
Average 24.8 32.6 38.5 46.4 46.3 
 
Panel E 
Asia/Pacific 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
China  4.8 5.6 7.7 10.4 13.3 
Hong Kong  23.1 30.5 37.2 46 43.7 
Indonesia  40.7 48.9 53.1 58.2 57.5 
Korea  19.9 21.6 20.2 26.9 31.6 
Malaysia  12.4 22.7 30.2 33.2 35 
Philippines  39.9 48.7 59.3 69.8 65.5 
Singapore  20.3 22.2 35.7 41.3 42.4 
Taiwan  10.6 11.1 15.2 20.8 24.2 
Thailand  43.7 56 63.3 59.5 57.9 
Average 23.9 29.7 35.8 40.7 41.2 
 
Panel F 
Central Asia 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Cyprus  35.5 18.2 5.7 26.1 37.1 
Turkey  15.5 18.9 29.5 36.5 31.3 
Average 25.5 18.6 17.6 31.3 34.2 
 
Panel G 
Developed nations 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Australia  43.2 46.7 47.2 51.9 49.3 
France  18.8 19.6 21.1 25.7 21.7 
Germany  30.1 28.9 28.7 36.8 40 
Japan  10.5 11.3 12.6 15.7 16.8 
New Zealand  25.7 24 23.2 28.8 26.6 
UK  37.7 34.2 34.7 38.8 36.5 
USA - NYSE 30.9 27 25.8 24.6 30.4 
Average 28.1 27.4 27.6 31.8 31.6 
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Panel H 
Developed nations including S&P-500 – USA 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Australia  43.2 46.7 47.2 51.9 49.3 
France  18.8 19.6 21.1 25.7 21.7 
Germany  30.1 28.9 28.7 36.8 40 
Japan  10.5 11.3 12.6 15.7 16.8 
New Zealand  25.7 24 23.2 28.8 26.6 
UK  37.7 34.2 34.7 38.8 36.5 
USA S&P 500 3.3 1.5 1 0.6 0.6 
Average 24.2 23.7 24.1 28.3 27.4 
 
 
 
 
 
A  6.2  Descriptive statistics for the zero-return measure sub-periods: Legal segments 
 
 
Panel A 
Common law emerging country group 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Bangladesh 29.0 22.4 23.4 20.5 25.3 
Cyprus 35.5 18.2 5.7 26.1 37.1 
Egypt 20.7 21.7 29.1 32.7 26.5 
Hong Kong 23.1 30.5 37.2 46.0 43.7 
India 35.8 47.4 52.4 56.7 57.2 
Kenya 40.1 45.7 51.5 50.2 42.4 
Malaysia 12.4 22.7 30.2 33.2 35.0 
Pakistan 53.0 65.3 55.8 48.2 49.6 
Singapore 20.3 22.2 35.7 41.3 42.4 
South Africa 32.7 40.7 62.6 73.8 71.0 
Sri-Lanka 61.5 59.7 65.7 54.1 44.5 
Zimbabwe 26.9 37.7 51.7 47.2 55.6 
 Average 32.6 36.2 41.8 44.2 44.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
128 
Panel B 
Civil law emerging countries group 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
Argentina 45.2 54.9 65.5 66.0 61.5 
Brazil 56.8 61.3 63.0 69.0 65.1 
Chile 38.3 47.3 51.5 54.0 49.1 
Columbia 71.5 76.7 82.9 83.2 78.9 
Czech Rep 21.4 40.4 65.2 81.5 82.8 
Ecuador 62.1 73.7 84.9 85.0 87.4 
Greece 8.4 11.4 11.0 13.3 14.5 
Hungary 31.0 40.1 46.5 60.6 66.2 
Indonesia 40.7 48.9 53.1 58.2 57.5 
Mexico 53.5 63.3 70.2 75.2 74.1 
Peru 57.5 69.5 74.7 78.7 77.4 
Philippines 39.9 48.7 59.3 69.8 65.5 
Portugal 32.4 31.1 31.9 38.8 36.7 
Korea 19.9 21.6 20.2 26.9 31.6 
Spain 17.1 18.6 25.5 24.2 21.1 
Taiwan 10.6 11.1 15.2 20.8 24.2 
Thailand 43.7 56.0 63.3 59.5 57.9 
Turkey 15.5 18.9 29.5 36.5 31.3 
Venezuela 25.8 40.4 65.4 80.8 79.7 
 Average 36.4 43.9 51.5 56.9 55.9 
 
Panel C 
Post-communist country group 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
China 4.8 5.6 7.7 10.4 13.3 
Poland 13.6 13.7 22.6 38.8 37.7 
Russia 49.7 73.0 67.0 67.4 64.8 
 Average 22.7 30.8 32.4 38.9 38.6 
 
 
 
 
A  6.3  Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for the zero-return measure: Legal origin groups 
Sample include common law countries, civil law countries and the post-communist countries 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Probability 
3.584 2 0.167 
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CHAPTER 7 Comparison of synchronicity measures 
 
 
7.1   Introduction 
Analysis in the previous three chapters found that synchronicity is higher in emerging markets 
than in developed economies. In addition, it is found that the classical synchronicity measure 
and the R-square measure capture a similar image of stock markets, whereas the zero-return 
measure appears to capture other aspects of stock market behaviour. This chapter analyses the 
three measures of stock synchronicity to explore further the synchronicities and differences 
that exist between these models. 
 
7.2   Comparison 
7.2.1   Panel data comparison 
Table 7.1 replicates the main features of the panel data analysis for the all-countries, 
developed countries and emerging economies groups using the classical synchronicity 
measure, the R-square measure and the zero-return measure detailed in the previous three 
chapters. 
One common feature of the panel data analysis is the positive correlation between 
regulatory control and stock market synchronicity using all three synchronicity measures. 
Regulatory control is found to be an important variable for the R-square and classical 
measures, though the impact is not statistically significant for the zero-return measure. 
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Table  7.1  Summary panel data analysis results 
The results reported in this table are based on the following model: 
iiiiiiiii TRSIZEGDPCPINVCRCMeasureSynchStock εβββββββα ++++++++= 7654321 )log(  
where iMeasureSynchStock , the dependent variable, is the stock synchronicity measure and α is a constant. Control (RC) is regulatory control 
index, Corruption (CP) is the corruption index produced by Transparency International, GDP is gross domestic product per capita / 10,000, Inflation 
(IN) is the inflation rate of a country, Trade (TR) is the trade openness measure, Accountability (VC) is the voice and accountability index and Size 
(SIZE) is the natural log of the geographical size of a country. Two values are reported below the estimated coefficient. The first, in parenthesis, is the t 
statistic using white adjusted standard errors and the second, in brackets, is the P value for the statistic. 
 
 Classical synchronicity measure R-square measure Zero-return measure 
Variables All  Developed  Emerging  All  Developed  Emerging  All  Developed  Emerging  
Control 0.01603 0.00951 0.00972 0.04639 0.05171 0.03728 0.77944 18.09835 1.67845 
  (3.83) (1.83) (1.98) (2.98) (1.30) (2.63) (0.35) (2.28) (0.69) 
  [0.00] [0.08] [0.05] [0.00] [0.21] [0.01] [0.73] [0.03] [0.49] 
Corruption -0.00789 0.00953 -0.00317 0.00407 -0.01595 0.01030 -2.75819 -2.11969 -4.84351 
  (-5.48) (31.25) (-1.21) (1.46) (-0.91) (7.58) (-5.13) (-0.81) (-3.46) 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.23] [0.15] [0.37] [0.00] [0.00] [0.43] [0.00] 
GDP  0.00325 0.01262 0.01198 -0.03399 -0.05327 -0.01677 -7.96318 2.64978 -7.37127 
  (1.62) (1.04) (1.77) (-8.05) (-3.15) (-1.86) (-6.07) (0.68) (-3.40) 
  [0.11] [0.31] [0.08] [0.00] [0.01] [0.07] [0.00] [0.50] [0.00] 
Inflation 0.00018 -0.00273 0.00020 0.00064 0.00912 0.00065 -0.00296 0.59291 -0.01335 
  (1.15) (-0.81) (1.18) (6.71) (0.78) (7.62) (-0.13) (0.83) (-0.53) 
  [0.25] [0.42] [0.24] [0.00] [0.44] [0.00] [0.90] [0.41] [0.60] 
Trade -0.01257 0.04789 -0.01726 -0.01346 0.17039 -0.00861 27.77115 -61.80561 33.89200 
  (-1.18) (0.56) (-1.32) (-0.58) (2.13) (-0.33) (11.27) (-2.66) (14.65) 
  [0.24] [0.58] [0.19] [0.57] [0.04] [0.74] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Accountability -0.02376 -0.12679 -0.02129 -0.03340 -0.07945 -0.03039 7.88461 25.21017 8.31786 
  (-6.39) (-3.09) (-6.45) (-3.28) (-1.07) (-2.91) (3.66) (1.67) (3.94) 
  [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.30] [0.00] [0.00] [0.11] [0.00] 
Log  (Size) -0.00381 -0.00355 -0.00044 0.00689 -0.00755 0.01455 3.76442 2.50366 3.68596 
  (-3.45) (-1.10) (-0.35) (2.45) (-1.26) (4.29) (30.98) (6.58) (17.52) 
  [0.00] [0.28] [0.73] [0.02] [0.22] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
R-square 0.269 0.614 0.128 0.240 0.460 0.210 0.360 0.740 0.330 
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Except for the developed country group, corruption is negatively correlated with the 
classical synchronicity measure and the zero-return measure but this effect is mostly positive 
for the R-square measure. There is also evidence that trade openness and log geographical 
size have a greater role for the zero-return measure than the classical synchronicity or the R-
square measure. 
In addition, inflation is positively correlated with the R-square measure for the all-
country and emerging country groups at the one percent significance level. However, the 
effect is not statistically significant for other synchronicity measures such as the classical 
measure and the zero-return measure, though mostly it is positively correlated with the 
classical measure. Surprisingly, inflation is negatively correlated with the zero-return measure 
except for the developed country group, although the effect is not statistically significant. 
These results suggest a negative correlation between zero-return measures with the two other 
measures of synchronicity. 
It is often argued by academic researchers that high inflation causes high levels of 
stock synchronicity. For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that Turkey and Malaysia exhibit 
higher stock synchronicity and both countries also exhibit high inflation during their study 
period. It is also found that inflation is positively correlated with the classical synchronicity 
and R-square measures. The study results from the zero-return measure conflict with the 
classical measure, the R-square measure and the results of Morck et al. (2000). 
 Further, emerging countries that exhibit greater stock synchronicity using the 
classical measure and the R-square measure surprisingly exhibit a low zero-return measure 
during the observation period. For example, China and Malaysia exhibit a low zero-return 
measure (China 11.5 percent and Malaysia 26.5 percent) relative to the mean of 42.9 percent, 
even though both exhibit high stock synchronicity. In contrast, Australia exhibits lower stock 
synchronicity using the classical measure (58 percent) and the R-square measure (0.041) but 
exhibits a greater zero-return measure than the other developed economies sampled. These 
results suggest that the zero-return measure captures somewhat different aspect of stock 
market behaviour rather than stock synchronicity. 
Accountability is negatively correlated with the classical measure and the R-square 
measure at the one percent significance level, with the exception of the R-square measure for 
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the developed country group. However, the zero-return measure is positively correlated with 
accountability for all three country groups (the all-country, the developed country and the 
emerging country groups). This result conflicts with the classical measure and the R-square 
measure, and is also inconsistent with the findings of Morck et al. (2000). 
Geographical size exhibits a negative correlation with the classical synchronicity 
measure, although it is statistically significant only for the all-country group. This is an 
expected result as it is assumed that larger capital markets are less synchronous than small 
capital markets due to the financial market size. However, geographical size shows somewhat 
mixed correlation with the R-square synchronicity measure.  In contrast, geographical size is 
positively correlated the zero-return measure at the one percent significance level for all 
groups. It is found that this result is mainly driven by the large countries that exhibit high R-
square measures (such as China) and high zero-return measures (such as Russia and Mexico) 
during the observation period. In addition, GDP per capita is positively correlated with the 
classical synchronicity measure, though this effect is mainly negative for the R-square 
measure and the zero-return measure at the 10 percent significance level, except for the 
developed country group.  
The overall result suggests that the classical measure and the R-square measure 
capture somewhat similar images of stock markets synchronicity, whereas the zero-return 
model measures somewhat different aspect of stock market behaviour. It is found that Skaife 
et al. (2006) analyse the zero-return measure for six sample developed countries including 
Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA.  If, as seems possible, the zero-
return measure does capture different aspects of stock markets, then it has implications for the 
developed financial markets. However, there is some doubt about the implementation of the 
zero–return measure on emerging economies like China and Malaysia, where the stocks are 
heavily traded. 
7.2.2   Correlation between synchronicity measures 
Table 7.2 exhibits the correlation between the classical measure, the R-square measure and 
the zero-return measure over the study period from January 1996 to December 2005. Further, 
the data is divided into three sub-sets, the all-country group (developed and emerging 
countries), the emerging country group and the developed country group. 
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Table  7.2  Correlation between synchronicity measures 
The classical synchronicity measure, the R-square measure and the zero-return measure 
The value in parentheses is the P value for the correlation-coefficient. Values in bold including star ‘*’ indicate 
that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Values in bold without star indicate 
significance at the 10 percent level. The data span the period from January 1996 to December 2005. The sample 
includes 41 countries for the all-country group, 34 emerging countries for the emerging country group and seven 
developed countries for the developed country group. 
 
All countries Classical synchronicity measure R-square measure 
R-square measure 0.508*   
  (0.00)   
Zero-return measure -0.078 -0.272 
 
(0.63) (0.09) 
Emerging countries Classical synchronicity measure R-square measure 
R-square measure 0.500*   
  (0.00)   
Zero-return measure -0.269 -0.429* 
 
(0.12) (0.01) 
Developed countries Classical synchronicity measure R-square measure 
R-square measure -0.153   
  (0.74)   
Zero-return measure -0.746 0.185 
 
(0.05) (0.69) 
 
 
Table 7.2 illustrates that the classical measure is positively correlated with the R-
square measure at the one percent significance level for the all country group. In addition, 
both the classical measure and the R-square measure are negatively correlated with the zero-
return measure, though the effect is only statistically significant for the R-square measure 
with the zero-return measure correlation-coefficient at the 10 percent significance level for the 
all-country and the emerging country groups. 
Further, correlation-coefficients for the emerging country synchronicity show that the 
classical synchronicity measure is positively correlated with the R-square measure and 
negatively correlated with the zero-return measure, which is consistent with the cross-
sectional analysis.  
The developed country group, on the other hand, shows somewhat mixed correlation 
between the synchronicity measures. For example, the R-square measure shows positive 
correlation with the zero-return measure, although the effect is not statistically significant. 
This may result from the small sample size that is used for the developed economies.  
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Spearman rank correlation coefficients are also reported in table 7.3 with little change 
in the results.  
 
Table  7.3  Spearman rank correlation-coefficient for synchronicity measures: Full period 
 
Values in bold including star ‘*’ indicate that the correlation-coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level and values in bold without star indicate significance at the 10 percent level. The sample includes 41 
countries for the all-country group, 34 emerging countries for the emerging country group and five developed 
countries for the developed country group. The data span the period from January 1996 to December 2005. 
 
 
All countries Classical measure R-square measure 
R-square measure 0.370*   
  (0.02)   
Zero-return measure -0.148 -0.145 
 
(0.36) (0.37) 
Emerging countries Classical measure R-square measure 
R-square measure 0.353*   
  (0.04)   
Zero-return measure -0.307 -0.327 
 
(0.08) (0.06) 
Developed countries Classical measure R-square measure 
R-square measure -0.174   
  (0.71)   
Zero-return measure -0.595 0.109 
 
(0.16) (0.82) 
 
There is evidence of positive correlation between the classical measure and the R-
square measure at the five percent significance level for the all-country and emerging country 
groups, whereas the zero-return measure is negatively correlated with the R-square measure 
and the classical measure at the 10 percent significance level for the emerging country group. 
Further, the developed country group shows some negative correlation between the classical 
measure and the R-square measure but the effect is not statistically significant. This suggests 
that a strong correlation exists between the classical measure and the R-square measure, 
whereas the zero-return measure is capturing a picture different from stock market co-
movement. 
In addition, to check whether the same effect also appears in synchronicity measures 
for sub-periods, the full period data is further divided into five sub-periods. The sub-periods 
are 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. Table 7.4 exhibits the correlation-
coefficient of synchronicity measures for the above sub-periods. It is found that the R-square 
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measure is positively correlated with the classical measure in each of the sub-periods in both 
the all-country and the emerging country groups, although the effect is only statistically 
significant for 2000-01 and 2002-03 at the five percent level; for 2004-05 at the 10 percent 
significance level for the all-country group; and for 1996-97 and 2000-01 at the five percent 
level and 2002-03 at the 10 percent level for the emerging country group.  
The zero-return measure is negatively correlated with the classical measure and the R-
square measure for every sub-period for the all-country and emerging country groups, with 
the exception of the classical measure in 1996-97 and the zero-return measure in 2004-05.  
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Table  7.4  Correlation-coefficient of synchronicity measures: Sub-period analysis 
(The classical measure, the R-square measure and the zero-return measure) 
 
Here, CS is the classical synchronicity measure, RS is the R-square synchronicity measure and the ZS is the zero-return measure. The value in 
parenthesis is the P value for the correlation-coefficient. Values in bold including star ‘*’ indicate statistically significance at the five percent level and 
values in bold without star indicate significance at the 10 percent level. The sample includes 41 countries in the all-country group, 34 emerging 
countries in the emerging country group and five developed countries in the developed country group. The sample includes five sub-periods, which are 
1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. 
 
 
  1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
All countries CS RS CS RS CS RS CS RS CS RS 
R-square measure 0.221   0.247  0.472*   0.371*  0.290   
  (0.17)   (0.12)  (0.00)   (0.02)  (0.07)   
Zero-return measure 0.227 -0.302 -0.027 -0.229 -0.210 -0.305 -0.131 -0.313 -0.213 0.066 
 
(0.15) (0.06) (0.87) (0.15) (0.19) (0.05) (0.41) (0.05) (0.18) (0.68) 
Emerging countries 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
R-square measure 0.500*   0.171  .442*   0.302  0.203   
  (0.00) . (0.33)  (0.01)   (0.08)  (0.25)   
Zero-return measure -0.269 -0.429* -0.083 -0.335 -.389* -0.427* -0.324 -0.469* -0.394* -0.046 
 
(0.12) (0.01) (0.63) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.80) 
Developed countries 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
R-square measure -0.022   -0.085  0.119   0.087  -0.203   
  (0.96)   (0.86)  (0.80)   (0.85)  (0.66)   
Zero-return measure -0.677 -0.01 -0.771* -0.028 -0.631 -0.132 -0.780* -0.034 -0.712 -0.376 
 
(0.10) (0.98) (0.04) (0.95) (0.13) (0.78) (0.04) (0.94) (0.07) (0.41) 
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However, the correlation-coefficient for the developed economies shows some 
variation between synchronicity measures, possibly due to the small sample size. Correlation-
coefficients for the developed economies are mixed; however, this effect disappears when the 
developed economies and the emerging economies are merged into a single group (the all-
country group).  
In addition, the study also tests the Spearman rank correlation-coefficients for 
robustness test. It is found that Spearman rank correlation-coefficients also capture the same 
trend between the synchronicity measures for the observed sub-period. There is evidence that 
the R-square measure is positively correlated with the classical measure for each of the sub-
periods except for the developed country group in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2004-05, and 
negatively correlated with the zero-return measure for every sub-period except for the all-
country group in 2004-05 and the developed country group in 1998-99 and 2002-03 (see table 
7.5), although none of these correlations is statistically significant. It seems that the small 
sample size of the developed country group erratically uncorrelated with the R-square 
measure and the classical measure. In addition, the classical measure shows negative 
correlation with the zero-return measure for all sub-periods, except in 1996-97 for the all-
country group and the emerging country group. 
The correlation-coefficient result for the sub-periods is consistent with the full period 
analysis. There is evidence of a positive correlation between the classical measure and the R-
square measure for the full period and sub-periods, though this effect is mostly negative for 
the zero-return measure. These correlation-coefficient analyses are also consistent with the 
cross-sectional analyses that are discussed in table 7.1 in this chapter. 
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Table  7.5  Spearman rank correlation-coefficient for synchronicity measures: Sub-periods 
 
Where CS is the classical synchronicity measure, RS is the R-square synchronicity measure and the ZS is the zero-return measure. The value in 
parenthesis is the P value for the correlation-coefficient. Values in bold including star ‘*’ indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level and 
values in bold without star indicate significance at the 10 percent level. The sample includes 41 countries in the all-country group, 34 emerging 
countries in the emerging country group and five developed countries in the developed country group. The sample includes five sub-periods, which are 
1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03 and 2004-05. 
 
 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
All countries CS RS CS RS CS RS CS RS CS RS 
R-square measure 0.153  0.069  0.319*  0.252  0.266  
 (0.34)  (0.67)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.09)  
Zero-return measure 0.206 -0.19 -0.028 -0.155 -0.156 -0.151 -0.112 -0.168 -0.245 0.076 
 
(0.20) (0.23) (0.86) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.48) (0.29) (0.12) (0.64) 
Emerging countries 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
R-square measure 0.062  0.171  0.298  0.142  0.203  
 (0.73)  (0.33)  (0.09)  (0.42)  (0.25)  
Zero-return measure 0.299 -0.321 -0.083 -0.335* -0.343* -0.257 -0.299 -0.350* -0.394* -0.046 
 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.64) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) (0.80) 
Developed countries 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 
R-square measure -0.055  -0.138  0.094  0.009  -0.040  
 (0.91)  (0.77)  (0.84)  (0.98)  (0.93)  
Zero-return measure -0.487 -0.018 -0.546 0.036 -0.593 -0.127 -0.577 0.200 -0.739 -0.394 
 
(0.27) (0.97) (0.21) (0.94) (0.16) (0.79) (0.18) (0.67) (0.06) (0.38) 
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7.3   Discussion 
The panel data analysis shows that there is some consistency between the R-square measure 
and the classical measure; whereas the zero return measure is capturing a different aspect of 
stock market behaviour. It is found that trade openness, accountability and geographical size 
have a greater impact on the zero-return measure. In addition, there is evidence that 
synchronicity values can vary across countries depending on the approach used. For example, 
China and Malaysia exhibit higher stock synchronicity using the classical measure (China 73 
percent and Malaysia 73 percent) and the R-square measure (China .241 and Malaysia .254), 
although these countries exhibit lower zero-return measures (China 11.5 percent and Malaysia 
26.5 percent) relative to the mean (42.9 percent).These results reinforce the possibility that the 
zero-return measure does capture a different aspect of stock market behaviour. Further 
analysis of this question is left to future research. 
It is found that in general the classical measure and the R-square measure are 
positively correlated, whereas the zero-return measure is negatively correlated with both these 
measures, though this effect is not statistically significant for all sub-periods. There is some 
inconsistency across the three synchronicity measures in correlation analysis over sub-period 
and full period data. For example, the zero return measure is positively correlated with the 
classical measure in 1996-97 (the all-country group) and with the R-square measure in 2004-
05 (the all-country group) using the Pearson correlation-coefficient, although this effect is not 
statistically significant. However, there is some evidence of similarities between the cross-
sectional analysis result and both the Spearman rank and Pearson correlation results. Both 
Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation find that the classical synchronicity 
measure and the R-square measure are positively correlated, whereas the zero-return measure 
is erratically uncorrelated with the classical measure and the R-square measure. 
Overall, the study finds that the R-square measure and the classical measure are 
positively correlated though there is some variation between the two measures. It is also 
found that the zero-return measure is not positively correlated with either the classical 
measure or the R-square measure. The possibility remains that the zero-return measure 
captures some aspect of broad equity market performance other than stock market 
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synchronicity and this is borne out to some extent in the panel data analysis reported in 
chapters three, four and five. 
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CHAPTER 8 Conclusion 
 
8.1   Introduction 
This thesis investigates whether stock market synchronicity is higher in emerging economies 
than in the developed economies. It is found that stock markets in emerging economies are 
more synchronous than in developed economies using the classical measure, the R-square 
measure and the zero-return measure. In addition, using the classical measure it is found that 
all of the securities in an emerging economy can move in the same direction over a given 
week (examples include Poland and Greece). This phenomenon is not observed in the limited 
developed market sample. 
Panel data analysis shows that stock synchronicity increases with inflation (except for 
the developed economies group) and decreases with higher degrees of government 
accountability using the classical measure and the R-square measure. Regulatory control is 
found to be positively correlated with all three of the synchronicity measures (the classical 
measure, the R-square measure and the zero-return measure).  
It is found that in emerging countries such as China and Malaysia, stock synchronicity 
is higher in terms of the classical measure and the R-square measure; but these countries also 
exhibit a low level of zero-return measure during the study period. It seems that the zero-
return measure may provide a good measure of synchronicity for developed economies but 
not for emerging economies. It also appears that the zero-return measure captures aspects of 
stock market behaviour other than those captured by the classical and R-square measures of 
stock synchronicity.  
The Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation-coefficient are estimated to 
determine the relation that exists between these measures. It is found that the classical 
measure is positively correlated with the R-square measure, although both measures are 
generally negatively correlated with the zero-return measure using both the Pearson 
correlation and Spearman rank correlation-coefficient. 
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8.2   Summary of the thesis 
The key focus of this thesis is the analysis of the synchronous behaviour of share price 
changes in emerging stock markets with comparisons against selected developed financial 
markets. It is found that stock prices in developed economies are less synchronous than stock 
prices in emerging financial markets.  
Chapter two introduces the concept of stock return synchronicity and discusses the 
literature. Morck et al. (2000) are among the first to introduce the topic of stock market 
synchronisation and argue that stock markets in economies with high per capita GDP move in 
a relatively unsynchronised manner over time, in contrast to stock prices in low per capita 
GDP economies. Additionally, they suggest that stock synchronicity is associated with 
macroeconomic indicators including rule of law, inflation, corruption and geographical size. 
They propose two measures of stock synchronicity to capture stock market synchronisation − 
the classical synchronicity measure and the R-square measure). Skaife et al. (2006) propose a 
further measure of stock synchronicity based on the proportion of zero-return days and argue 
that the zero-return measure is a superior measure of stock market co-movement.  
Research methodology and data are described in chapter three. There are 34 emerging 
economies and seven developed markets in the sample. Weekly stock return data is collected 
from DataStream and additional data are collected as required from the Yahoo finance 
website where gaps exist in DataStream. The final dataset includes approximately 20.8 
million firm week observations for 40,014 firms across the world. Data used in cross-
sectional analysis is also discussed in this chapter; they include two corporate governance 
indicators (regulatory control and voice and accountability) as well as other index data 
including inflation, a corruption index, GDP per capita, a measure of trade openness and 
geographical size of a country. 
The first of the three stock synchronicity measures is analysed in chapter four. This 
chapter uses the classical synchronicity measure to capture stock market synchronicity for the 
sample of 41 countries. There is evidence that over the 10-year period the synchronicity 
measure is stationary. Indeed, there is little evidence of autocorrelation in the data over the 
study period. It is evident that stock markets in emerging economies are more synchronous 
than in developed economies over the sample period. Additionally, there is evidence of a 
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statistically significant negative correlation between stock synchronicity and both government 
accountability and corruption. There is also a positive correlation found between inflation and 
stock synchronicity.  
Analysis of the second measure of stock synchronicity (the R-square measure) is 
presented in chapter five. The R-square measure of stock synchronicity averages 0.091 for the 
emerging markets and 0.045 for the developed economies. China, Malaysia and Turkey 
exhibit the highest R-square values among the emerging economies during the study period. 
In contrast, Japan exhibits the lowest R-square value among the developed economies. In 
panel data analysis, there is evidence of a statistically significant positive correlation between 
the R-square measure and both corruption and inflation. There is also a negative correlation 
evident between the R-square with government accountability and GDP per capita. Finally, 
R-square measures for the civil law countries are generally higher than for the common law 
countries, suggesting that corporate governance mechanisms are more effective in civil law 
countries. 
Chapter six provides analysis and discussion of the third measure of stock 
synchronicity, the zero-return measure, suggested by Skaife et al. (2006). It is found that the 
zero-return measure for emerging economies is higher than for developed economies. 
Unexpectedly, China and the S&P 500 group of companies exhibit the lowest values for the 
zero-return measure during this period. It is also found that both GDP per capita and 
corruption are negatively correlated with the zero-return measure at the one percent 
significance level, and both trade openness and accountability are positively correlated with 
this measure. These results differ from those for the first two measures, particularly for GDP 
per capita and trade openness. 
A comparison of the three synchronicity measure is presented in chapter seven. It is 
found that the classical synchronicity measure and the R-square measure are positively 
correlated. These measures appear to capture similar characteristics of the markets in the 
study. In contrast, the zero-return measure shows either insignificant or negative correlation 
with the classical measure and the R-square measure for most sub-periods and the full period. 
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8.3   Key contributions of the thesis 
The study uses three measures of stock synchronicity and finds that stock synchronicity is 
higher is emerging economies than in developed markets. To the authors knowledge there is 
no comparison of the three measures of synchronicity provided in the literature to date. It is 
also found that synchronicity is statistically significantly associated with a range of country-
level variables. 
Some of the major findings presented in this thesis include: 
8.3.1   Time series analysis 
A. Consistent with the literature review, while there have been few time series analyses, 
this study provides a comprehensive analysis of three synchronicity measures, 
particularly with respect to emerging markets.  
B. It is found that stock markets in the emerging countries are more synchronous than in 
the developed economies using the classical measure, the R-square measure and the 
zero-return measure. In addition, high levels of stock synchronicity are evident for 
China, Turkey and Malaysia and a low level of stock synchronicity is evident for 
Germany and Australia using the classical measure and the R-square measure. 
C.  Common law origin countries exhibit lower levels of stock synchronicity than civil 
law origin countries and post-communist countries. Further, post-communist stock 
markets tend to be more synchronous on average (examples include China and 
Poland) using the classical measure and the R-square measure. In contrast, the zero 
return measure shows post-communist countries to exhibit a lower proportion of zero-
return than civil law countries and common law countries. 
D. Time series stock return data is stationary over the study period. 
8.3.2   Panel data analysis 
A. The study extends the work of Morck et al. (2000) and introduces some new country 
level variables that have greater explanatory power; such as regulatory control and 
trade openness. There is evidence of statistically significant correlation between these 
explanatory variables and stock market synchronicity. 
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B.  Inflation is positively correlated with stock market synchronicity in general, 
suggesting that higher inflation levels are associated with higher stock synchronicity 
levels. 
C. The country corruption index is negatively correlated with stock synchronicity using 
the classical measure (except for the developed countries) and the zero-return 
measure, which suggests that high levels of corruption are associated with high levels 
of stock price co-movement. 
D. Country geographical size is negatively correlated with stock synchronicity using the 
classical measure. This suggests that stock markets in large economies are less 
synchronous than those in small economies.  
E. There is evidence that accountability and geographical size are positively correlated 
with the zero-return measure of stock synchronicity, which is inconsistent with the 
classical measure. 
F. GDP per capita is negatively correlated with the R-square measure and the zero return 
measure in general, suggesting that lower GDP per capita countries exhibit higher 
stock market co movement. 
8.3.3   Comparison between the synchronicity measures 
A. The classical synchronicity measure and the R-square measure are generally positively 
correlated, suggesting that both measures capture similar aspects of the stock markets. 
In contrast, the zero-return measure is negatively correlated with both the classical 
measure and the R-square measure, so that perhaps the zero-return measure captures a 
different aspect of broad equity market behaviour. 
B. While Skaife et al. (2006) use Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the 
USA stock market data for their zero-return measure analysis, this thesis expands the 
application of the synchronicity method to 41 countries. This measure appears to work 
well for developed economies but for emerging economies like China and Malaysia 
with heavily traded stocks, the zero-return measure based rankings are inconsistent 
with both the classical and R-square measures. 
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8.4   Limitations and directions for future research 
Stock market synchronicity is a new area of research within the finance literature. This study 
uses stock return data from 41 countries over the period from January 1996 to December 2005 
for analysis. Additional country data may provide a more robust analysis of stock 
synchronicity. The study uses country-level stock market data in synchronicity analysis; 
however, individual firm-level synchronicity analysis would provide a valuable extension for 
further research.  
The study uses seven explanatory variables for cross-sectional analysis. Additional 
explanatory variables − such as anti-director rights index and analyst forecast earning index − 
could be useful for cross-country synchronicity analysis. 
While the study uses all available stocks from DataStream following Morck et al. (2000), it is 
possible that some listed stocks may have been ignored. Thus, a possible extension could 
involve analysis of more extensive datasets as they become available. 
Finally, it is found that the classical measure and the R-square measure capture similar 
aspects of stock market behaviour, whereas the zero-return measure appears to capture 
different aspects of stock market movements. It is assumed that emerging stock markets 
exhibit greater zero-return measures than developed financial markets, yet important 
examples such as China and Malaysia provide inconsistent results. Further analysis of this 
question is left to future research.  
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